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PREFACE 
The defects of works of scholarship or of intellect, like those 
of works of art (which, after all, they generally are) are never 
entirely to be excused; although there is always something relevant 
and occasionally something useful to be said in explanation of them. 
In his Discourse of 1786 Sir Joshua Reynolds voiced a doubt 
which has gnawed at the artist's heart ever since; especially if he 
is so much a victim of cultural history as to be expected to show 
both the classical character of the practical chap and something of 
the romantic nature of the divine fool as well. ' ... yet perhaps the 
most perfect criticism', Reynolds said, 'requires habits of 
speculation and abstraction, not very consistent with the employment 
which ought to occupy, and the habits of mind which ought to prevail 
in a practical Artist'. 
Thus, being a professional sculptor, I write abstractly and 
speculatively under a double disadvantage: not only without formal 
training in philosophy, but also and always with the superstitious 
fear at my elbow that if what I have to say is sound then I am by 
that very fact exposed as an artistic fraud; and if indeed a 'practical 
Artist' then, necessarily, a foolish venturer on intellectual seas. 
Under the circumstances it seems to me to have been a bold and 
generous act of the Australian National University to offer me the 
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many advantages of a Research Scholarship in order to make a study of 
those aesthetic problems which generally lie more or less dangerously 
unresolved at the back of a reflective sculptor's mind. 
There are two principal linked problems. The first is quite 
general, and is readily posed by asking what sort of activity the 
activity of aesthetic appraisal is: whether it is at all like 
scientific investigation in being directed to the elucidation of 
uncommonly subtle matters of fact; whether it is, like judicial 
inquiry, devoted to the establishment of probabilities beyond 
reasonable doubt; whether it is like the grading of produce for market, 
or like the election of heroes by augury or divination. Or whether, 
perhaps, it is to some extent like only itself, with a character not 
to be fully described with the obliquity of analogy but only directly, 
as wanted persons are described in police messages. 
It is because the artist is a critic himself that this question 
is important to him; for each time he chooses to make a work or a part 
of it thus rather than otherwise, he performs a covert act of 
aesthetic app'raisal - and if he has inept or cramping theories of the 
nature of such an act he may feel constrained to do what he need not 
do, or to refrain from doing what it is fully open to him to do. 
The first five chapters of this thesis are devoted more or less 
directly to the question of just what it is that critics are doing 
when they say the things and when they make the gestures that they 
say and make; and if my account is correct or even nearly so, then 
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artists should find the burden of theory a great deal less onerous than 
it has seemed to the authors and the partisans of the uncountable 
aesthetic manifestos of modern times. This section of the work is for 
the most part unoriginal in its leading ideas, although it contains 
one or two suggestions which I have not seen or heard expressed 
elsewhere. It does, however, assemble material around a sustained 
theme in such a way as to expose me to the legitimate rewards of 
responsibility - praise or blame. 
Into the wider context of the account of aesthetic appraisal thus 
provided I have tried to set a solution to a specifically sculptural 
problem which, although it is the locus of a good deal of modern 
rhetoric, does not seem anywhere to have been adequately argued. This 
is the question whether what are sometimes called 'pictorial' 
considerations are or are not relevant to the critical appraisal of 
sculpture. I believe that the difficulty has deeper roots than is 
generally thought, and that they go well down into the philosophical 
substratum of theories of human perception. In attempting to trace 
them out I have been obliged to delve into matters which do not seem 
on the face of it to be aesthetic at all. For this reason there 
occurs, between Chapters V and VI, a perceptible break in the 
philosophical texture of the thesis, from fairly general argument 
applicable to a wide range of indubitably aesthetic subject matter to 
a much closer style of argument concerning the altogether non-aesthetic 
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matching by eye of the visible features of things: in particular, the 
hue of coloured surfaces. 
This move is vindicated, if at all, by its efficacy. If I have 
got hold of the right end of the stick two consequences follow from 
the discussion of matching. One of them is a small but possibly 
useful contribution to epistemology: the introduction of the notion of 
the imaginary picture plane between the perceiver and the perceived, 
in terms of the presently acceptable image upon which it is often our 
unreflecting habit to give accounts of the things that we see. And 
the second, presently more important consequence is that the key to 
the dispute about the proper criticism of sculpture which has rumbled 
on so inconclusively for so long is revealed as lying all the time in 
our own hands - or rather, in our own language. All that was needful 
to unlock the puzzle was recognition that if what we see is three-
dimensional, then we see something that is three-dimensional and not 
J 
any two-dimensional image of that thing. Confusion has been bred by 
our habit of giving accounts of the three-dimensional things that we 
see in an imprecise mixture of three-dimensional and of two-dimensional 
terms. We ordinarily and naturally give what I shall call 'picture 
accounts' as well as 'object accounts' - and one or two other kinds of 
account - of what we see. 
The polemicists of modern sculptural theory have been misled in 
part by the very widespread mistake that the real objects of visual 
perception must all, always, be some sort of two-dimensional 'image' or 
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'impression'; and in part they have been seduced by the non sequitur 
that whatever has intimately to do with flat planes cannot also have 
intimately to do with solid bodies. The language of visual perception, 
in which we express our perceptually acquired beliefs about the world, 
is just such an ambivalent medium; and it is in this language that we 
make our aesthetic remarks and defend our verdicts upon works of 
sculpture. 
Whether in the end I am right or wrong, or something of both about 
all this, I certainly owe thanks for encouragement and help not only 
to the A.N.U. but also to a number of individuals; especially to 
Mr Stanley Eveling who first mocked me into thinking what I was saying 
about sculpture, and to my research supervisors: to Professor John 
Passmore for obliging me (always with innnense patience and kindness) to 
argue every inch of my laborious way; to Mr Bruce Benjamin who, I hope, 
would not have been too disappointed with the outcome; and to 
Professor Peter Herbst, who endured my lectures to his undergraduate 
students on some of the themes of this thesis with an encouraging show 
of fortitude. 
D.B. 
Canberra, January 1965 
SYNOPSIS 
CHAPTERS I and II 
These chapters deal with some of the problems involved in the 
definition of sculpture, and with the so-called 'essence' and the 
ontological status of aesthetic objects in general and of sculptures 
in particular. Had there been a little less ground to cover it would 
have been convenient to place all this introductory material in a 
single chapter: as it is, the unwieldiness is somewhat reduced by 
dividing the matter roughly between the questions (Chapter I) 'How 
should we use the word "sculpture"'l' and (Chapter II) 'Are sculptures 
objects of such a nature that some kinds of criticism are necessarily 
and evidently inept or misdirected since they either do not presuppose 
that nature or do presuppose some other nature?' 
It is argued that sculptures form a Wittgensteinian 'family'; 
that the concept of sculpture is open to the future, and that the 
question what is the ontological status of a work of sculpture is a 
bogus one. In particular, the essentialist ontology of an Idealist 
such as Collingwood is rejected; and it is maintained that it is not 
replaceable by any simple Materialist ontology since the word 'sculpture' 
is properly used of - at least - the following kinds of thing: material 
objects; types of which material objects may be regarded as tokens; 
objects not only simpliciter but as seen in relation to a cultural and 
historical context; and of the movements of material objects and of 
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their temporal changes, as in the cases of the mobile and of 'auto-
destructive' art. 
There is much here that is too philosophically fundamental to 
argue ab initio, and must be taken rather as a declaration of the 
general standpoint adopted than as a systematic defence of 
presuppositions which, whether entirely valid or not, are nowadays 
both familiar and respectable. 
CHAPTER III 
Turning from aesthetic objects to their appraisal, it is 
suggested that there is a kind of remark - an aesthetic remark - which 
exercises the aesthetic sensibility of a critic who has adopted an 
aesthetic attitude to an appropriate object. These ideas are 
evidently conne,cted, but may be elucidated piecemeal: the aesthetic 
remark is not foundational to later argument, but is merely the first 
to receive attention. 
It is held that although there are conspicuous aesthetic terms 
(graceful, elegant, etc.) which are almost invariably used to make 
aesthetic remarks, this is not a necessary state of affairs. 
Aesthetic remarks may be made without employing any explicitly 
aesthetic terms, and it is at any rate not logically impossible to use 
'aesthetic' terms for other than aesthetic purposes. 
Aesthetic remarks, it is maintained, are such that necessary and 
sufficient conditions for their correct application cannot be 
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specified. It is incidentally pointed out that Frank Sibley, the 
author of one of the most illuminating recent papers on this topic, 
errs in making this claim for aesthetic terms instead of for aesthetic 
remarks. 
The use of such aesthetic terms as 'pretty' and 'gaudy' is 
ordinarily taught through ostended paradigms; for which reason, in a 
culturally homogeneous society, it often seems that there is a well 
established correct use in spite of the freedom from the regimen of 
necessary and sufficient conditions. For this reason, it is argued, a 
study of explicitly aesthetic terms does not greatly help us to grasp 
what is peculiarly aesthetic about aesthetic remarks; since they share 
their application-condition freedom with certain other kinds of term, 
and moreover their firm anchorage in paradigms during the learning 
process makes for relatively easy agreement about their use. What is 
peculiarly aesthetic about aesthetic remarks, it is suggested, is 
their function of drawing attention to some aspect or feature of an 
object of sense-perception to which only an aesthetically sensitive 
person would, in the context, respond. This may well be a commonplace 
natural feature of the object, the mere discrimination of which calls 
for no special sensitivity, although the choice of this feature for 
remark rather than another is, under the circumstances, a demonstration 
of aesthetic sensibility. 
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CHAPTER IV 
An attempt is made to survey the much disputed boundaries between 
the domain of the aesthetic, the moral, the economic, etc. Traditional 
attempts to find a sharp criterion of demarcation are criticized, 
particularly those which rely upon a special quasi-physiological mode 
of 'aesthetic' perception. This notion is related to the core concept 
of 'aesthetic disinterestedness' deriving from Kant, and to the 
logically independent idea of the 'innocent eye' by means of which 
Ruskin introduced a Berkeleyan strand to twine with the Kantian into 
the thread of recent aesthetic theory in which an introspectively 
discerned aesthetic response is postulated. Clive Bell's theory of the 
'aesthetic emotion' is taken as typical, and is subjected to an assault 
which makes use of arguments derived from Wittgenstein's rejection of 
private languages. 
It is suggested that there is, in the nature of things, no simple 
or conclusive way of distinguishing aesthetic remarks from others, but 
that marginal cases must be argued on their merits. In defence of 
this view a paradigmatic situation is set up, in which a professional 
art critic makes an exemplary aesthetic remark about a universally 
acknowledged work of sculpture in an appropriate place and upon a 
suitable occasion. The main elements of this total situation are then 
severally varied in such a way as to become unparadigmatic or even 
contra-paradigmatic, while the remaining bulk of the considerations 
remain unchanged. The question whether, in each case, the words 
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uttered constitute an aesthetic remark in the new situation is then 
seen to be arguable in different ways according to the set of the 
circumstances, and to resist general solution a priori. It is a 
corollary of the indeterminate character of aesthetic concepts that 
they are to some extent historically mutable. 
CHAPTER V 
The traditional view of so-called 'judgments of aesthetic value', 
it is claimed, is that they attribute a single homogeneous property or 
character - aesthetic excellence - to suitable objects. This view is 
challenged, it being argued that the notion of aesthetic excellence is 
not - to use a mathematical analogy - linear but multi-dimensional: 
that whatever may be attributed to an object which is judged to be 
'consununate' is not simply and literally somewhat more or less of what 
is attributed to it when it is said to be 'marvellous' or 'negligible' 
or 'superb ' . 
Hare's view that ' ••. it is the purpose cf the word "good" and 
other value words to be used for teaching standards' is challenged in 
as much as he maintains (but, I think, need not maintain) that it would 
be inconsistent ' .•• to apply the word "good" to one picture, if I 
refuse to apply it to another picture which I agree to be in all 
other respects exactly similar ... '· The honorific imputation of 
aesthetic originality, at least, it is argued, shows Hare's doctrine 
to be inadequate. 
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Verdicts, it is claimed, are a peculiar variety of aesthetic 
remark which is marked off imprecisely from the general run by the 
appropriateness of giving reasons in terms of other aesthetic remarks 
as well as in terms of the natural features of'the object. They are 
also essentially partisan, and the notions of the pro and the ££!!. 
at&.i.tude as expressed in verdicts is examined, together in each case 
with the triple possibility that a verdict might be genetic, open or 
consequential. Examples are offered and discussed. 
The purposes of verdicts - as contrasted with the reasons given 
in support of them - are held to be (at least) threefold. They are 
discussed under the rubrics of the performative theory, the emotive 
theory and the predictive theory; and these are held not to be 
competitive but rather collaborative accounts of the practice of 
sensitive critics. Performative verdicts receive special remark since 
they do not depend upon the giving of reasons but upon the authority 
Q 
of the critic - although reasons will often be found for them. It is 
a consequence of the performative element in criticism that new and 
seemingly arbitrary material is introduced into cultural history at 
its growing point. 
CHAPTER VI 
The need for an adequate philosophical theory of perception with 
which to attack the longstanding problem of the difference (if any) 
between the principles of criticism in painting and in sculpture, is 
stressed. 
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Since an account of visual perception which admits no intermediate 
entities such as 'sensa' or 'sense-data' between the perceiver and the 
object perceived is to be recommended, one such theory is taken as a 
starting point. D.M. Armstrong's identification of 'veridical 
perception' with the acquiring of up-to-the-moment true belief about 
the world, as proposed in his book Perception and the Physical World, 
is criticized in relation to a single specific problem: that of the 
acquisition of true beliefs about the colours of things in the world. 
It is argued that there are three and only three logically 
distinct ways of selecting a sample to match a seen colour: direct 
matching (as with cottons or silks), which should strictly be regarded 
as measuring; matching at a distance (which cannot in general be done 
with very great accuracy, and which at best demonstrates the 
acquisition, on sight, of an approximately true belief); and 
illusionistic picture-matching, which can be carried out to any 
required degree of accuracy by a normally sighted person and which, 
moreover, makes sense of the accounts we give, and criticize, of the 
colour of such nebulous objects as the sky, shadows, smoke, and so on. 
CHAPTER VII 
The leading ideas of the previous chapter are developed, and 
especially the notion that to see rightly is not necessarily to enjoy 
the 'veridical perception' of a viewer who is able to give correct 
object accounts of what he sees but is equally and indeed rather to be 
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able to give, on sight (and from a given position) acceptable 
facsimile, model or picture accounts of what is seen. The notion of 
the acceptability (of picture accounts in particular) is examined in 
the light of Gombrich's theory of the development of naturalistic 
painting. 
The thesis is developed that we ordinarily, and moreover quite 
properly, give picture, model and facsimile accounts as well as object 
accounts of what we see, and that there are appropriate criteria for 
the truth or accuracy of an account of any of these types. Since 
they are accounts of the object that is seen, there is no evident 
reason why any or all of such accounts should not appear at some point 
in the critical appraisal of a visible object. 
CHAPTER VIII 
The application of these considerations to the particular problem 
of sculpture is exhibited through a discussion, first, of a pair of 
competing theories - both of which are seen to be in some ways false 
and at best only capable of dealing partially with the facts. 
These theories may, for convenience in reference, be spoken of as 
'Hildebrand's theory' of the essentially pictorial character of 
sculpture, and 'Read's theory' of the essentially spatial character of 
sculpture. The disputants are seen to share a common error involving 
the postulated two-dimensionality of the objects of visual perception, 
which is rectified by the adoption of a theory of direct perception. 
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If, in addition, the conceptual apparatus of picture, model and 
facsimile accounts is adopted, it becomes evident that the 
stipulation of any one type of account in terms of which aesthetic 
appraisal is to be conducted is perfectly arbitrary. The disputants 
are not really arguing, as they suppose themselves to be, but merely 
legislating and counter-legislating. 
Finally, the two aspects of the whole inquiry, the general and 
the specific, are brought together in the analysis of a paradigmatic 
passage of aesthetic appraisal of sculpture to which all the central 
ideas of the thesis are seen to have clear application. 
-xv ix-
CHAPTER 1 
THE PLACE OF SCULPTURE IN AESTHETIC THEORY 
There is no doubt at all that aesthetics is a confused and 
confusing topic. In what other traditional branch of philosophy 
would it be so tempting to write: 'This essay - let there be no 
doubt about that 
-
is philosophy as well as aesthetics. I'll To call 
it a discipline is to exaggerate its rigour; perhaps 'field' is the 
subtly and suitably evocative metaphor. 2 It is a field in which, most 
with a few notable exceptions, considerable philosophers have been 
reluctant to labour very systematically, and some of its ranker 
growths have provoked not only professional jibes but even the wry 
incredulity of laymen. As Randall Jarell's narrator in Pictures from 
an Institution puts it: 
1 
2 
Miss Rasmussen began to tell Gottfried and me about her 
statues. Some of what she said was technical, and you 
would have to be a welder to appreciate it; the rest 
was aesthetic or generally philosophic, and to 
appreciate it you would have had to be an imbecile. 
Andrew Paul Ushenko, Pynamics of Art (1953) p.3. 
The very existence of the subject has been questioned. See 
Stuart Hampshire, 'Logic and Appreciation', in Elton, ed., 
Aesthetics and Language (1954) p.161. 
1 
2 
It is proper to begin with a sketch of the field as it is 
conceived in this inquiry, and I am indebted to Professor Beardsley, 
one of the clearest of contemporary aestheticians, for as plain a manifesto 
within the prevailing English-speaking climate of opinion as could be 
proposed: 
There would be no problems of aesthetics .•• if no one ever 
talked about works of art. So long as we enjoy a movie, 
a story, or a song, in silence - except perhaps for 
occasional grunts or groans, murmers of annoyance or 
satisfaction - there is no call for philosophy. But as 
soon as we utter a statement1about the work, various 
sorts of question can arise. 
To be plain, although a considerable virtue, is not necessarily 
to be right, and Beardsley's view is open at least to the objection 
that the limitation of aesthetics to an investigation of questions 
raised by statements about works of art is arbitrary. Whilst it is 
probably true that works of art are the objects which most and best 
exercise the sensitivity and wit of people of taste, and which thus 
indirectly stimulate the activities of aestheticians, it is quite 
undeniable that there are objects of aesthetic attention and remark 
which are not works of art and which are nevertheless provocative of 
at least some of the problems central to traditional and to 
contemporary aesthetics alike. Sunsets, seascapes, flowers and 
1 
Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of 
Criticism (1958) p.l. 
1 faces are common subjects of critical appraisal. It will be 
convenient at this point to introduce as a working term the phrase 
aesthetic object, to refer to whatever is made the subject of 
aesthetic attention or remark - whether it is a work of art or not. 
This expression can now, I think, safely be used for work somewhat 
different from that to which it was put by Idealist aestheticians, 
for whom it marked a contrast between physical objects - painted 
canvas, or marble - and 'works of art proper' or 'aesthetic objects' 
which were regarded as necessarily incorporeal. More will be made of 
this in the next chapter; for the moment it is enough to point out 
that my use of the expression aesthetic object will carry with it no 
ontological commitment. 
Amongst aesthetic objects works of art are undoubtedly the most 
discussed, and to my mind the most stimulating and satisfying; and 
since my central concern in this thesis iswithworks of art of a 
fairly specific and even concrete nature - namely, sculptures - I 
shall not enter any objection stronger than this caveat against 
Beardsley's dogma. 
To quote another American contemporary, upon the relative 
importance of art and nature from the aesthetic standpoint: 
1 
Some landscapes, especially in post-eighteenth century England 
~works of art; so are some Japanese trees and well-bred domestic 
animals. The distinction between art and nature is not one which a 
casual viewer can always draw easily and correctly at sight. 
3 
A work L-;f ar!:_f may possess great emotional expressiveness 
or it may have psychological overtones of other kinds 
which rivet our attention to it. Unlike most natural 
objects, it can have enormous cultural significance, 
embodying aspirations and traditions of a society or its 
most revered religious doctrines. Such a work as Dante's 
Divine Comedy sets forth an overarching conception of the 
significance and purpose of human life ••• we cannot say 
that art possesses these values exclusively and that 
nature is entirely devoid of them .•. Natural objects and 
scenes are often found 'moving' and the mystic can 'see a 
World in a Grain of Sand'. But on the whole, Nature is 
deficient in psychological and symbolic interest, compared 
to art. 1 
'.Che way in which art is formally distinguished from that which 
is not art is, traditionally, by definition; the definition being 
constructed by theoreticians who claim to have made an appropriately 
careful preliminary study of examples. In Collingwood's words: 
What is art? 
A question of this kind has to be answered in two stages. 
First, we must make sure that the key word (in this case 
'art') is a word which we know how to apply where it ought 
to be applied and refuse where it ought to be refused. It 
would not be much use beginning to argue about the correct 
definition of a general term whose instances we could not 
recognize when we saw them. Our first business, then, is 
to bring ourselves into a position in which we can say 
with confidence 'this and this and this are art; that and 
that and that are not art 1 • 2 
Unfortunately for the strict methodological propriety of 
Collingwood's and uncountable similar enterprises, concealed 
presuppositions so guide the very hand which points out 'this and 
1 
Jerome Stolnitz, Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism 
(1960) p.51. 
2 
R.G. Collingwood, '.Che Principles of Art (1938) p.l. 
4 
this and this' that the outcome inevitably has somewhat the look of 
a forced card. Moreover, a definitional approach to the problem of 
art by theorists of high and abstract principle may well lead to 
conclusions which, even within a generation, come to seem almost 
comically absurd. Collingwood is constrained by the intentionalistic 
presuppositions of his own theory to say such things as: 
If Mr Skeaping hid his drawings in a coal-cellar and 
expected anybody who found them to shoot them full of 
bullet-holes, aesthetic theorists would say that he was 
no artist, because he intended his drawings for 
consumption, as targets, and not for contemplation, as 
works of art. By the same argument, the paleolithic 
paintings are not works of art, however much they may 
resemble them; the resemblance is superficial; what 1 
matters is the purpose, and the purpose is different. 
There seems little reason to doubt that the aesthetic theorists 
of the sixties would regard Mr Skeaping as eccentric if he were to 
behave in this outlandish way; but every reason to doubt whether 
they would deny that his drawings are works of art. Similarly, few 
of them - perhaps by now none of them - would question the received 
opinion that paleolithic cave paintings are to be numbered amongst 
the finest works of art in the cultural lexicon. Collingwood's 
prefatory remarks, if they were intended to herald a serious 
progrannne of research into the ordinary usage of his time, would be 
misleading if not actively tendentious; and it is difficult to see 
1 
Ibid., p.10. 
5 
what other construction can be put upon them. It seems inescapable 
that the very definition which is avowedly yet to be constructed 
already determines the choice of examples from which it is destined 
to be derived. 
To review briefly the pattern of traditional attempts to 
distinguish art from that which is not art: it is first of all 
noticeable that they divide fairly sharply into essentialist and 
non-essentialist essays. Essentialist definitions of art may be 
treated conveniently and perhaps not too misleadingly, as amounting 
to the proposal that some single nominated characteristic of a thing 
be regarded as the sole necessary and sufficient condition for that 
thing's being a work of art. Essentialist definitions of art lend 
themselves, by the aphoristic brevity which allegedly masks their 
subtlety, to perpetuation in the form of slogans, with which it was 
once the unbecoming fashion of aestheticians to bombard and belabour 
each other. Thus: 'Art is Imitation' 'Art is Revelation' 'Art is 
wish-fulfilment' 'Art is play' 'Art is Significant Form' and - the 
Croce-Collingwood theory which has not yet been fully wrested from 
lay acceptance in spite of its present philosophical disrepute -
'Art is Intuition-Expression'. In such accounts of the matter it is 
perhaps strictly improper to speak of definitions in terms of features 
or characteristics, since the copula in a paradigmatically essentialist 
slogan is said to be the 'is.' of identity, not of predication; but this 
is a logical nicety the precise disposition of which lies well outside 
6 
the scope of the present work, and nothing that is to be argued here 
hangs upon it. 
Some attempts to transfix the essence of art with a verbal pin 
are more, and some less, dauntingly deep. Erich Kahler writes: 
Art is a human activity which explores, and hereby 
creates, new reality in a suprarational, visional 
manner and presents it symbolically or metaphorically 1 
as a microcosmic whole signifying a macrocosmic whole. 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary (4th ed., 1952) by contrast 
proposes: 
ART, n. Skill, esp. human skill as opposed to nature .•• 
and 
work of art, fine picture, building,poem, etc. 
An objection must be entered here against this last implicitly 
honorific usage (a fine picture, etc.) although it has to be 
admitted that it is not by any means without basis in common speech. 
It seems to have encouraged the use of mixed definitions of a non-
essentialist character which include the provision, as one of the 
necessary conditions for a work of art, that it shall exceed a 
certain threshold minimum of excellence. Such definitions are 
generally constructed out of a set of defining characteristics which 
are regarded as being severally necessary and jointly sufficient. 
1 
'What is Art?' a reply to Morris Weitz's 'The Role of Theory 
in Aesthetics', in Weitz, ed., Problems in Aesthetics (1959) 
p.171. 
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Typically: 'A work of art is whatever is made by man; is in one of 
1 the presently accepted art forms; and is better than a certain 
minimal (never specified, and probably unspecifiable) excellence'. 
Objections can be brought against each of these provisions in 
turn, and especially against the last as potentially question-
begging. For if that excellence which is sought is excellence of a 
kind peculiar to works of art, then this condition alone is 
sufficient; and if it is an excellence which is not peculiar to 
works of art then a good deal more needs to be said about it, in 
support of its candidature for a role in the definition. Many 
objects, works of art and others, are excellent draught-excluders, or 
excellent securities against loans; and neither of these excellences 
would convincingly clinch an otherwise inconclusive argument that 
something or other is a work of art. If the conditions can be 
refined without circularity, then well and good; but this does not 
seem, at least on the face of it, to be very likely. To speak - as 
is not uncormnon - of the characteristic excellences of works of art 
(instead of the peculiar excellences of works of art) is merely 
evasive, since in the end such excellence must be specified, and it 
will then become apparent either that it is peculiar to works of 
1 
Restriction to the classical five (poetry, music, painting, 
sculpture and architecture) is excessively cramping. One might 
prefer to emulate the catholicity of Thomas H. Munro, in 'Four 
Hundred Arts and Types of Art', JAAC, XVI (1957) pp.45-65. 
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art - in which case the question is begged - or that it is not, in 
which case we are entitled to ask again why this excellence, connnon 
to many kinds of thing, is definitive of art while other common 
excellences are not. 
The traditional candidate for the role of that excellence 
which is most assuredly a necessary condition of works of art is 
beauty, and while it cannot plausibly be denied that any beautiful 
product of human skill with the conspicuous outward show of being 
a work of art is a work of art, it may pertinently be doubted 
whether the inclusion of beauty amongst the provisions is necessary. 
The word 'beauty' has not been effectively negotiable critical or 
philosophical currency for a long time, and there is no present 
reason to try to rehabilitate it. There is, besides, another good 
reason for resisting the inclusion of any kind of necessary 
excellence in the account we give of works of art: it is that such 
a move places us in a very serious logical predicament when we wish 
to say, as we not infrequently do, that something is a thoroughly 
bad work of art. That overtone of praise which is still clearly 
audible in a good deal of common speech has made possible the 
honorific hyperbole 'It's a work of art!' used of objects such as 
Ascot hats and wedding cakes, which upon any ordinary showing are 
not works of art. Most of us are content with this locution, yet 
would wish to be able to remark without logical impropriety that 
some of the objects in our national and provincial collections and 
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galleries are in every way downright wretched works of art. In 
doing so we implicitly reject excellence as a defining 
characteristic or necessary condition of art; and it seems that 
this is the most rational course to take. 1 We have our cake cannot 
and eat it, unless we resolve only to eat it figuratively. 
Much looser definitions even than this (human origin, acceptable 
or conventional form, and appropriate excellence) are possible. It 
might be held, for example, that some specified number - say, two or 
twenty - out of a list of condition-features none of which is 
individually either necessary or sufficient, will be collectively 
sufficient. But by now the notion of a definition has been so 
stretched as barely to be recognisable, and it is but a small loss 
to abandon it altogether and to apply the Wittgensteinian doctrine 
of family resemblances to the problem. Representative of 
contemporary philosophers who have made this move is Morris Weitz, 2 
who writes: 
1 
Is aesthetic theory, in the s.ense of a true definition or 
set of necessary and sufficient properties of art, 
possible? If nothing else does, the history of aesthetics 
itself should give one enormous pause here .•• 
••• aesthetic theory - all of it - is wrong in principle in 
Cf. Beardsley, 'The Definition of the Arts',~' XX (1961) esp. 
p.185, for an argument to a similar conclusion, in contrast with 
much that is implicit in his Aesthetics (1958). 
2 
'The Role of Theory in Aesthetics', op.cit., p.145 ff. This 
article originally appeared in JAAC, XV (1956). 
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thinking that a correct theory is possible because it 
radically misconstrues the logic of the concept of art •.• 
He goes on to argue that the concept of·art is 'open textured': 
I can list some cases and some conditions under which I 
can apply correctly the concept of art but I cannot list 
all of them, for the all important reason that 
unforeseeable or novel conditions are always forthcoming 
or envisageable. 
And he concludes that: 
To understand the role of aesthetic theory is not to 
conceive it as a definition, logically doomed to failure, 
but to read it as swnmaries of seriously made 
recommendations to attend in certain ways to certain 
features of art. 
The key passage from Wittgenstein occurs in his discussion of 
games. I shall accept its implications for the theory of art without 
further ado, since it is no more possible in aesthetics than in any 
other branch of philosophy to question everything at once. One must 
address oneself - from a suitably advertised standpoint - to those 
problems which seem most exigent. Concerning board-games, card-games, 
ball-games, and so on: 
1 
Don't say: 'There must be something in common, or they 
would not be called "games"' - but look and see whether 
there is anything connnon to all, but similarities, 
relationships, and a whole series of them at that. 1 
And: 
I can think of no better expression to characterize these 
similarities than 'family resemblances'; for the various 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. 
G.E.M. Anscombe (1958) 1:66, p.3le. 
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resemblances between members of a family: build, features, 
colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and 
criss-cross in the same way. - And I shall say: 'games' 
form a family.l 
Similarly, I shall say: 'works of art' form a family. But how 
shall we determine whether an individual, picked at random, is a 
member of the family? According to W.E. Kennick it is quite simple; 
but I do not think that we should accept his amusing account of the 
matter uncritically: 
Imagine a very large warehouse filled with all sorts of 
things - pictures of every description, musical scores 
for symphonies and dances and hymns, machines, tools, 
boats, houses, churches and temples, statues, vases, 
books of poetry and of prose, furniture and clothing, 
newspapers, postage stamps, flowers, trees, stones, 
musical instruments. Now we instruct someone to enter 
the warehouse and bring out all the works of art it 
contains. He will be able to do this with reasonable 
success, despite the fact that, as even the aestheticians 
must admit, he possesses no satisfactory definition of 
Art in terms of some connnon denominator, because no such 
definition has yet been found. Now imagine the same 
person sent into the warehouse to bring out all objects 
with Significant Form, or all objects of Expression. He 
would rightly be baffled.2 
This is too facile. It is by no means certain, nor perhaps even 
very likely, that a majority of messengers would decide unhesitatingly 
that, say, the printed score of a musical work, or any given specimen 
of furniture, is a work of art. These reservations do not however 
1 
Ibid., 1:67, p.32e. 
2 
W.E. Kennick, 'Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake?' 
Mind, LXVII (1958) pp.317-34. 
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bear dangerously upon the central thesis; they tend to show that 
picking out works of art is probably not such a simple matter as 
Kennick suggests; they do not show - as some of his opponents seem 
to have held - that it is an esoteric matter. One might remark too, 
in passing, that the demand for definitions only becomes clamorous 
when there is widespread uncertainty about the proper use of an 
expression. Kennick's point is more firmly made in another passage, 
and he seems only to have erred in supposing it a more modest. 
achievement to understand English than is in fact the case. He 
writes: 
We are able to separate those objects which are works of 
art from those which are not, because we know English; that 
is, we know how correctly to use the word 'art' and to 
apply the phrase 'work of art'. To borrow a statement from 
Dr Waismannl and change it to meet my own needs, 'If 
anyone is able to use the word "art" or the phrase "work of 
art" correctly, in all sorts of contexts and on the right 
sort of occasions, he knows "w2at art is" and no formula in 
the world can make him wiser'. 
\ 
Fortunately for the present enterprise it is not necessary to 
explore in detail English usage in respect of all the arts - a 
formidable task - but will be sufficient if the approximate position 
1 
F. Waismann, 'Analytic-Synthetic II', Analysis, II (1950) p.27. 
Waismann speaks, of course, of 'time' not of 'art'. He also 
says, and the observation is pertinent: 'Incidentally, the fact 
that one can know perfectly well 'what time is' without knowing 
all the idioms should make us hesitate to accept the formula 
"meaning = use".' 
2 
Kennick, op.cit. 
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Bird in Space (1919) by Constantin Brancusi 
of sculpture within the complex can be marked out. That simple 
definitions are of very doubtful utility is once again illustrated 
1 1 b f h C · Oxf d D. · 1 very c ear y y re erence to t e onc1se or 1ct1onary: 
SCULPTURE, n., & v. t. & i., I. Art of forming 
representations of objects in the round or in relief by 
chiselling stone, carving wood, modelling clay, casting 
metal, or similar processes; .•• 
The unsatisfactoriness of this account of sculpture was brought 
out quite dramatically during the nineteen-twenties, a full thirty 
years before the edition of the dictionary quoted here went to press, 
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in the celebrated case of Brancusi v. The United States. The sculptor 
successfully resisted the imposition of import duty by u.s. Customs 
upon his abstract brass sculpture, Bird, as (since it was non-
2 figurative) scrap metal. Amongst the opinions expressed at the 
1 
The Concise Oxford is chosen for its usual knack (here sadly 
absent) of going straight to the heart of ordinary current 
usage. Rather curiously, an earlier edition (1933) of the 
Oxford English Dictionary does not propose the representation 
claus~, although it has idiosyncracies of its own, For example: 
' .•• L"Sculpture" i~7 Now chiefly used with reference to work in 
stone (esp. marble) or bronze (similar work in wood, ivory etc. 
being spoken of as carving), and to the production of figures of 
considerable size'. But surely there is nothing seriously wrong 
with 'small wood sculpture'? 
2 
In some re-tellings of this by now almost legendary case it is 
held that the work was dutiable as a mechanical tool or instrument. 
Although the subject of much connnent and frequent later reference 
(see, for example, the Dictionary of American Biography under 
'Brancusi, Constantin') the case is rarely if ever given a full 
citation, and I have been unable to resolve the point 
conclusively. 
hearings was Jacob Epstein's; that although a mere mechanic might 
have polished the work, only an artist could have conceived it. 
Mr Justice Waite seems to have been unimpressed by the genetic 
definition of a work of art implicit in this view and to have taken 
a more objective stand in his decision for Brancusi: 
The object now under consideration is shown to be for 
purely ornamental purposes, its use being the same as 
that of any piece of sculpture of the old masters. It 
is beautiful and symmetrical in outline, and while 
some difficulty might be encountered in associating it 
with a bird, it is nevertheless pleasing to look at and 
highly ornamental. 
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His rejection of any account of sculpture in terms of the sculptor 
was sound on more than one ground. Apart from normal legal procedure 
and precedent, and the need to beware the incipient circularity of 
defining art in terms of artists and artists in terms of art, there is 
the matter of the doubtful moral and professional probity of the 
artist. Although his prestige is only moderately high in contemporary 
Western society, it has been higher and it has been very much lower. 
In the early Middle Ages: 
1 
Common superstition did not encourage respect for art and 
artists. The 'mechanic' arts were low in the scale of 
labor, and masons and painters at the best of times were 
classed as 'mechanic' artisans. The idleness and 
mischief of masons was proverbial and indicated perhaps 
the vagabond reputation, which has clung to artists to 
this very day. Learned monks would cite the fourth 
chapter of Genesis to prove the descent of masons from 
the cursed progeny of Cain, and would derive the word 
'mechanic' from 'moechus' an adulterer. 1 
Frank P. Chambers, The History of Taste (1932) p.9. 
Where there is reason to think of the artist as part trickster 
or scoundrel - and tradition supplies at least some motive for 
thinking in this way - then this, coupled with an implicitly 
honorific use of 'sculpture' will be enough to engender mistrust of 
any allegedly necessary connection between sculptors and sculpture. 
The average man, and perhaps especially the average legal man, is 
morbidly sensitive to the danger of having his leg pulled by the 
modern artist. 
Bearing in mind the time and the circumstances, Mr Justice 
Waite's criteria are extremely liberal and permissive. Even so, 
they would be inapplicable to much that is nowadays regularly 
exhibited, sold, bought, and criticized as sculpture. Our notions 
of what is pleasing to look at have changed quite radically during 
the last half-century, and now include a great deal which is 
neither evidently beautiful nor synnnetrical in outline, and some 
which is not even for the same use as that to which the work of the 
'old masters' was put. Before Dadaism, surely no recognised master 
attached an axe to his work in order that members of the public 
should be encouraged to give destructive vent to their sense of 
outrage~ 
The Concise Oxford, even as (anachronistically) liberalised by 
U.S. case-law, is not equal to the legislative task set by the 
impact of anti-art and non-art upon art, in the early years of the 
twentieth century. Every one of the practical criteria which would 
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have seemed unassailably secure to a Victorian or Edwardian 
theorist has succumbed to the erosive tides of the last turbulent 
half-century, and been either swept away altogether or reduced to 
the proportions of a nostalgic and perilous ruin. Even the final 
conviction that works of art must be of patently human origin has 
been exposed to a double attack. On the one side the work of 
higher apes, and of machines, has been accepted, exhibited, and for 
critical purposes treated as art. It is true that chimpanzees are 
presently more celebrated as painters than as sculptors, but this 
state of affairs seems unlikely to persist indefinitely; and 
machines have been responsible for acceptable works of great 
variety from the extremes of non-figurative patterning to 
naturalistic portraiture achieved by a photographic link to three-
dimensional profile-cutters. On the other side, the objet trouve 
and the Ready Made have provided the artist with a less laborious 
role as finder instead of maker. Strictly speaking, only the 
natural 'found-object', the wave-carved rock or branch or bone, is 
truly independent of the human hand, and is elevated at least to 
putative sculptural status by the mere act of being found, and 
appropriately exhibited. Marcel Duchamp's Ready Mades and Picasso's 
Metamorphoses, as well as most of their more recent descendants, 
17 

1 Assemblages, are for the most part human artifacts throughout, 
although their components were not originally fabricated for 
artistic ends. There is, in fact, a continuous spectrum of cases 
from the purest objets trouv~s, through found-objects assisted, 
Ready Mades and Metamorphoses to constructions in which the human 
hand is as evident in every part of the work as in any traditional 
sculpture, and all that is novel is the use of raw materials not 
previously available to the artist. 
It is not difficult to see how the application of 'family 
resemblance' tests reveals Picasso's Bull to be a work of sculpture 
about which, in the cultural climate of the nineteen-sixties, little 
pressure need be felt by aestheticians to behave as if a serious 
decision-problem calling for close argument were yet to be resolved. 
Regarded as a question of English usage whether or not The Bull 
should be referred to as a sculpture, the matter is settled. But not 
all such questions can even now be so summarily dismissed. That of 
the very pure ob jet trouv~ is, I should say, a persistently nagging 
problem; and resistance to the classification of suitably exhibited 
natural formations as sculptures may yet be offered on at least the 
desperate ground that unless a line is drawn somewhere the 'family' 
of sculptures will expand to embrace the entire contents of the 
1 
A good account of this genre, and of its history, is to be 
found in William C. Seitz, The Art of Assemblage (1961). 
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universe, and thereby forfeit any claim to useful distinctiveness. 
A telling point in the debate about the status of objets 
trouves, and one which is perhaps too often ignored or overlooked, 
is that they are assimilable into the family of works of art in two 
quite distinct ways. Objets trouv~s are not merely objects which 
possess such aesthetic features as, say, agreeable texture or 
delicacy of pattern in common with (some) works of art. They are not 
even, at most, objects which possess such features in unusual 
abundance; although this is one of the ways in which they may be 
marked off from the general run of random objects. What may tempt us 
even more strongly than the possession of unusual 'intrinsic' 
aesthetic interest to regard objets trouv~s as works of art, is a 
quite different consideration. Some works of art are thought 
noteworthy because they are seen as acts, or gestures, made in a 
context of cultural history. The art which innovates, or which makes 
a protest, or which connnents wittily or slyly upon other art or upon 
the state of the arts in general, is appreciated as it would not 
necessarily be in another context, whether material or historical. 
Objets trouv~s may well often lay claim to family membership in this 
second way; by being seen as having a role in a context, quite like 
the role which is assigned to some works which are deliberately 
wrought for the purpose. A critic might say, in effect, not only 
'See how the action of wave and water on rock can be evoked with a 
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Ready Made, Bottle Rack (1914) by Marcel Duchamp 
chisel', but equally: 'See how some of the effects of modern 
sculpture can be evoked (parodied, satirised, etc.) with a well-
chosen pebble~' 
A problem, which is perhaps even more complex in some ways, is 
posed by such an object as Duchamp's Ready Made, 1914 because of the 
ways in which it fits - and the ways in which it fails to fit - the 
logic of ordinary discourse about art, artists, and works of art. It 
is an object with a firm place in the history of contemporary and 
recent sculpture, and a subject of remark in all appropriate works of 
1 
reference. It is, nevertheless, neither more nor less than a bottle-
drying rack, made originally by a craftsman for a quite mundane 
purpose. It was signed by a respected professional artist, Marcel 
Duchamp, and exhibited as sculpture amongst sculpture. Apart from 
the addition of his signature, Duchamp did not modify it in any way; 
he did not even contrive an imaginative metamorphosis such as 
Picasso's with the bicycle saddle and handlebars. Perhaps we should 
say that Duchamp's artistry consisted precisely in his flair for the 
right occasion to let well alone? After all, why should a sculptor 
be regarded as under obligation to manipulate his material in order 
1 
A comprehensive bibliography of studies in which Ready Made 
(1914) is referred to either implicitly or explicitly as a 
sculpture would be - pointlessly for present purposes - very 
long. But see, for example: Alfred H. Barr, Jr., Fantastic 
Art, Dada, Surrealism (1936); Carola Giedion-Welcker, 
Contemporary Sculpture (1960); and William C. Seitz, op.cit. 
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to produce sculpture if his material happens to come - as Duchamp 
pointed out - Ready Made? 
Ought we perhaps to concede thatthis object is a sculpture, 
but argue that it is a sculpture by an anonymous craftsman which 
was (fraudulently?) appropriated by Duchamp? Certainly that it 
was made to serve a purpose would not ipso facto disqualify it, 
any more than a Cellini salt cellar or a Donatello candlestick is 
disqualified. But having been made for use without so much as a 
thought of decoration ••• ? Yet what of the unconscious artistry of, 
say, ledger clerks whose pages of accounts are now carefully 
preserved as exemplars of the art of penmanship? 
One might continue at exhaustive and exhausting length tracing 
out the pattern of resemblances, the ways in which this object is 
like other members of the family of sculptures, and the ways in 
which it is unlike. It would be necessary to bear in mind the 
dangers attendant upon an insufficiently considered positive verdict. 
If this bottle-drying rack is a sculpture, are all bottle-drying 
racks - and a great deal more besides - sculptures? Could we 
perhaps admit Duchamp's bottle-drying rack but hold back the flood 
of base contenders by making it a condition for the acceptance of 
bottle-drying racks that their candidature be endorsed by an artist 
whose reputation is securely founded upon less contentious 
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enterprises?1 But would this not be a quite new and dangerous 
principle? There is no precedent for the rejection of the 
offerings of unknown sculptors unless and until their claim to 
attention is reinforced by celebrated testimonial. And to say 
shortly that the context of exhibition ultimately and absolutely 
determines whether or not an object is properly to be classified 
as a sculpture is to evade the point that some objects, let us say 
for example the works of Rodin, are plainly sculptures wherever 
they happen to be discovered; whereas bottle-drying racks are not. 
It was characteristic of Duchamp's sardonic, ambivalently 
creative and destructive intelligence, that he should have provoked 
these puzzles so early in the twentieth century game. In 1914 it 
was still received doctrine amongst philosophical aestheticians 
that works of art were essentially so, or not so, and to tease the 
argument not with counter-argument but with a simple gesture was 
surely to act with extraordinary prescience. 
Some problems of classification within the arts are insoluble 
for the obvious reason that objects of such novelty that there are 
1 
As Georges Hugnet (trans. Margaret Scolari) writes, in an 
essay on Dadaism contributed to A.H. Barr, op.cit., p.19: 'In the 
first New York Independent's exhibition, 1917, he (Duchamp) 
entered a porcelain urinal with the title Fontaine and signed it 
R. Mutt to test the impartiality of the executive connnittee of 
which he was himself a member .•• But R. Mutt's entry was thrown 
out of the show after a few hours' debate and Duchamp, making the 
issue a question of principle, tendered his resignation'. 
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as yet no class-names for them, are nowadays prone to make their 
appearance. I have in mind such extravagances as Tinguely's Study 
for the End of the World, which was reported by a Paris newspaper 
correspondent under the heading 'The Tradition of Gorgeous 
1 Legpulls'. This dismissive formula is too sanguine; Tinguely pulls 
legs to some purpose, even if we cannot say quite under the aegis of 
which Muse. As Mcinnes writes: 
It was a piece of music, in the sense that it was worked by 
a piano and made a noise; it was a sculpture, in that it 
contained plastic forms; and it was a painting, in that it 
included a canvas on which colours were to be spread. But 
the Author preferred to call it a Self-Destruction Machine, 
for it had this peculiarity, that it was capable of only 
one performance. 
The masterpiece was composed of 12 electric motors, a 
quantity of scaffolding, numerous pulleys and conveyor 
belts, smoke bombs and - perched on top of its thirty foot 
high structure - a brand new refrigerator. When the 
pianist began to play the Study, the keys of the piano-
board (being wired to electric motors) set the contraption 
in jerking motion. Gradually and majestically, the whole 
thing collapsed while the smoke-bombs released their fumes 
and pots of paint were splashed on the virgin canvas. At 
the end of the 30 minute performance, there was nothing 
but a tangled mass of ironwork, and a choking, deafened 
and mystified audience. In brief, the end of the world. 
Whatever is to be said of such terata, it is at least clear 
that the concept of sculpture is open to the future. Decision 
problems arise and call for solution; or they temporarily defy 
solution. If we are asked whether a characteristic work by Cesar 
Baldaccini in welded scrap metal is a sculpture, we shall answer 
1 
Neil Mcinnes, The Bulletin (Australia), 16 June 1962, p.22. 
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without hesitation that it is. If we are asked whether Duchamp's 
Ready-Mades are sculptures, we shall hedge. Even after half a century 
of furious debate we can only aptly summarise the state of the 
argument by saying: 'They are and they aren't'. The point for 
aesthetic theory is that little or nothing hangs on the question 
'What is (how do we recognise ••• ) a sculpture?' Properly considered 
it is a question for customs officials, for insurance companies and 
for copyright agents to settle, with artists, critics and 
aestheticians amongst the ranks of expert witnesses. '.Che really 
serious problems of aesthetics are not centred here, and it would 
serve the purpose of a theorist of the criticism of sculpture well 
enough - although perhaps be cramping to his style - if he were to 
conduct his business entirely in terms of generally accepted 
conservative paradigms. It is as an inheritor and user of the 
English language, and perhaps as a potential litigant, not 
specifically as a philosopher, that he is concerned with the question 
whether this or that marginal object should be classified as 
sculpture. 
A rejection of essentialist answers to the question: 'What is 
sculpture!' and a thoroughgoing scepticism about the ultimate utility 
for any but legal or quasi-legal purposes of crisp definitions does 
not, however, entirely resolve all that is traditionally discussed 
under the rubric of 'the ontological problem'. In the next chapter 
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I shall examine the possible force of the objection quite commonly 
raised by theorists against the remarks of art critics, or by one 
critic against another: 'That is all very well, but it doesn't bear 
upon the sculpture considered as sculpture'. 
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CHAPTER II 
SCULPTURES AS AESTHETIC OBJECTS 
The attempt to determine the precise (and allegedly connnon) 
ontological status of all works of art has always been more than a 
mere routine philosophical enterprise comparable to the 
investigation of the ultimate nature of the objects of perception, or 
the objects of thought. Works of art have consistently aroused the 
passions of philosophers, from Plato who mistrusted their fraudulent 
power and would have banished poets from the Republic, to 
Wittgenstein who would ' ••• whistle through a whole concerto, 
interrupting himself only to draw the listener's attention to some 
detail of the musical texture•. 1 It is beyond question that art is 
deeply enjoyed by philosophers, no less than by other men, and one 
way of publishing satisfaction is to attribute value to those objects 
which afford it. But such expressions having been wrung from 
philosophers against a native caution, it is fitting that they should 
not be wasted upon inappropriate objects. A cautious gambler, 
staking his reputation for intellectual clarity and probity upon each 
utterance, will not wish to venture capital on non-starters. 
1 
Georg Henrik von Wright, A Biographical Sketch contributed to 
Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir (1958) p.6. 
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Collingwood, as has been remarked, would have supposed it a 
waste of sense, because of the authors' alleged intentions, to 
attribute aesthetic value to cave-paintings; but not senseless to 
attribute - or at any rate for their authors to attribute -
magical powers to them. Moreover, setting the purpose of the work 
aside, those drawings in coloured oxides upon the rock would not, in 
any case, for Collingwood, be true works of art. His Idealist 
programme was to give works of art a common ontology in terms of 
their supposed essence: imagination. It will be helpful to quote 
him at sufficient length to make his position absolutely clear on 
this point: 
If the making of a tune is an instance of imaginative 
creation, a tune is an imaginary thing. And the same 
applies to a poem or a painting or any other work of 
art. This seems paradoxical; we are apt to think that 
a tune is not an imaginary thing but a real thing, a 
real collection of noises; that a painting is a real 
piece of canvas covered with real colours; and so on. 
I hope to show, if the reader will have patience, that 
there is no paradox here; that both these propositions 
express what we do as a matter of fact say about works 
of art; and that they do not contradict one another, 
because they are concerned with different things. 
When speaking of a work of art (tune, picture, &c.), 
we mean by art a specific craft, intended as a 
stimulus for producing specific emotional effects in 
an audience, we certainly mean to designate by the 
term 'work of art' something that we should call real. 
The artist as magician or purveyor of amusement is 
necessarily a craftsman making real things, and making 
them out of some material according to some plan. His 
works are as real as the works of an engineer, and for 
the same reason. 
But it does not at all follow that the same is true of 
an artist proper. His business is not to produce an 
emotional effect in an audience, but, for example, to 
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make a tune. This tune is already complete and perfect 
when it exists merely as a tune in his head, that is, an 
imaginary tune. Next, he may arrange for the tune to be 
played before an audience. Now there comes into 
existence a real tune, a collection of noises. But 
which of these two things is the work of art? Which of 
them is the music? The answer is implied in what we 
have already said: the music, the work of art, is not 
the collection of noises, it is the tune in the 
composer's head. The noises made by the performers, and 
heard by the audience, are not the music at all; they 
are only means by which the audience, if they listen 
intelligently (not otherwise) can reconstruct for 
themselves the imaginary tune that existed in the 
composer's head. 1 
It is not my purpose to rehearse here the entire parade of 
arguments for and against this view; it will be sufficient to refer 
to the objection, which I regard as utterly conclusive, that such a 
'reconstruction' as Collingwood calls for is in principle impossible 
(whether the artist himself is cooperative or uncooperative, alive 
or dead) quite simply because there is and could be no appropriate 
object to reconstruct. It is of course perfectly true that a 
composer might create a tune, or a poet a verse, and keep it to 
himself; that is, not make it public by playing it, htlilDlling it 
aloud, speaking or writing it. But such an object is not an 
imaginary object in the required sense; it is merely a contingently 
private object which stands in a similar relation to the artist's 
audience as, say, a gramophone record of the tune locked up in the 
artist~ safe. And just as we could blow the safe if we were 
1 
The Principles of Art p .139. 
' 
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sufficiently determined, so could we (in logical if not in moral 
principle) twist the artist's arm, or drug him, in order to make him 
give up his work to us. The poem or the tune that he divulges, 
willingly or unwillingly, will almost certainly be less perfect than 
the artist would wish; this is a cormnonplace of experience. He may 
'have it in mind' to make improvements; but if so, and if he does 
not yet have the precise improvements in mind, then the improved 
work is not a candidate for the role of existent (though imaginary) 
work of art which is to be contrasted with the existent (uttered or 
actual) work of art, since not even the artist himself has yet 
attained access to the improved work. If he did have such access 
there is no reason why he should not make the improvements public; 
and indeed there is every reason in the psychology of artists to 
suppose him in general eager to do so. It does not follow from 
the artist's dissatisfaction with his actual production that there 
must already exist an imaginary work with which he would be better 
pleased; nor, a fortiori, that this hypothetical object is to be 
'reconstructed' from the material which is presently available, 
either by the artist himself or by anyone else. 
Not only is all this patently true of poems and tunes, the 
most plausible cases from Collingwood's point of view, but there 
are still the examples of painting and sculpture to consider. 
Here even the argument that original composition takes place in the 
head, mind, or imagination, is much less plausible: 
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An imaginary picture is not a picture and is of an 
entirely different logical type because the work of 
producing a picture cannot be done or, at least, 
completed without physical labour. But the task of 
making up a poem or a story or composing a tune may 
sometimes be over before these are spoken, sung, or 
written down ••• Of one who had never produced a public 
work it would be absurd to ask whether he might be a 
silent rival to all known artists. One who never 
exhibits his artistic skill is not a very 'pure' 
artist but a fraud.l 
We are never obliged to construct, or to reconstruct, what is, 
or was, in the artist's head because only in this way would 
something to which we necessarily have no direct access be thus 
made available to us. At most the work of art is an object to 
which we contingently have no access, because the artist happens to 
be reticent, or dead. The perfect work, of which the artist's 
2 
actual work is but a feeble shadow, is not a peculiarly 
inaccessible existent object: it is an object which the artist has 
not yet made, and which it would therefore be absurd for his public 
to suppose that it might reconstruct. 
The entire matter is raised, however, not:so much as a live 
argument (nor yet as one which is quite certainly dead) but rather 
as part of an account of the present use of terms which is 
1 
Margaret Macdonald, 'Art and Imagination', PAS, LIII (1952-53) 
p.211. 
2 
Cf. Shelley, in Defence of Poetry: ' .•• and the most glorious 
poetry that has ever been communicated to the world is 
probably a feeble shadow of the original conceptions of the 
poet'. 
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required for clarity in this unusually confusing semantic region. 
The phrase aesthetic object has been much used until comparatively 
recent years, and indeed still is used from time to time, to 
designate an 'imaginary' work of art which is supposed to afford 
explicit contrast with the physical work of art, and to be the 
proper object - and the only proper object - of aesthetic 
attention. The view is classically put thus: 
1 
The unphilosophical mind means by the Mona Lisa a canvas 
that hangs on a wall in the Louvre; by the Venus de Milo 
a sculptured block of marble ••• and by a poem something 
he can find written on a certain page of a certain book 
••• The solution /~f the difficulties immediately 
apparent to the philosophical min~/ ••• is, of course, as 
follows: just as the theologian distinguishes between 
G~d, whom no man hath seen at any time, and the temple, 
shrine or icon, where God may be supposed to 'appear'; 
so we can distinguish the aesthetic object or experience -
a sensuous form, together with meanings underlying the 
form, which exists only in the imagination, and what I 
would call the aesthetic instrument, which is the 
vehicle for the imagination, and a part of the physical 
world.l 
Parker moves on at once to a family quarrel: 
But while it is important that this distinction be made 
and its validity recognised, one must not go the 
lengths of a Croce in affirming that the instrument has 
nothing to do with art. For the appreciator, the 
instrument is essential, because it makes the aesthetic 
experience communicable; and preserves it for future 
generations. Without the instrument it would be a mere 
dream, unknowable and ephemeral. Imagination and 
physical embodiment are two aspects of a single fact. 
DeWitt H. Parker, 'The Nature of Art', RIP, 4 (1939) 
pp.684ff. 
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But he nevertheless stands firmly with the party that has 
almost succeeded in acquiring sole rights to the innocent phrase 
aesthetic object to designate objects which are, necessarily, not 
any part of the physical world. The contrast thus generated 
between 'real' - that is to say, imaginary - works of art and 
'real' - that is to say, physical - works of art has caused a 
great deal of confusion; and not merely confusion, endemic in 
philosophy, about the proper sense of that unhappy adjective, 
'real'. There are, for example, consequent problems which can in 
the end only be dealt with by resorting to such desperate paradox 
as this: 
When people disagree whether something is obscene they 
are likely to be judging different works of art 
(constructed, as it were, from the same object), 1 
rather than reacting differently to the same work. 
And: 
A proper judgment of obscenity in the arts can only be 
made by an informed and sensitive reader - not because 
only he can decide whether a work is obscene, but 
because only he can decide what work it is that is 
being judged.2 
Just as inside the fat man there is allegedly a thin man 
struggling to get out, it would seem that inside the novel which is 
1 
Abraham Kaplan, 'Obscenity as an Aesthetic Category', in 
Robert Kramer, ed., 'Obscenity and the Arts', Vol.XX of Law 
and Contemporary Problems (1955) p.545. 
2 
lb id. ' p. 546 
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brought to the attention of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
there is a legion of novels, severally accessible to readers who 
are differently informed and of different sensitivity - at least 
one of which may turn out to be obscene. Unfortunately, it seems 
that this imaginary roisterer carmot be put off by the conductor 
so that the other passengers in the vehicle may go their way 
without danger to public morals. If, as Kaplan seems elsewhere to 
suggest, it is not the published work which is, as such, obscene, 
but the expert witnesses' interpretations of it; then we might ask 
why it is not these very witnesses, or their recorded 
interpretations, which properly deserve to be made the subject of 
criminal prosecution. If that work of art which is obscene can 
only be smelled out by the expert nose, it is difficult to grasp 
how it may be supposed likely to deprave and corrupt the common 
man. The fallacy at the root of this absurdity is the supposition 
that it is interpretations which are the subject of judgment; 
whereas of course what is judged is the work of art: interpretation 
is not even a prelude to judgment but a part of it. 
I do not wish to suggest that questions about obscenity in the 
arts are always trivial, or easily settled, but only that they are 
questions which are rendered effectively insoluble, except by a 
clumsy casuistry, if we accept the doctrine of multiple imaginary 
aesthetic objects within physical embodiments or vehicles. 
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One way of avoiding the possibility of a clash of understanding 
would be to abandon the jargon aesthetic object and invent afresh; 
but while this would be a laudably irenic move it would surely be a 
betrayal of sense. The objects of aesthetic attention and remark 
are, upon any principle or canon of linguistic rationality, 
aesthetic objects; and it is undesirable that past abuses should be 
condoned by resigning the phrase to exploitation as the personal 
slave of Idealist aesthetic theories. 
Essentialist theses - whether Idealist or not - that works of 
art have a corrnnon and peculiar ontology, are no longer 
1 philosophically acceptable. It is much less a commonplace of 
contemporary opinion, however, that positions of a somewhat 
essentialist character or flavour, in relation to individual arts -
in particular to sculpture - are untenable. Some present argument 
that the use of the term 'sculpture' is more complex than any 
single simple formula will elucidate is certainly called for; and 
especially is it important to emphasize that it would be a gross 
oversimplification to maintain - in reaction against the excesses 
of Idealism - that sculptures, regarded as aesthetic objects, are 
necessarily material objects. 
1 
Again, one cannot do everything at once. A characteristically 
contemporary paper on the subject is Robert Hoffman's 
'Conjectures and Refutations on the Ontological Status of the 
Work of Art',~' LXXI (1962). 
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The most usual way in which we apply the term 'sculpture' is, 
undoubtedly, to certain objects which are spatially extended in 
three dimensions and of perceptible mass. Relief sculptures, 
however, may so diminish in projection as in this respect to meet 
and even overlap very heavily textured paintings, montages and 
assemblages. The line here, if it is to be drawn at all upon the 
crude single criterion of relief projection, must be somewhat 
arbitrary. The extension of a visible thing in a third dimension 
seems almost to entail corporeality; and this is incidentally as 
true of physical paintings - as contrasted with, say, blue 'expanses' 
like the sky - as it is of sculptures. The imaginations of the 
writers of science-fiction have long since given us the 'tri-image' 
or 'visiprojector', by means of which intangible three-dimensional 
visibilia are projected into clear sight in a definite and 
explorable spatial relationship to observers; but it is by no means 
obvious that such notions should be regarded merely as lying beyond 
our present technology and not, like time machines, as logically 
incoherent. To speak of a sculpture is, more often than not, to 
speak of a substantial object; or at the very least to speak of 
something with a very intimate relation to a substantial object. 
It is as a rule to speak of something which is either visible or 
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tangible and corrnnonly - not invariably - both. 1 Sculptures are, in 
all proper uses of the term, public objects. They are identified 
without any necessary reference to particular observers, in such a 
way as to make it always intelligible to speak of two, or three, or 
any number of observers seeing the same sculpture (although, 
contingently, not from the same viewpoint at the same time). As to 
the metaphysics of the question of the ultimate nature of the 
objects of perception, I shall adopt an Austinian caution: 
There is no~ kind of thing that we 'perceive' but many 
different kinds, the number being reducible if at all by 
scientific investigation and not by philosophy: pens are 
in many ways though not in all ways unlike rainbows, 
which are in many ways though not in all ways unlike 
after-images, which in turn are in many ways but not in 
all ways unlike pictures on the cinema-screen - and so 
on, without assignable limit.2 
After-images sit a little awkwardly in this company, being, 
like pains, arguably things that we have rather than things that we 
perceive. It makes very good sense to speak of an existent pen, 
rainbow, or cinema-picture which, for one reason or another, we do 
not happen to perceive; but very doubtful sense to speak of an 
after-image which we do not perceive. But however this may be, 
1 
Naum Gabo says 'I can make a sculpture with the rays of the 
sun', but he does not say how. See Of Divers Arts (1962) p.64; 
which is the text of his 1959 A.W. Mellon Lectures at the 
National Gallery of Art, Washington. 
2 
J.L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (1962) p.4. 
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Austin's policy seems sound, even if one of his examples is in a 
certain way infelicitous. These epistemological considerations will 
be taken up again in the discussion: 'Pictures, Models, Measures and 
Matches' and in subsequent chapters dealing with the perceptual 
basis of criticism in painting and sculpture: for the moment it 
would be pointlessly provocative to insist upon nailing a standard 
to the mast. 
Many of the sculptures that we see and touch, criticize, buy and 
sell, insure, recover from the sea or accidentally break, are 
material objects in the plainest possible understanding of the 
expression. There is only one archaic Greek marble sculpture which 
is called, in English, The Calf-Bearer (illustrated frontispiece) 
which stands now in the Acropolis Museum in Athens, about which it 
is proper to say - amongst uncountable other things - that after 
wartime safe-keeping it lay for some time in several pieces in the 
basement of the National Museum. But there is, in addition to the 
(illustrated) unique original token, a ~called The Calf-Bearer, 
about which the Museum Guardians feel no concern lest enthusiasts 
should fingermark it. It is theft and mark resistant. We are not all 
perfectly agreed about how to describe its qualities, whether as 
those of the original carving of the first half of the sixth 
century B.C., or as those of the present weathered and partly 
broken object; but we have no doubt that in one form or another it 
would survive even the total loss of the original token. We only 
say that the Phidian chryselephantine statue of ~ ~ 
magnificent, rather than that it is magnificent, (or vulgar, or 
whatever), because we have no really trustworthy facsimiles of the 
lost object but only a tissue of hearsay and guesses. If we had 
plaster casts in every museum we should undoubtedly say that the 
Phidian sculpture is magnificent (or vulgar) and yet refuse to 
admit that what we are judging is to be identified with a 
particular material object in Berlin, or New York, or Athens, or 
anywhere. 
The type-token distinction, particularly as it touches the 
question of the honorific imputation of novelty or originality, is 
treated more fully in chapter five; it is mentioned here merely in 
presentation of the good prima facie case that the use of the term 
'sculpture' is not easily restricted to contexts in which particular 
ostensible material objects are the subject of remark. Even 
theorists who disallow the conceptual machinery of the type-token 
distinction upon one count or another must deal with the problem of 
editions of bronzes from a single mould, with later pirate casts, 
and with all the variety of possible copies and replicas made by 
various processes. Is Rodin's sculpture The Burghers of Calais in 
Calais or in London? Is Degas' Girl Dancer of Fourteen in Paris 
or in Copenhagen? The evident absurdity of attempting to answer 
these questions as put brings out the required point, whether a 
resolution of the difficulty in terms of types and tokens is 
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Unigue Forms of Continuity in Space (1913) by 
Umberto Boccioni 
regarded as acceptable or not. Yet another obstacle for whoever 
would simplify discourse about sculpture by a bold stroke of 
legislation is that he must somehow acconrrnodate within his scheme the 
distinction between an object simpliciter (whether type or token) and 
an object in a historical and cultural context. An original formal 
device, like an original strategy at chess, can only occur once. 
Copies of it, although in an important sense 'indistinguishable' from 
it, are not honorifically original sculptures or strategies. 1 
But perhaps the most striking and least contentious illustration 
of the ineluctable complexity in our use of the word 'sculpture' 
arises out of movement and the way in which objects designed to 
undergo rapid temporal change are assimilable for critical purposes 
to the class of performances more readily than to that of material 
objects. 
The representation of movement in sculpture is a challenge to 
the artist which has been variously and ingeniously met, from the 
stiff forward thrust of the leg of the archaic kouros to the formal 
Futurist contrivance of Boccioni's Unique Forms of Continuity in 
Space (1913). It would be an egregious mistake, however, to suppose 
that the 'movement' of such objects is a perceptible aesthetic 
1 
This argument is developed in Chapter V. It connects also 
with the point made in Chapter I; that works of art (and, or 
including, objets trouves) may be seen as pointed within a 
context, as being in some ways more like events than objects. 
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phenomenon, comparable to the movement of a dancer; although we 
certainly have an idiom in which the movement (not in conspicuous 
quotes) of, say, a baroque design, is a feature to which attention 
may be directed. Whatever is meant by this - and there is no doubt 
that several things may be meant - there remains outstanding the 
simplest and most literal use of the word. Movement in sculpture, 
not the mere representational or symbolic convention, nor the 
invitation to a movement of the spectator's eye but the actual 
displacement of the parts of the work relative to each other and to 
an external reference-frame, has only a sporadic history and has not 
until quite recently been taken fully seriously as an aesthetic 
medium, or art. 
From very early times there has been animated statuary, ranging 
from religious images capable of potent or terrifying gesture, to 
the dancing and cavorting figures upon public clocks and musical 
boxes. Cellini claimed a high dramatic success with a figure on 
castors: 
I placed the statue, and ••• waited for the coming of the 
King LFrancis !]. '!'he Jupiter was raising his 
thunderbolt with the right hand in the act to hurl it; 
his left hand held the globe of the world. Among the 
flames of the thunderbolt I had very cleverly introduced 
a torch of white wax ••• Lw/hen the night came I set fire 
to the torch, which, standing higher than the head of 
Jupiter, shed light from above and showed the statue far 
better than by daytime. 
At length the King arrived ••• ! made my prentice Ascanio 
push the Jupiter toward his majesty. As it moved 
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smoothly forwards, my cunning in its turn was amply 
rewarded, for the gentle motion made the figure seem 
alive ••• The king exclaimed at once: 'This is by far the 
finest thing that has ever been seen .•• •l 
But in none of the historical instances, awesome, ingenious, 
delightful or grotesque as they have been, does it ever seem 
seriously to have been supposed that the movement of the object 
constituted a distinct aesthetic phenomenon comparable to a dance. 
Cellini's Jupiter is, in the end, judged stationary by daylight; 
clocks, prancing dolls and musical boxes have never been regarded by 
contemporaneous critics and commentators as exemplifying a distinct 
aesthetic medium; and the animated devices of magic and religion have 
not provoked any very searching reappraisals of traditional aesthetic 
theory. It was not until the twentieth century that there emerged a 
form of sculpture, the mobile, 2 which was designed to be seen in 
motion and not to be arrested for the purpose of conducting a really 
business-like critical appraisal of the sculpture 'as such'. The 
sculpture, as such, moved. 
The American sculptor Alexander Calder is generally credited 
with this innovation, although, like the internal combustion engine, 
it has about it an inevitability in the context which makes the 
1 
Benvenuto Cellini, The Life of Benvenuto Cellini, tr. John 
Addington Symonds (1925) p.330. 
2 
For an account of the origins of the term mobile (in which it 
is attributed to Duchamp) see: James Johnson Sweeney, Alexander 
Calder (1951) pp.32-35. 
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Steel Fish, Mobile (1934) by Alexander Calder 
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election of heroes difficult. Nevertheless, Calder's name is rightly 
prominent, and his early Steel Fish (1934) is illustrated opposite. 
Still photographs of mobiles are, more surely even than Plato's 
paintings of beds, at such a remove from reality that whoever has 
not seen a fine one in action will derive only a very poor impression 
of the effect. Such constructions as this have been assimilated into 
the family of sculptures as a branch which still lacks an entirely 
satisfactory theoretical basis for its appreciation and judgment. 
Even as lately as 1955 Patrick Heron, a critic of by no means 
reactionary opinions, was still inclined to say with apparent 
diffidence what one might have supposed by now to warrant full 
confidence: 
I think it is true to say that the movements of which 
Calder's tin leaves on their long stalks are capable 
are of far greater aesthetic interest than the shapes 
themselves.l 
It is one of the central contentions of this thesis that 
aesthetic verdicts may be passed upon the movement of mobiles as 
confidently as upon any aesthetic object of any kind whatever: that it 
is quite unnecessary to regard the assimilation of mobiles into the 
family of sculptures (rather than that of, say, ballets) as a move 
which entails COlillllitment to an essentialist theory of sculpture which 
would throw doubt upon the propriety of such remarks as Heron's. It 
1 
The Changing Forms of Art (1955) p.222. 
is, incidentally, an interesting pointer to the rate and pattern of 
verbal coinage in the arts that we also have the improbable term 
stabile, the meaning of which may be roughly and a little 
paradoxically rendered: 'mobile which is not designed to move'. We 
have entered a situation in which viewers who are thoroughly 
familiar with the cultural and historical context are able to see 
certain stationary non-figurative objects as representing a 
momentarily arrested movement, in analogy with the familiar way in 
which any bronze Deity is seen to be frozen in the act of hurling 
his trident or thunderbolt. There is a distinct extension in the 
range of permissible interpretation of sculptures, attributable 
basically to the invention of the mobile. 1 
Even more bizarre are the constructions of Tinguely and others; 
such as trundling objects, self-propelled by internal electric motors 
and directed by electronic circuitry into autonomous and highly 
enigmatic movement amongst their spectators. These extravagant 
conceits shade off, through single performances on the pattern of the 
Study for the End of the World, described in the previous chapter, 
into a distinct contemporary genre. Auto-destructive Art, as it has 
1 
Strictly speaking Calder's own stabiles, so named by Hans Arp 
in 1931, anticipated his mobiles by a year or two. Nevertheless 
the term mobile seems to have logical priority and stabile to be 
a dependent notion, to the precise extent that the word usefully 
connotes something importantly different from the traditional, 
unmoving, sculpture. 
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been called, may well be thought to have interesting, perhaps morbid, 
psychological and sociological determinants; but it cannot thereby be 
removed altogether from under the aesthetician's nose, A cardboard 
construction subjected to the corrosion of an acid-drip, such as has 
been made by Gustav Metzger in London - and appears in many variant 
forms all over the world - is very arguably, and even exhibitably, 
sculpture. Nevertheless, unlike an object exposed only to natural 
decay (and judged in some particular temporal appearance) such a 
thing is designedly a performance, from its pristine factory or 
studio condition to its final ruin. How we are properly to 
appreciate such a performance, especially if it is too lengthy to be 
kept under consistent observation for an entire 'show', is far from 
clear; and moreover it is quite certain that we have as yet no 
agreed canons by which to compare auto-destructions inter se, unless 
perhaps for ingenuity and extravagance. 
All sculpture, of course, is 'auto-destructive' in a very thin 
sense. That is to say, it is subject to the corruption of time, 
even if it escapes the vandal. Everything flows, as Heraclitus said, 
but stone and bronze flow very slowly indeed, and are almost 
paradigms of the permanent. Nor do the changes wrought by time upon 
a sculpture inevitably amount to a deterioration. A really fine 
patina, as every sculptor knows, takes time. Bronzes are buried in 
the ground, or left in the foundry urinal in order to accelerate 
patination; but any good manual of technique will admit that its 
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recipes are in general inferior to the mere lapse of a few 
favourable centuries. Nevertheless, the average uncared-for 
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sculpture has a finite life the vicissitudes of which no doubt present 
a discrete spectacle sub specie aeternitatis. 
The position of auto-destructive art in the family of sculptures 
is in some ways analogous to that of happenings in the family of 
theatrical entertainments. When an audience is expensively 
assembled, invited to turn its chairs in such a way as to place the 
stage behind it, the instructor then leaving the room permanently, 
has the audience witnessed or participated in a cabaret act?. A 
problem, no doubt, for Actor's Equity, and for licensing 
authorities; but not for aesthetics. A critic who remarks 'How 
inventive (or how unimaginative) it all was!' has made an aesthetic 
remark about an aesthetic object the precise logical or legal status 
of which is of no professional concern to him. Similarly, the 
critic who remarks 'What a gay (solemn, graceful, etc.) movement that 
sculpture has!' is only trivially faulted by a freak legal ruling 
that mobiles are not sculptures; and he is not in the least faulted 
by a logical ruling that a movement is not a material object, or that 
it is not an object of the imagination. The critic's answer is 
ready: 'No, indeed it is not; but nevertheless how gay (solemn, 
graceful, etc.) it is!' 
In sunnnary of the assumptions and arguments of this and the 
previous chapter, it might be said that: 
Firstly: the definition of 'art' and of 'sculpture' is a matter 
for the dictionaries and specialist works of reference, whose proper 
duty it is to keep pace with and accurately reflect the usages which 
emerge from the sprawling general debate which is conducted by 
English speakers, and which is occasionally highlighted by dramas 
of litigation. 
Secondly: these debates may well benefit both in urgency and 
clarity from the expert witness of philosophers, but nothing of 
profound metaphysical importance hangs upon the outcome. In 
particular, the elucidation and clarification of the use of the 
word 'sculpture' is not a matter of uncovering any essential 
property of sculptures which is common and peculiar to them. 
Thirdly: the unacceptable essentialist ontology postulated for 
works of art by Idealist aestheticians cannot be replaced by an 
equally clumsy Materialist ontology. 'Sculpture' is a term used, 
quite properly, of - at least - material objects; of types of which 
material objects are tokens; of objects as seen in relation to a 
context; of objects seen as events in a context; and of the 
movements of objects (whether seen in relation to a particular 
historical and cultural setting or not). 
And fourthly: consequent upon these considerations, the 
familiar theoretical obstacle placed in the way of certain kinds of 
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aesthetic remark - that they do not bear upon the sculpture as such 
- is to be treated with the deepest suspicion. We simply do not 
have a sufficiently monolithic concept of 'sculpture', much less 
of 'art', to make of such a move anything subtler than a legislative 
fist within a philosophical glove. 
Aesthetic objects, then, are the objects of aesthetic attention 
and remark; and they may be of as many logical types as there are 
kinds of thing in the world. Sculptures occupy an indefinite but 
connected range of the many-dimensional spectrum of kinds of thing, 
and they are the subject of special consideration in two ways 
throughout the remainder of this thesis. They supply the bulk of 
the examples and lie at the focus of attention in the next three 
chapters, which attempt to clarify the notions of aesthetic 
attitude, aesthetic remark, and verdict in a way which evidently has 
a much wider application than to sculpture alone, or even to the 
whole range of visual arts. And the final chapters attempt to deal 
with a problem which is peculiar and central to the criticism of 
sculpture and which, if properly solved, may be expected to throw 
light upon much that is puzzling in current critical practice. 
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CHAPTER III 
AESTHETIC REMARKS 
Aesthetic remarks, I shall argue, are utterances the 
understanding of which is intimately bound up with the notions of 
the aesthetic attitude and of aesthetic sensibility. They have 
many forms from monosyllabic exclamation of an almost sub-linguistic 
kind to that of the complete, sometimes elaborate sentence in which 
a subject is located and characterized. 
Sometimes a critic will draw attention to what we would perhaps 
wish to call a natural feature of something - such as its shape or 
colour - but he will do this for aesthetic ends or purposes, having 
exercised sensibility in the selection of the feature for remark. 
Thus, he might say upon being offered a paint by a colour merchant: 
'It is violet - that certainly won't do!' That the colour is 
violet (if it is) is a matter of fact, and its discrimination 
involves no exercise of taste at all, but only of quite connnonplace 
powers or capacities. Sensibility is involved in seeing that what 
'won't do' about the paint, in terms of some projected scheme of 
decoration, is its hue, rather than, say, its intensity or its 
gloss. To have picked out and drawn attention to the hue is, in 
envisageable circumstances, to have exercised taste; even when the 
uttered remark embodies no conspicuously aesthetic terms, and might, 
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in other circumstances, not have been an aesthetic remark at all. 
'It is violet - that certainly won't do!' could very well be the 
form of rejection of a colour for use in a projected colour-
discrimination test to which only, say, yellow and green are 
appropriate; a rejection involving no question of aesthetic 
sensibility whatsoever. 
Something of the diverse range and character of aesthetic 
remarks in the professional critical mouth, even in relation to 
a single art, is shown by the following examples. They are taken 
from contexts in which there is no doubt - in a general sort of 
way - about what is afoot: critics are here supposing themselves to 
be, and no doubt are, exercising and exhibiting aesthetic 
sensibility, although in strikingly different ways and phrases. 
1 
But as you pass, these wooden scarecrows come to life. 
They radiate personality ..• l 
And: 
What can be seen is that he's leaning forward more than 
a third of a cubit; and this by itself is the worst and 
most intolerable error that useless, vulgar craftsmen 
can make ..• And they say that one of the feet of the 
Hercules is buried, and the other looks as if someone 
has lit a fire under it.2 
Hugh Gordon Porteus, 'Wooden Scarecrows', a review of the 
sculpture of Peter Startup in The Listener, 29 August 1963. 
2 
Benvenuto Cellini, The Life of Benvenuto Cellini. Cellini 
is regaling Duke Cosimo with an account of the imperfections 
of his rival Bandinelli's Hercules and Cacus. 
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And, of Anton Dominik van Fernkorn's monument to the fallen in 
the cemetary at Aspern near Vienna, where Napoleon suffered his 
first defeat: 
His ••. Pying Lion shows that Fernkorn possessed a fiery 
spirit like Rude's and Rethel's. In its dramatic forms 
the huge figure of the animal, with its almost human 
face ravaged by grief, is artistically superior to 
Thorwaldsen's Lion of Lucerne.l 
And: 
••. the formless and much pierced metal-ware of Adams, 
Milani, Garelli or Riopelle is destined, I suppose, to 
take its place in corridors or chambers. And what is 
the fate of the Double Money Box, with removable lid, 
by Dalwood? Under the bed.2 
Some of these remarks do more than baldly characterize the work 
from an aesthetic point of view, or in evidently aesthetic terms: 
they embody verdicts upon it. I shall argue in Chapter V that 
aesthetic verdicts are aesthetic remarks which have certain special 
functions (notably those of response-prediction, connnendation and 
reconnnendation), but that in forming them taste is exercised no less 
than in the formulation of those aesthetic remarks which do not 
function as verdicts. In brief, aesthetic verdicts are aesthetic 
remarks - whatever else they may be - and they are responsive to the 
same preliminary moves in analysis. 
1 
Fritz Novotny, Painting and Sculpture in Europe, 1780-1880 
(1960) p.227. 
2 
Douglas Cooper, 'Venice Art Fair', The New Statesman, 
17 August 1962. 
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The first problem which must be clarified in an investigation 
of the logical features of aesthetic remarks is that of the relation 
between what might be called patently aesthetic terms (such as 
'pretty', 'ugly', 'delicately patterned' and so on) and the 
aesthetic use of terms. Terms which are not conspicuously 
aesthetic or moral or economic, or indeed of any proprietary kind, 
make up the bulk of any natural language, and most of them may be 
put to aesthetic use. The great majority of English words and 
phrases are, like tools, apt to a wide variety of purposes; although 
there are, as in any natural modern language, certain terms and 
expressions which may be said to have a characteristic if not a 
quite exclusive use in aesthetic contexts. 
Frank Sibley, in a notable paper, 1 lists useful examples of 
terms (as it happens, but not of necessity, adjectives) which often 
find aesthetic use, as: 
Unified, balanced, integrated, lifeless, serene, somber, 
dynamic, powerful, vivid, delicate, moving, trite, 
sentimental, tragic.2 
He then nominates a handful which, he claims, 'function only 
or predominantly as aesthetic terms'. These are: 
1 
2 
3 
graceful, delicate, dainty, handsome, comely, elegant, 
garish.3 
'Aesthetic Concepts', PR, LXVIII (1959). 
Ibid., p.421. 
p.422. 
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And these he contrasts with words 'which are seldom used as 
aesthetic terms at all'. It is incidentally symptomatic of the 
uncertainty surrounding the distinctions that are to be made here 
that Sibley employs the locution ' ... used as aesthetic terms' (my 
emphasis); a formula which knits together rather than unpicks the 
logical tangle. Indeed, he connnents in a footnote: 'I shall speak 
loosely of an "aesthetic term", even when, because the word 
sometimes has other uses, it would be more correct to speak of its 
1 
use as an aesthetic term'. Nevertheless it is plain from his 
argument - indeed one might almost say it is his argument - that 
elegance (for example) cannot but be an aesthetic feature of any 
object which exhibits it, whereas squareness (let us say) cannot be 
an aesthetic feature. His list of non-aesthetic terms, to contrast 
with the aesthetic terms exemplified above, runs: 
red, noisy, brackish, clannny, sguare, docile, curved, 
evanescent, intelligent, faithful, derelict, tardy, 
freakish.2 
I believe that although this contrast is a plausible one, its 
logical force has been much exaggerated, largely as a result of a 
too summary dismissal of the dangers implicit in speaking 'loosely' 
of terms instead of, 'more strictly', the use of terms. A similar 
1 
Ibid., p.421. 
2 
Ibid., p.422. 
52 
1 point has indeed already been made by H.R.G. Schwyzer, although 
Sibley has evaded the full force of his objections by demonstrating 
a certain amount of cross-purpose between Schwyzer and himself. 2 At 
any rate it would seem to be common ground that such an adjective as 
'pretty' (not to raid Sibley's hoard) is one of which aesthetic use 
is made upon such an overwhelming majority of its appearancesthat 
one might as well call it an aesthetic term - so long as it is 
remembered that such use, though usual, is not unavoidable. In its 
adverbial role ('pretty well, thank you') it means 'moderately'; and 
even as an adjective ('a pretty kettle of fish') its import may be 
quantitative rather than qualitative. 
The logically crucial step in Sibley's treatment of patently 
aesthetic terms is to regard them as having the proper function of 
referring to an object's aesthetic features, which are contrasted 
with its non-aesthetic features; these latter being features which 
3 
'do not depend for their recognition upon an exercise of taste'. 
For reasons which will become apparent I shall prefer the expression 
'natural features' to 'non-aesthetic features', although both 
locutions have their disadvantages, and they are certainly not 
synonymous. Sibley argues, persuasively: 
1 
'Sibley's "Aesthetic Concepts'", PR, LXXII (1963). 
2 
'Aesthetic Concepts: A Rejoinder', PR, LXXII (1963). 
3 
'Aesthetic Concepts', p.424. 
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When we cannot ourselves quite say what non-aesthetic 
features make something delicate or unbalanced or 
powerful or moving, the good critic often puts his 
finger on something which strikes us as the right 
explanation. In short, aesthetic words apply ultimately 
because of, and aesthetic qualities ultimately depend 
upon, the presence of features which, like curving or 
angular lines, color contrasts, placing of masses, or 
speed of movement, are visible, audible, or otherwise 
discernible without any exercise of taste of 
sensibility. Whatever kind of dependence this is, and 
there are various relationships between aesthetic 
qualities and non-aesthetic features, what I want to 
make clear ... is that there are no non-aesthetic 
features which serve as conditions for applying 
aesthetic terms. Aesthetic or taste concepts are not 
in this respect condition-governed at all.l 
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It is a corollary of this last contention, and surely a true one, 
that it would be quite impossible to construct any descriptive 
catalogue of the natural features of an object - say, a vase - such 
that someone who had not seen the vase would be able to say that it 
is deducible from its possession of the natural features listed that 
the vase must be, cannot but be, delicate, or elegant. Sibley 
contrasts this state of affairs with other cases, arguing that some 
list of conditions (in terms of natural features) would be sufficient 
for the application to an appropriate object of such non-aesthetic 
terms as 'intelligent' or 'lazy'; and that even defeasible concepts 
2 
such as 'offer' and 'acceptance' are condition-governed in that 
1 
Ibid., p.424. 
2 
Cf. H.L.A. Hart, 'The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights', 
in A.G.N. Flew, ed., Logic and Language (1951). 
adequate specification of rather complex circumstances, in particular 
that there is no voiding feature present - assuming that this can be 
known - will logically guarantee that an offer or an acceptance has 
taken place. 
Nothing, in terms of non-aesthetic, or natural, features, will 
guarantee that an unseen vase is elegant; although sufficiently 
complete descriptions of it will make the possibility appear a likely 
one. In such a case, however, if the description is comprehensive 
enough, we may be put virtually into the position of a viewer who 
does see the object, and may well be able in practice to form sound 
opinions about its aesthetic qualities. It is, nevertheless, in such 
a case, because we are able to imagine the object and not because of 
any implications derivable deductively from the description, that we 
are able to make plausibly apt aesthetic remarks about it. 
All this is in a way quite familiar. The view that it is 
impossible to make logical transitions from descriptions to 
normative judgments is a hallowed one. Sibley's contribution in this 
respect is to cast the discussion into contemporary philosophical 
terms and - perhaps more importantly - to take something of the 
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force of valuation away from the traditional concept of a normative 
judgment. His 'aesthetic terms' are still arguably value-uncorrrrnitted, 
in spite of being 'aesthetic'. It is open to a critic to say 'Elegant, 
Ah!' or 'Elegant, Bah!' or indeed 'Elegant, so what?' Elegance, in 
his view, may be a perceptible feature or characteristic of something 
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much as, or as value-neutrally as, squareness or symmetry is a 
perceptible feature or characteristic of it. The difference, he 
holds, is that whereas sufficient conditions for the application of 
such an epithet as 'square' or 'syrrnnetrical' can be given, no set of 
conditions can be established such that the applicability of an 
aesthetic term like 'elegant' is guaranteed. Viewers with 
sensibility ~ that something is elegant; viewers without do not. 
And presumably, whether a viewer does or does not see that a suitable 
object is elegant may be regarded, reciprocally, as criterial of 
whether or not this viewer is a person endowed with aesthetic taste 
or sensibility. 
An unfortunate effect of this interesting argument is that it 
tends to turn our attention away from the important fact that the 
natural features of objects may not merely explain or account for 
its aesthetic features, but may actually be aesthetic features of it. 
Aesthetically sensitive commentators often draw attention to the 
precise shape or colour of something with the same point - that is, 
aesthetic point - as they draw attention to elegance or garishness. 
Sibley's way of putting the matter will not do; even though it be 
granted - as it surely must - that there are some feats of 
discrimination which do, and some which do not call for the exercise 
of aesthetic sensibility. The objection to it can be put quite 
briefly: it is that the distinction between natural and other 
qualities (taking the regulation of the appropriate epithets by sets 
of sufficient conditions to be criterial of the 'natural') is not the 
same as the distinction between natural qualities and aesthetic 
qualities. It is neither true that no natural quality (condition-
governed) can be an aesthetic quality; nor is it true that all 
non-natural qualities (not condition-governed) must be aesthetic 
qualities. In order to bring out these contentions more clearly I 
shall distinguish 'natural' qualities from others in a somewhat 
different way. 
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Let us think, now, in terms of the construction of facsimiles of 
sensorily perceptible objects. If someone is set the task of 
imitating or copying an object of sense-perception as exactly as human 
skill in sensory discrimination will allow (assuming that he has 
adequate mechanical competence) we might say that the difference 
between what I have called natural features and others is expressible 
in this way: any mistake or failure to discriminate a difference 
between a natural feature of the original and the corresponding 
feature' of the attempted facsimile must issue in imperfection in the 
copy, whereas failure to make non-natural discriminations need have 
no such consequence. Lack of taste may result in the production of 
an imperfect copy, but it need not. It is not necessary - although 
it is undoubtedly helpful - to see the graceful tension or the 
flaccidity of a line in order to copy it correctly or to pick out 
the best from a selection of slightly differing copies of it. If an 
observer is able to discriminate between one object and another 
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which differs from it in any sensorily perceptible respect by more 
than a normal discrimination step then he can (in principle) make or 
select a perfect facsimile even if in the process he notices no 
aesthetic features whatever in either the original or in the copy, and 
a fortiori totally fails to perform a single feat of aesthetic 
discrimination. 
The notion of a 'discrimination step' introduced here is, of 
course, somewhat indeterminate. The size of such a step cannot, in 
principle, be specified exactly. Tea-tasters and wine-tasters, as 
well as expert wool-dyers, make finer discrimination steps within a 
certain range than do most of us, and each one of us is able to 
perform some humble feat of discrimination which scarcely anyone else 
can manage, even if it is only to pick out a particularly well-known 
face in a crowd. The point is that a capacity to make uncommonly 
fine discrimination steps, as contrasted with coarse ones, does not 
mark a sensitivity to non-natural, as contrasted with natural, 
features. One does not, assuming normal vision, come to see the 
gracefulness of a curve by looking harder in the way in which one 
might come to see the smaller local variations in its direction and 
intensity by looking harder. A powerful glass is not normally, for 
objects of moderate size, an aid in the discrimination of differences 
in aesthetic quality although, as Dr Watson was tediously instructed, 
it might help one to distinguish a defunct cigar recently enjoyed by 
a red-haired officer with a lisp who had been cashiered for 
embezzlement in Afghanistan in 1871, from a more commonplace butt. 
The attractiveness of this criterion of the natural sensorily 
perceptible property - its relevance to facsimile construction - is 
much higher at an abstract theoretical level than at the practical 
level where specific candidates for the role of natural feature are 
under examination. It happens to be a well-attested psychological 
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fact that people ordinarily make visual discriminations (for example) 
very much in terms of how they see things, or of what they see them as. 
The familiar figure-ground relationship illustrates the point: the 
viewer who sees a candlestick will make a copy of the diagram which 
differs in predictable and easily-explained ways from that of the 
viewer who sees the original diagram as a pair of kissing faces. Or 
the viewer who is given sample felts of the same colour, one in the 
shape of a leaf, the other in the shape of a donkey, will match the 
former with a greener and the latter with a browner sample from a 
presented range. 
Ofcourse, if the samples or the diagrams are put into appropriate 
proximity and scrutinised minutely it will often prove possible for 
viewers to correct discrepancies to some extent, even without tumbling 
to an alternative interpretation of what they are looking at which 
would make their task much easier; although it may well be the case 
that there are often - perhaps always - residual failures in fine 
discrimination which are only ultimately explicable in psychological 
terms since the physiological capacity to make that very 
discrimination under different conditions can easily be established. 
These reservations do not seem, however, to have any important 
relevance to the aesthetic issue; except in that failure to make 
discriminations within the normal range between the natural 
properties of things - as for instance in the case of defective 
colour-vision - will tend to issue in abnormal aesthetic judgments. 
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The real difficulty about the 'facsimile' test for 
distinguishing the natural sensorily perceptible properties of things 
comes when we try, not to demonstrate but to ~' in general terms, 
which properties are natural and which are not: which are the 
perceptible features about which mistakes would necessarily show in 
a copy, and which are those about which discrimination-failures would 
be of no consequence. It is intuitively obvious that an aesthetically 
insensitive person who did not notice a clash of colours might 
nevertheless have missed no natural feature of what is before him, 
but it is far from obvious how one is to establish the principles 
upon which characterizing words or phrases already in use are to be 
divided into those which do, and those which do not refer to natural 
features. 
We might stipulate, as a rough rule, that 'natural sensorily 
perceptible features' are to be understood as those in respect of 
which normal observers are able to make normal, testable, 
discriminations. But what is the contrast here~ If normal observers 
cannot distinguish between the appearance of two objects, then we 
must say that there is no perceptible difference between them, and 
that the notion of non-natural perceptible qualities is a wholly 
bogus one! 
A resolution of the dilemma seems to be possible in this way: 
if there is a perceptible difference between two objects (let us say 
a supple curve and a slack curve), then anyone with normal sensory 
powers will see, if he looks closely enough, that there is a 
difference. What such a person may be unable to do is to recognize 
the difference as an aesthetic difference, and to give it an 
aesthetic characterization. He may be able to make or to select 
facsimiles which demonstrate that he sees the difference, and even 
to offer descriptions or characterizations which show that he sees 
it (for example: 'This curve is thinner just here, and straighter 
just here, and .•. ') but he may nevertheless not recognize or be 
capable of remarking the aesthetic difference that while one curve 
is supple the other is slack. 
A point of the utmost importance must be made here. It is that 
while the appropriateness of most of the paradigmatically aesthetic 
terms in Sibley's list will depend upon the natural features of the 
object characterized in such a way that objects which differ in 
their aesthetic features will also differ perceptibly to any 
physiologically normal viewer, with or without taste; it is 
nevertheless not the case that all apt remarks which distinguish 
aesthetically between two objects draw attention to a difference 
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which has a corollary in the natural sensorily perceptible features 
of these objects. This claim is less paradoxical than it sounds. 
Raising the hat, for example, may be elegantly courteous in a certain 
situation; in another (perhaps a second after the person to be 
saluted has passed haughtily by) it may appear exaggeratedly and 
comically derisive, although there is no perceptible difference 
between the bodily movements in the two cases, but only in their 
timing in relation to the context of events. 
Or, to take another case, a work of art which breaks new ground 
in a laudable way ('exciting, fresh, original', the critics say) may 
be copied very exactly with results about which the critics are not 
enthusiastic in the same way. It is not that the copy is seriously 
held to differ from the original in any of its natural sensorily 
perceptible features, but merely in the relation it bears to the 
objects and events which constitute its cultural context. 
And finally, if it is not to labour the point unnecessarily, 
today's elegant gown or smart suit is often tomorrow's amusing 
fancy dress. 
To sunnnarize the point: we sometimes remark that something is 
for example garish, it being an exercise of taste to notice this, 
and we try to persuade a companion who has not seen it in that way 
that he should do so. We draw his attention to the brightness of 
colour, the amount of decoration, and so on, in an effort to win 
his agreement that it is indeed a gaudy or garish thing. Sometimes, 
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however, we try to get our companion to see things as we do, or to 
see 'eye to eye' with us, or to see matters 'in the same light' (in 
a word, to agree) by drawing attention to the object's context. 
'This would no doubt be a stimulating and lively addition to X's 
scheme of interior decoration', we say, 'but in Y's rococo dining 
room it is garish'. 
The difference between an object of aesthetic attention seen 
simpliciter and seen in relation to a context ~ whether physical or 
historico-cultural - has been minimised, exaggerated, and ignored by 
aestheticians. It may be minimised by treating entire physical 
contexts as natural objects of aesthetic a~tention, and regarding 
complete works of art within such contexts as internal features of 
it, much as the work itself has internal features. This stratagem 
effectively dismisses difficulties arising from the contrast of 
object simpliciter with object in a specific environment, by 
postulating effectively different objects of aesthetic attention and 
thereby resolving threatened contradictions of aesthetic terms. But 
this move does not dispose of the somewhat different case of the 
object seen in relation to or in terms of a historical and cultural 
context. It is not quite plausible to say that pointing out the 
impressive originality of a particular work of art is a concealed 
means of drawing attention to a feature of our civilization. At 
most we may feel inclined to say that what is discerned is a feature 
of the work which only a civilised person could be expected to see. 
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The difference between an object simpliciter and an object in a 
cultural and historical setting may be exaggerated; and indeed it 
has been exaggerated, especially by formalistic theoreticians whose 
policy in this respect is legislative. The modern locus classicus 
for stipulative theorizing of this sort is, of course, Bell's 
surprisingly influential book: 
•.. to appreciate a work of art we need bring with us 
nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and 
affairs, no familiarity with its emotions.l 
But the view that contextual considerations can easily and 
sharply be distinguished from intrinsic considerations is by no 
means a peculiarly modern one. It is, indeed, virtually implicit 
in any theory of intrinsic or objective beauty from Plato's onwards, 
whether beauty is held - as by Plato - to be a transcendental 
quality or - as by Osborne - an emergent one. Osborne writes: 
... beauty itself is simply the extension of that 
principle of emergent perceptual configuration 
innnediately apprehensible by unreflective intuition ... 2 
That 'beauty itself' is not simply any such thing is made clear 
a little later, when Osborne brings out the importance of 'unity' to 
those perceptual configurations which are properly called beautiful. 
But if beauty is not at least (whatever else) an emergent objective 
1 
Clive Bell, Art (1949) p.25. 
2 
Harold Osborne, Theory of Beauty (1952) p.122. 
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property in Osborne's view, then he has undoubtedly failed to make 
his position clear. He writes: 
A work of art is a successful work of art in so far as 
it achieves an organisation of perceptual material into 
a single organic whole from which emerges a new and 
unique perceptual quality in awareness. In so far as 
it falls into two or more discrete sections not 
organically connected in experience but related only 
discursively, it fails as a work of art. As, 
therefore, beauty was defined as the characteristic 
excellence of a work of art, we may now describe it 
more concretely as the property of being an organic 
unity to perception.l 
Whatever it may be, quite precisely, that is being argued here, 
it certainly seems plain enough that such a view cannot be maintained 
consistently with an admission that the time, place and circumstances 
in which an object is known to have been made and is presently 
examined will affect the range of aesthetic epithets or 
characterizations properly applicable to it. I hope neither to 
minimize nor to exaggerate the relevance and importance of these 
considerations, nor to ignore them nor to legislate concerning them, 
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but simply to offer an account of aesthetic remarks which acconnnodates 
them. 
It will be convenient at this point to recapitulate some of the 
main contentions so far. Aesthetic remarks, it has been claimed, are 
remarks which generally speaking cannot be appropriately made in novel 
situations except by viewers who have, and exercise, aesthetic 
1 
Ibid., p.125. 
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sensibility. Normally and correctly functioning sense organs by means 
of which the observer is able to make all ordinary discriminations 
between the natural perceptible properties of things are perhaps a 
necessary, but certainly not a sufficient condition for making 
aesthetic remarks to which the assent of other normal observers can 
rationally be invited. Amongst the linguistic resources which are 
available to us for making aesthetic remarks are certain conspicuously 
aesthetic terms - of which 'pretty' might serve as an example; and 
amongst the features of objects, especially perhaps those features 
to which aesthetic terms evidently apply, are some whose special 
dependence upon particular natural perceptible features is at once 
obvious to the eye of taste. In illustration of this last contention: 
the skilful critic says 'It is the absence of clearly defined features 
which gives the bronze face that aloof, timeless grandeur', or 'The 
texture is too rough and irregular for so small a work - it breaks 
up the calm flow of the surfaces into irrelevantly agitated facets'. 
In such cases the critic will often be said to have 'put his 
finger on something that strikes us as the right explanation'. Our 
puzzle is, however, to understand how it is that pointing out natural 
perceptible features can be called 'giving the right explanation' of 
an aesthetic feature, while at the same time maintaining that not 
even conspicuously aesthetic terms - much less aesthetic remarks in 
general - are appropriate in virtue of any set of natural perceptible 
features providing the sufficient conditions for their application. 
We are inclined to insist either that these terms or remarks must be, 
after all, somehow condition-governed; or else that whatever the 
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critic has achieved it is not the explanation - in any logically crisp 
sense of the word - of the correctness of the aesthetic term he applies 
or the aesthetic remark he makes. 
There is something to be said in support of both these 
inclinations; and no doubt when it is said it will be easier to see 
how the dilemma should be resolved. 
To consider the second inclination first: we may be disposed to 
argue that the presence of no natural perceptible feature, or set of 
features, explains the presence of an aesthetic feature. And, of 
course, if we read 'explains' as 'provides the sufficient conditions 
for ..• ', then we do not have an explanation. But it is noteworthy that 
Sibley uses a very natural locution when he says that the good critic 
puts his finger on something which strikes us as being the right 
explanation. If we think in psychological, not in logical terms, then 
we might have a viable sense of 'explanation' which meets the case in 
hand. This is not to propose psychological explanations of the 
relation of dependence between natural features and aesthetic features, 
which would be absurd, but to suggest that human beings with a similar 
nature and training will in fact accept as explanatory arguments which 
are not logically compelling. Thus, for example, we sometimes account 
for our saying that Jones is in love by pointing out certain things 
about his behaviour - perhaps just one telling thing about it - which 
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will at once strike mutual friends as being the right explanation for, 
and as completely justifying, an assertion about Jones which they had 
perhaps not previously felt any inclination to make themselves and 
which they may even have resisted until their attention was drawn to 
'the explanation'. At the same time, it would be impossible to argue 
that behaving in just this way constitutes a sufficient condition for 
the application of the predicate 'is in love'. Not even taking all 
that is already known about Jones, together with the new observation, 
do we have a logically sufficient condition for saying that he is in 
love; merely what a lawJermight call 'very strong grounds for 
presumption', or a physician 'marked indications'. 
Does this imply that we can never be certain that anyone is in 
love! If the only certainty we will allow is the certainty of logical 
inference from sufficient conditions, then it does; but of course this 
is not the only kind of certainty. Even if we have residual doubts 
about Jones (who may, after all, have his eye on the girl's Post 
Office Savings Account, or be acting under the influence of drugs or 
hypnosis), we can have none about Heloise, or Romeo. It would be 
foolish to ask whether perhaps these paradigm lovers were really 
deceiving their Abelard or Juliet. 
The other impulse, to say that the application of aesthetic terms 
is somehow governed by logically sufficient conditions specifiable in 
terms of the natural sensorily perceptible features of things, may not 
be prompted by a conscious and explicit thirst for a single kind of 
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certainty so much as by the obvious parallels which obtain between 
patently aesthetic terms such as 'pretty' and other terms which we are 
able to apply with confidence in spite of the extreme openness of 
their application-conditions. 'In love', for example, or 'polite'. 
We might see every event which takes place in a certain situation 
and yet, occasionally, ask ourselves: 'Was it a polite deference that 
he showed, or an impudently mocking one?' Most often, however, we 
simply know, having been taught from infancy how to manipulate 
concepts of manners. We know that there was impudence, and sometimes 
we can explain how we know: 'Didn't you see him wink?' 
Much as we learn what is courteous and what is rude, from 
exemplars, so do we learn what is pretty - and what is graceful, 
elegant, dainty and so on as well. Amongst our earliest lessons in 
the cradle are 'See the pretty rattle ..• see the pretty lady'; and, a 
little later perhaps: 'See the nasty toad .•• don't pull horrid faces .•• '. 
The patently aesthetic terms listed by Sibley are terms the first use 
of which is learnt through ostended exemplars, just as the use of many 
other characterizing expressions is learnt. We are sometimes entitled 
to be just as sure that a little girl is pretty as that she is 
disgracefully rude, although in neither case can we say what facts or 
events are quite certainly sufficient to justify the application of 
the epithet. What we can say - sometimes - is what particular fact 
or event justifies the use of the epithet on a particular occasion: 
'justify' here meaning not 'provide the logically sufficient condition' 
but simply 'account for what was said, and secure the consent of 
similarly trained people to the usage'. 
Sibley seems to be mistaken in supposing that the absence of 
logically sufficient application-conditions for aesthetic terms is 
what marks them off from other'kinds of linguistic device. This is 
quite clearly not the case: politeness, for example, is at least as 
'open' in relation to bodily movements as prettiness is in relation 
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to natural perceptible features. He is certainly not mistaken, however, 
in arguing, as he does, that the words and gestures of the art critic, 
including the pointing out of natural perceptible features whose 
recognition requires no exercise of taste, sometimes have the effect 
of bringing others to see aesthetic qualities that they had not 
previously noticed, or to consent to the application of aesthetic 
terms which they had not previously thought applicable. Such an 
observation seems to be in no way theoretical, speculative or 
contentious but to be one of the facts of common experience which it 
is the role of theory to give an account. 
The key to the central dilennna about aesthetic remarks - that they 
seem to be remarks about which it is intelligible to hold that they may 
be correctly or incorrectly applied and at the same time remarks which 
cannot, in principle, connnand general assent - seems to be this: 
conspicuously aesthetic terms such as 'pretty' are not the most helpful 
but, on the contrary, the least helpful expressions from the point of 
view of grasping what is peculiarly aesthetic about aesthetic remarks. 
They are unhelpful both because their freedom from logically 
sufficient application-conditions is shared with other non-aesthetic 
kinds of term, and - more importantly - because their firm anchorage 
in paradigms during the learning process makes for relatively easy 
agreement about their use. Their 'condition-freedom', indeed, often 
gives little more space for manoeuvre than another's chains. Who 
would feel that the selection of a pretty girl from a crowd was a 
particularly exacting task, or one in which his choice was very 
likely to be challenged? 
What is peculiarly aesthetic about aesthetic remarks, whether 
they make use of patently aesthetic terms or not, is that their 
function is to draw attention to something about an object which 
only an aesthetically sensitive person would, in the given context, 
respond to. The feature provocative of such a response may well be 
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a natural sensorily perceptible feature of something - its colour, 
say. It has already been pointed out that, under appropriate 
circumstances, such an utterance as 'It is violet!' may be an 
aesthetic remark, notwithstanding that whether the object is or is not 
violet is a matter of fact about which we are not severally entitled 
to our different opinions. Freedom is introduced in this way: whoever 
would not make that aesthetic remark is not thereby committed to 
denying that the object is violet, but to denying that 'It is violet' 
is an appropriate, or correct aesthetic remark. 'A man of taste 
would not make that remark about it at all', an objector might say, 
'but something quite different: for example .•• ' 
This state of affairs, it is true, differs from that which 
obtains when patently aesthetic terms are at issue. One might 
challenge the contention that something is elegant either by 
insisting that it is not elegant, or by holding that its elegance 
has, in the specific context, no aesthetic relevance. One might say, 
for example: 'When you describe the solution to that problem as 
"elegant" you are not making an aesthetic remark. It is a clear, 
simple, and correct solution; but when you characterize it - quite 
permissibly - as "elegant" you are not exercising aesthetic taste but 
some other kind of taste.' The onus of argument would be upon the 
challenger here, and it is not clear without having a quite specific 
case in mind, how he would proceed. But if, for example, he were to 
argue successfully that the original critic would not have called the 
solution 'elegant' if it had in fact been a false or stupid solution, 
then he would seem to be some way towards establishing that he was 
using 'elegant' non-aesthetically. 
Or, to alter the example, it is surely clear that the stage-
Soviet critic's 'Elegant, bah!' to Paris fashions is a moral remark. 
These examples are not, it must be confessed, overwhelmingly 
convincing; but this is surely unsurprising in view of the fact that 
they aim to make a logical point of which practical advantage is 
relatively seldom taken. Terms like 'elegant' function, as Sibley 
quite rightly points out, 'only or predominantly as aesthetic terms'. 
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It will evidently not be easy to find a convincing non-aesthetic use 
for a term which is seldom if ever ordinarily given a non-aesthetic 
use. At the same time it must not be assumed that the practical 
difficultyis a logical one - that 'aesthetic terms' cannot be given 
non-aesthetic use. 
What it is to exercise aesthetic sensibility or to adopt an 
aesthetic attitude, will be investigated more fully in the next 
chapter: but ~thing which is certainly involved, and which this 
discussion of aesthetic remarks brings out, is that aesthetic remarks 
are personal or - to risk a dangerous word - subjective, in the sense 
that we cannot be constrained to make them or assent to them by 
arguments cast in the form of logical deductions from the natural 
sensorily perceptible features of objects. On the other hand some of 
them are virtually impersonal or objective in that they are rooted in 
paradigms. It would be almost senseless to deny that suitably chosen 
paradigm objects are pretty, dainty, elegant, or whatever. Almost, 
but not quite, senseless: for if it could not intelligibly be denied 
that a certain dress was elegant or girl pretty, then these 
assertions would not be aesthetic remarks but statements of fact. To 
keep the aesthetic 'game' in play we need something very like facts 
to give our arguments sense and direction, but not so like facts that 
our judgments are no longer a matter of taste. 
Such material is supplied in part by our physiology and in part 
by our training and cultural experiences. We are likely to agree 
73 
74 
quite substantially about what sort of thing is, for example, 
sexually attractive; what is, in this or that social situation,the 
'done' thing (or the said thing); and which suits are smart and 
which works of art sentimental. Most of these things we are taught, 
although there are no doubt some which we do not need to be taught or 
in connection with which instruction is only nominal. Kant's view, 
that the aesthetic judgment is subjective yet it nevertheless makes 
a universal claim, 1 bestrides the paradox of agreement about matters 
of taste, and fails to resolve it. His implication that our corrrrnon 
humanity guarantees that all disinterested viewers would assent to 
any judgment of aesthetic taste appears to overlook the consideration 
that we all, as individuals, are ultimately and irreducibly various, 
and that if we were not there would not be any matters of taste at all 
but merely what we should all regard as matters of fact. In a world 
of similar disinterested critics a judgment that something or other 
is beautiful would be as much or as little 'aesthetic' as a judgment 
that it is blue, or that it tastes of garlic, or that the sum of its 
angles is two right angles. 
We can assent, it seems, to many of the things that Sibley says, 
as well as to most of those that Schwyzer, who seems to disagree with 
him, says. Sibley concludes: 
1 
Irrrrnanuel Kant, Critique of Aesthetic Judgemen~ passim. 
1 
2 
.•. it should not strike us as puzzling that the critic 
supports his judgments and brings us to see aesthetic 
qualities by pointing out key features and talking about 
them in the way he does. It is by the very same methods 
that people helped us to develop our aesthetic sense and 
master its vocabulary from the beginning. If we 
responded to these methods then, it is not surprising 
that we respond to the critic's discourse now. It would 
be surprising if, by using this language and behaviour, 
people could not sometimes bring us to see the aesthetic 
qualities of things; for this would prove us lacking in 
one characteristically human kind of awareness and 
activity.l 
And Schwyzer: 
Why, in trying to get you to see that my vase is 
graceful, can I not simply say that it is long and thin 
and slightly curved! Well surely because you can see 
this for yourself. But if I cannot in these 
circumstances talk in this way, how is it that I can 
talk in the following way, for example: 'You see how very 
gradually the stem curves downwards and outwards .•• '! 
Clearly because this is something you might not have seen, 
something you might not be able to say. Now why should 
this be so, when what I said contained no 'aesthetic' 
terminology? The only things at issue seem to be 'easily 
discernible non-aesthetic features'. But there is more 
to it than this. Roughly, you did see that the stem 
curved downwards and outwards gradually; you did not see 
how gradually it curved. And the moral of that is that 
when I say 'You see how very gradually ... ,' I~ engaging 
in aesthetic discourse, although I am not using any words 
that are tailor-made for that purpose .•. I make no 
transition from aesthetic to non-aesthetic talk, for I do 
not talk 'non-aesthetically' at all.2 
And: 
'Aesthetic Concepts', pp.49-50. 
'Sibley's "Aesthetic Concepts"', p.75. 
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There is no transition, in criticism, from aesthetic to 
non-aesthetic use of language. There need, therefore, 
be no puzzLement about how such transition is possible. 1 
An aesthetic remark, then, is a remark about an object of sense-
perception which - amongst other things to be discussed in the 
following chapter - could not, in principle, be held to be logically 
inadmissible or to be demonstrably untrue when it is uttered by a 
competent language-user. Of course, when teaching a child his mother 
tongue we are entitled to fault him. If he says: 'Not a pretty 
rattle' we shall suppose his temper to have deflected an already 
uncertain linguistic grasp, and shall in general be inclined to 
correct him - if not upon this then upon another suitable occasion. 
But if his father agrees with him, remarking that the pink is too 
insipid and the shape too visceral for the rattle really to be 
counted pretty, then we shall do well to pay close attention. 
Perhaps upon reflection we shall agree; and even if we do not we 
certainly cannot prove him wrong. If we could, then it would not be 
an aesthetic question whether the rattle is or is not pretty, nor 
would it be an exercise of aesthetic sensibility to pick out those 
natural features which most powerfully incline us to say that the 
object is pretty, and with the aid of which we might yet hope to win 
agreement. 
1 
lb id. ' p. 7 8. 
76 
This criterion of the aesthetic - that taste or sensibility is 
intimately involved while conclusive demonstrability is not - serves 
to distinguish aesthetic remarks from some others. Descriptive 
remarks, for example, employing terms for the use of which sufficient 
conditions can be established, are not, as such, aesthetic; although 
aesthetic use may be made of them. But this criterion does not 
distinguish the aesthetic at all clearly from certain other non-
descriptive areas or regions of discourse: notably those of manners 
and morals. Some further clarification will therefore be attempted 
in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
AESTHETIC ATTITUDES AND AESTHETIC SITUATIONS 
The exercise of aesthetic sensibility or discernment in 
noticing and in drawing the attention of others to the aesthetic 
features of aesthetic objects by means of or in terms of aesthetic 
remarks, may be regarded as the outcome of the adoption of an 
aesthetic attitude within an aesthetic situation. Here are the 
central concepts of aesthetics, which are in the end only to be fully 
explained and understood in terms of each other. Not one of them is 
in any clear sense unshared by the others evidently foundational to 
the subject, and the exploration of their logical relations will 
certainly expose what a polemical or progrannnatic aesthetic theorist 
will incline to condemn as 'circularities'. 
Not all circles are vicious, of course; and I hope that the 
mutual dependence of the notions of aesthetic sensibility, aesthetic 
remarks, objects, attitudes and situations will be seen to form a 
pattern - a circle, if the reader insists - which is connnodious, 
complex, interesting, and entirely innocuous. 
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Aesthetic situations, I shall argue, are not sharply marked off 
from other situations, nor are aesthetic attitudes easily and 
conclusively distinguishable from all other attitudes. As Wittgenstein 
puts it: 
.•. imagine having to sketch a sharply defined picture 
'corresponding' to a blurred one. In the latter there is 
a blurred red rectangle: for it you must put down a 
sharply defined one. Of course - several such rectangles 
can be drawn to correspond to the indefinite one. - But 
if the colours in the original merge without any hint of 
outline won't it become a hopeless task to draw a sharp 
picture corresponding to the blurred one? Won't you then 
have to say: 'Here I might just as well draw a circle or 
a heart as a rectangle, for all the colours merge. 
Anything - and nothing - is right." - And this is the 
position you are in if you look for definitions 
corresponding to our concepts in aesthetics or ethics.l 
In aesthetics at least, however, if not in ethics, it seems over 
permissive to say that in general anything is right, and excessively 
stern to insist that nothing is: the picture is not quite utterly 
blurred. Indeed, one important and often overlooked factor 
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contributing to its indistinctness is surely that it is a historically 
moving picture, but one which moves so deceptively slowly that we are 
prone to confuse ourselves by snipping stills from different epochs 
and unwittingly superimposing them. If we restrict attention to the 
aesthetic concepts of a sufficiently local time and place we may well 
often find ourselves able to trace out the main a:>ntours with a good 
deal of definition and without culpable insensitivity to the subtler 
transitions. 
The mid-twentieth century European, or Western standpoint has 
been tacitly adopted, and fortunately for this section of the inquiry 
the notion of an aesthetic approach to the objects of perception is a 
1 
Philosophical Investigations, I:77, p.36e 
relatively modern one - if a couple of hundred years will pass as a 
moment in historical perspective. In Jerome Stolnitz's words: 
The central and animating idea in modern aesthetics, 
which thereby sets it off from traditional theory, is 
that of a distinctive mode of perception, 'aesthetic 
disinterestedness'. This concept, which is logically 
foundational in the aesthetics of Kant, Schopenhuaer, 
et al., is first brought to light and developed by the 
British, beginning with Lord Shaftesbury in the early 
years of the century. Aesthetic theory as we know it 
comes into being, for now all of the arts as well as 
natural objects are considered together, so far as 
they are objects of such perception.l 
I hope to show that the notion of a 'distinctive mode of 
perception', if this is even quasi-physiological, is untenable; 
although the notion of a distinctive attitude to the world, regarded 
as a disposition to attend to certain kinds of perceptible features, 
is not. But first of all, the idea of disinterestedness. 
A great deal of effort and imagination has gone into the 
elucidation of precisely what may be meant by 'disinterestedness' in 
an aesthetic context or connection; but I think it may fairly be said 
that it remains extremely obscure, however clear it may have been in 
the writings of those political theorists from whom it seems to have 
derived. Kant writes: 
1 
TASTE is the faculty of estimating an object or a mode 
of representation by means of delight or aversion 
'A Third Note on Eighteenth Century Disinterestedness', 
~' XXII (1963) p.69. 
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APART FROM ANY INTEREST. The object of such a delight is 
called BEAUTIFUL.l L-;riginal emphasi~/ 
But for Kant this condition of disinterestedness seems to have 
hung upon the viewer's indifference to the actual physical existence 
of the object contemplated: 
The delight which we connect with the representation of 
the real existence of an object is called interest. Such 
a delight, therefore, always involves a reference to the 
faculty of desire, either as its determining ground, or 
else as necessarily implicated with its determining ground. 
Now, where the question is whether something is beautiful, 
we do not want to know, whether we, or anyone else, are, 
or even could be, concerned in the real existence of the 
thing, but rather what estimate we form of it on mere 
contemplation (intuition or reflection).2 
To this it must be objected that the notion of a disinterested 
judgment is founded rather upon the possibility of ignoring or 
discounting personal interests than upon the possibility of having 
none. Indeed, it is hard to see how one could ever assure oneself 
that one had no interest whatsoever (moral, economic, erotic, 
proprietorial, fetishistic, etc.) in something: but on the other hand 
there is no insurmountable problem about assuring oneself that, 
whatever one's recognised or concealed interests may be, one's 
judgment has not been swayed by them. This is achieved by relating 
the judgment to public norms or standards. A lover who judges that 
his beloved is beautiful may assure himself that his interest in the 
1 
Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, First Moment, Sect.5. 
2 
Ibid., Sect.2. 
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matter has not distorted his aesthetic judgment by investigating 
whether other competent judges who do not share his interest 
nevertheless judge similarly. 
On the view that disinterestedness is not the literal absence 
of any interest but rather freedom from any distortion of judgment 
such as is attributable to interest, it is apparent that one might 
judge interestedly or disinterestedly of an object in connection 
with which he is 'concerned in the real existence of the thing', and 
equally so in connection with an object whose 'real existence' does 
not concern him in the least. The lover may disinterestedly judge 
his beloved beautiful, and he may disinterestedly judge an abstract 
picture beautiful, even though he desires the girl and is the proud 
author of the picture. 
I shall not attempt any deeper analysis of the notion of 
disinterestedness, beyond this reference to its patent unclarity. 
Disinterestedness in some sense or other does seem to be an 
'animating idea in modern aesthetics', but the senses evidently vary 
between writers, and the notion has appeared in progressively more 
fashionable disguises as times and jargon have changed. Early in the 
twentieth century something with at least a close family likeness to 
Kantian disinterestedness was presented in psychological dress in a 
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paper which became extraordinarily influential and which has been 
much anthologised and echoed in more recent writings: 1 
LPsychicalf Distance, Bullough wrote, does not imply an 
impersonal, purely intellectually interested relation ..• 
On .the contrary, it describes a personal relation, often 
highly emotionally coloured, but of a peculiar character. 
Its peculiarity lies in that the personal character of 
the relation has been, so to speak, filtered. It has 
been cleared of the practical, concrete nature of its 
appeal, without, however, thereby losing its original 
constitution. 
And: 
.•• the whole sensual side of Art is purified, 
sE_irituali~ed, 'filtered' as I expressed it earlier, by 
LPsychical/ Distance. The most sensual appeal becomes 
the translucent veil of an underlying spirituality, once 
the grossly personal and practical elements have been 
removed from it. And - a matter of special emphasis 
here - this spiritual aspect of the appeal is the more 
penetrating, the more personal and direct its sensual 
appeal would have been BUT FOR THE P&ESENCE OF DISTANCE. 
LThe emphatic devices are Bullough'~/. 
This psychological-hydraulic theory ran parallel with, neither 
corresponding quite exactly nor conflicting sharply with theories 
deriving more directly from the philosophical tradition which, via 
Croce, had come to lay heavy emphasis upon the imagination and its 
products. Roger Fry, more influenced by Idealist philosophy than by 
experimental psychology for all his choice of scientific jargon, 
wrote: 
1 
Edward Bullough, '"Psychical Distance" as a Factor in Art and 
an Aesthetic Principle', British Journal of Psychology, V (1912-
13) pp.87-118. 
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lMa£f has ••. the possibility of a double life; one the 
actual life, the other the imaginative life. Between 
these two lives there is this great distinction, that in 
the actual life the processes of natural selection have 
brought it about that the instinctive reaction, such, for 
instance, as flight from danger, shall be the important 
part of the whole process, and it is towards this that 
the man bends his whole conscious endeavour. But in the 
imaginative life no such action is necessary, and, 
therefore, the whole consciousness may be focused upon 
the perceptive and the emotional aspects of experience. 
In this way we get, in the imaginative life, a different 
set of values, and a different kind of perception.l 
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The distinctive mode of perception that is aesthetic, then, is in 
some way detached, indifferent to the actual existence of the objects 
of contemplation, disinterested, impersonal, purely imaginative, 
spiritualized by psychical distance, or characterized by some other 
adjectival expression belonging to the same loose but recognizable 
cluster. In all its imprecision it is suunnarized admirably by Hunter 
Mead: 
1 
It has long been axiomatic that the aesthetic 'mood' or 
attitude is one of detached, disinterested, and 
impersonal contemplation. Its detachment is established 
by the fact that .•. we are for the moment released from 
the ordinary practical concerns of daily living ... The 
aesthetic mood represents a pause, as it were, during 
which we momentarily suspend this normal cause-and-
effect series .•• by detaching ourselves from this ends-
and-means chain of events. The disinterestedness of 
this mood arises from the contemplative manner in which 
we normally perceive aesthetic objects. We are content 
to be absorbed in beholding or in listening, and there 
is no desire to possess, utilize, or in any way exploit 
the aesthetic object for our selfish ends or private 
'interests'. The impersonal character of the aesthetic 
'An Essay in Aesthetics', in Vision and Design (1920) p.12. 
mood in turn grows out of that disinterestedness. Our 
personal desires, goals, hopes, and fears are 
temporarily suspended (or at least rendered largely 
impotent), while in more intense aesthetic experiences1 
we may become absorbed in the object to such an extent 
that we are 'taken out of ourselves' or 'carried away' 
and the self or ego is eliminated from consciousness.2 
To be 'carried away' is, in the tradition going back to Plato, 
the business of the artist rather than of the observer: in Protagoras 
it is said of the poet that 'There is no invention in him until he 
has become inspired and is out of his senses, and the mind is no 
longer in him'; but perhaps creativity and receptivity are thought to 
make use of the same psychological machinery, much as the dynamo and 
the electric motor are basically the same machine. It is worth 
remarking, too, that self-forgetfulness is often noticeable in 
individuals who are not in aesthetic situations at all: someone who 
has adopted a moral attitude to some abominable scene which rouses 
him to indignant action or comment might also be 'carried away'. The 
elimination of the self or ego from consciousness (supposing Mead's 
formulation to be intelligible) is at least not obviously a 
sufficient condition of an aesthetic attitude. 
1 
The slide from talk of a mood or attitude, which are 
dispositional notions, to talk of an experience, which must be 
occurrent, is significant here. It will be noticed again 
shortly in a quotation from Hospers, and will be argued that it 
is a carelessness which either expresses or perhaps generates an 
important muddle. 
2 
Aesthetics (1952) p.13. 
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Before commenting further upon the notion of a distinctive type 
of aesthetic perception it will be helpful to consider yet another 
important idea which has run a parallel course to that of 'aesthetic 
disinterestedness', and which even seems sometimes to have been taken 
for a theoretically central component of it in so far as the visual 
arts are concerned. This is the concept of the innocent eye. 
Deriving ultimately from Berkeley, via Ruskin, the basic teaching is 
quite clear although - as will be argued in due course - false. 
Ruskin writes: 1 
The perception of solid form is entirely a matter of 
experience. We ~nothing but flat colours; and it is 
only by a series of experiments that we find out that a 
stain of black or grey indicates the dark side of a 
solid substance or that a feint hue indicates that the 
object in which it appears is far away. The whole 
technical power of painting depends on our recovery of 
what may be called the innocence of the eye; that is to 
say, of a sort of childish perception of these flat 
stains of colour, merely as such, without consciousness 
of what they signify - as a blind man would see them if 
suddenly gifted with sight.2 
A radically different philosophical approach to the problems of 
perception will be made in Chapters VI and VII: for the moment it 
will be sufficient to remark that Ruskin did not have the advantage 
1 
The Works of John Ruskin, Edd.E.T. Cook and Alexander 
Wedderburn (1904) Vol.XV, The Elements of Drawing (1857), note 
to para.S. 
2 
The error is pervasive. Compare Henry Moore, 'Notes on 
Sculpture' in Henry Moore, ed. Herbert Read (1962) p.xi: 'The 
child learning to see first distinguishes only two-dimensional 
shape ••• ' 
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of reading the collection of case-histories of cataract removal 
assembled more recently by Von Senden, 1 which throws serious 
empirical doubt on the plausibility of the notion that 'a blind 
man .•• suddenly gifted with sight' can be said to~ anything at all, 
much less distinct 'flat stains of colour'; although he certainly 
has acquired a new physiological capacity to learn to see, which he 
previously lacked. The empirical point would perhaps have appealed 
to Ruskin even more strongly than the philosophical argument, for he 
was certainly concerned in The Elements of Drawing to develop and 
expound an effective method of teaching and learning a craft and not 
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to offer, except by implication, a philosophical theory of perception. 
In fact, his method is effective and is still in use, with or 
without benefit of Berkeleyan rationalization. A device familiar to 
academically trained artists is that known as 'drawing by the spaces 
left'. When a difficult passage is reached in a representational 
drawing - say a sharply foreshortened limb - it is often helpful to 
disregard the limb that is being drawn and to concentrate attention 
upon the space between it and another object. An ancillary technique 
is to close one eye in order to reduce so far as possible distracting 
distance cues and to try to see the space between the limb and the 
other object, the 'space left', as if it were already drawn or 
1 
M.Von Senden, tr. Peter Heath, Space and Sight (1960) 
passim. 
painted on a single plane perpendicular to the viewer's line of 
sight. As if, that is to say, it were traced upon a window placed 
between the draughtsman and the object. The effort of seeing what 
is before one as a flat pattern of shapes (which, incidentally, 
should hardly be an effort according to Ruskin, who holds that this 
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is how we naturally see things), together with the absence of 
preconception about the shapes involved which comes from concentrating 
upon the unfamiliar and nameless 'space left' instead of upon the 
known limb, is a tremendous aid in the construction of a correct 
projection of the object at the picture-plane of the drawing. 
Anyone with practical experience of it will testify to the efficacy of 
the method, which, when it is first learnt, has something of the force 
of a revelation. Students often delight in producing an 
extraordinarily solid-looking drawing of a figure by carefully 
drawing everything except the figure, in terms of 'spaces left', and 
then applying a touch or two within the figure to bring it up in a 
perspectival correctness which they could scarcely have matched by 
concentrating upon the figure as such and consciously invoking the 
rules of perspective. 
There is no reason in principle why we should not all master 
this device to some extent (it is !!£!:..easy) and employ it not only 
when we are making drawings but when we are looking critically at 
three-dimensional - and even at two-dimensional - aesthetic objects, 
so that by habit it becomes the case that we see nameless but 
interesting shapes everywhere and almost cease to notice the 
familiar cow-shapes, cube-shapes and cabbage-shapes. Two points 
must be made, however. The first has already been touched upon: 
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that this is a sophisticated trick, learnt of necessity after we have 
learnt to see in the ordinary way and have come to understand the 
relation a central perspective projection onto a picture plane bears 
to the objects so represented. We must both learn to see things and 
learn to 'read' pictures before we can fuse the skills. And secondly, 
the technique can be misplaced and misused. A device which is helpful 
to a draughtsman because it helps him to render the appearance of 
solid objects correctly within a certain pictorial convention is not 
one which can sensibly be used by his critics in order deliberately 
to avoid noticing what it is that he has drawn and how well he has 
done it. The appeal to us to pay attention to what we ordinarily do 
not notice (for example, the 'spaces left' between obtrusive objects) 
is often a pointed and effective one in aesthetic discourse; but the 
demand sometimes heard that we should never do otherwise, that we 
should not notice what we do notice - the depth of the three-
dimensional objects in front of us - is excessively and unjustifiably 
strict. 
I shall anticipate here the arguments of Chapters VI and VII, 
and simply assert that an innocent eye is not a necessary and 
sufficient organ for a viewer who would adopt an aesthetic attitude; 
although to the extent that an eye which is quick to notice unfamiliar 
configurations in a familiar context may be regarded as 'innocent', 
it may well be an asset. A critic who is able to break our habit of 
seeing things in familiar ways, and to induce us to notice things 
we might otherwise never have noticed - a critic who can, in 
Wittgenstein's phrase, relieve our 'aspect-blindnesses' - is likely 
to be regarded as more aesthetically perceptive than most. It would 
be a serious mistake, however, to suppose that he is exercising 
sensibility only when he notices such unfamiliar aspects of things. 
Noticing is at the heart of aesthetic matters, and noticing something 
which is thoroughly familiar but which might yet pass unremarked by 
another viewer may be as much an exercise of sensibility as noticing 
something altogether unusual or neglected. Aesthetic illuminations 
are not lights such that, like matches, they can only be struck once. 
The two strands of thought, aesthetic disinterestedness deriving 
from Kant, and the innocent eye, deriving from Berkeley via Ruskin, 
have been woven together in the present half century with a correlate 
notion: that of a specific and unique inner occurrent aesthetic 
response, feeling or emotion. It is my aim to distinguish as 
clearly as possible between an aesthetic attitude, which is an 
indispensable key to the theory of appreciation and criticism, and 
all of these bogus quasi-physiological occurrences which have been 
alleged to mark off plainly to introspection the aesthetic from all 
other responses to the perceptible world. 
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This distinction is by no means respected in the literature. 
Indeed, so far from achieving respect it often seems not even to 
have won recognition. Hospers, for example, in the course of making 
another distinction, misses this one entirely: 
Much confusion results from the failure to remember that 
'the aesthetic' refers to a kind of attitude rather than 
the objects towards which this attitude is taken .•• It 
is important to remember also that the aesthetic attitude 
may be co-present with other attitudes, and only 
occasionally is present exclusively. Rarely does the 
experience reach such a peak of intensity as to exclude 
all else from the field of consciousness.l 
In this short passage what is at first clearly designated an 
attitude mysteriously becomes, in the final sentence, an experience; 
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and moreover an experience which, when it reaches 'a peak of intensity' 
is by no means to be distinguished from Bell's famous pure aesthetic 
emotion. The same tendency has already been remarked in connection 
with a passage from Hunter Mead quoted earlier. 
Clive Bell published the classic statement of the theory I wish 
to refute, in 1914: 
1 
The starting point for all systems of aesthetics must be 
the personal experience of a peculiar emotion. The 
objects that provoke this emotion we call works of art. 
All sensitive people agree that there is a peculiar 
emotion provoked by works of art .•• This emotion is 
called the aesthetic emotion; and if we can discover 
some quality common to all the objects that provoke it, 
we shall have solved what I take to be the central 
John Hospers, Meaning and Truth in the Arts (1946) p.7. 
problem of aesthetics. We shall have discovered the 
essential quality that distinguishes works of art 
from all other classes of objects.l 
The scandalous circularity of Bell's doctrine as a whole has 
2 
already been adequately commented upon, but what he called its 
'starting point' was connnon ground with aestheticians of a quite 
3 different tradition and temper. Criticism of it must therefore be 
more radical and more comprehensive in its broad consequences for 
aesthetic theory than a demonstration that Bell's distinctive 
solution of 'the central problem' in terms of Significant Form is 
empirically vacuous, or amounts to mere verbal legislation. The 
basis of such a criticism is to be found in the insight, due to 
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Wittgenstein, that inner states stand in need of an external criterion. 
In order to make quite explicit what theory it is that is under 
attack, I shall extract from the various versions what seem to be their 
three necessary features. The aesthetic emotion (or sense, or feeling, 
1 
Art (1949) pp.6-7 
2 
See, for example, Beryl Lake, 'A study of the Irrefutability of 
Two Aesthetic Theories' in Elton, ed., Aesthetics and Language. 
3 
For example, R.G. Collingwood, in Outlines of a Philosophy of 
Art (1925) p.7: 'Fundamentally, fine art is the apprehension of 
beauty ••• The awareness of beauty is at once the starting point 
and the culmination, the presupposition and the end of all art'. 
And (p.11): ' ••• the artist's pleasure is not the pleasure of the 
voluptuary or the scientist or the man of action, but a 
specifically aesthetic pleasure'. 
or response - writers differ) is evidently held to be an inner 
state which is: 
a) a distinct state, unlike all other inner states 
b) an inner state which, when it occurs, announces its 
presence (and its nature) indubitably to the 
introspective eye, and 
c) an inner state which is logically foundational to 
aesthetic theory in that aesthetic objects, or 
works of art (or, in Bell's version, objects with 
Significant Form) are identifiable only by ultimate 
appeal to some individual's enjoyment of such an 
inner state in the presence of a candidate object. 
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The pragmatic objection to all this, that one's own introspective 
efforts reveal no such inner state, would simply remain an unresolved 
empirical issue between oneself and Bell's 'sensitive people', if it 
were not that the very idea of such a state is inadmissible. 
Itcannot be a feature of the theory that whatever object arouses 
or provokes the aesthetic state in Jones must arouse that state in 
Smith; for such a provision would render the entire theory either 
philosophically trivial or empirically false. It would be a trivial 
theory if this invariable agreement of observers were to be secured 
by stipulation, so that anyone - let us say Smith - who confessed 
that he was not put into the aesthetic state by an object which moved 
Jones, would thereby be shown not to be genuinely 'sensitive'; that 
is, to lack a capacity or faculty of the relevant kind. For the 
authority of Jones's response is surely open to question. Why should 
not Smith, who claims to be in an aesthetic state when in the presence 
of objects which do not move Jones, be thought to enjoy the true 
capacity for entering aesthetic states, and Jones to be the victim of 
spurious promptings? 
To generalize the point: if there were not paradigm objects from 
which, or in the presence of which the use of the phrase 'aesthetic 
state' (or 'emotion', or whatever) is learnt, as the name of an 
occurrence in the presence of these objects, then that phrase could 
not come to have a function in our public language - or rather, it 
could not come to have the function it is alleged to have, as the 
94 
name of an inner state the occurrence of which is to serve as criterial 
of the presence of an appropriate object. And to admit that 
aesthetic objects have logical primacy or priority is contrary to the 
hypothesis actually advanced. 
If, on the other hand, the theory is genuinely empirical and not 
tautologous by covert stipulation, then it is quite certainly false. 
As a matter of fact, those individuals who lay claim to the enjoyment 
of occasional aesthetic states differ sharply and argumentatively over 
which objects are properly provocative of them. 
In spite of this, it is sometimes maintained that the theory 
requires only a little modification to stand up. There is what might 
be called a strong and a weak caveat which tend to be advanced by 
theorists who concede the force of the argument above. The strong 
caveat might be put in this way: 
Perhaps, in spite of what has been said, it might be true 
as a matter of empirical fact that we are able to 
introspect a distinctive aesthetic state the occurrence 
of which we should be entitled to regard as criterial of 
our having adopted an aesthetic attitude. Such an 
attitude might be adopted towards any object, natural or 
artificial, and any remarks made under what one might call 
its patronage or auspices would necessarily be aesthetic 
remarks. 
The shift embodied in this suggestion - which is in the end no 
more than an evasion of the difficulty - is from the treatment of 
inner states as criterial of the presence of a certain kind of object, 
to these states as criterial of a certain kind of attitude. And of 
course a precisely parallel argument will go: if the attitude is the 
public phenomenon then it is this which is logically prior in that 
the correct use of the phrase 'aesthetic state' will be regulated by 
paradigmatic aesthetic attitudes. It is illuminating, however, to 
consider the case a little differently. 
Suppose I remark that the layout of a newspaper at which I 
casually glance (and let us imagine it to be printed in a language I 
do not understand) is marred by the use of too many different weights, 
sizes and styles of type; and that introspection reveals to me no 
inner emotions or states which did not seem to be present both before 
and after giving brief attention to the page. It is a matter of habit 
with me to notice such things and to make such remarks, just as it is 
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a habit of the motorist to notice traffic signs without any - necessary -
emotion. Now upon the theory, ought it to be said that: 
i. My attitude to the page, expressed in the remarks I 
made, is not an aesthetic attitude? Or 
ii. Since I make an exemplary prima facie aesthetic 
remark my attitude must have been, however briefly, 
an aesthetic one. It therefore follows that I must 
have experienced an aesthetic emotion, although~~ 
perhaps so fleetingly and at so low a pitch of 
intensity that I was not able to introspect it? 
It is evident that neither of these expedients will serve the 
proposer of the strong caveat. For if he maintains that to notice 
and to remark upon the layout of a visual design in such a way and in 
such terms as I did is not to adopt an aesthetic attitude, then he 
will find himself legislating against the main stream - perhaps one 
should say the overwhelming torrent - of language. 'Your aesthetic 
attitude to these things', the mogul says, 'doesn't interest me. I 
know what sells newspapers'. Whether he is right or wrong, in the 
long or in the short run, about taste and demand is not to the point: 
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the point is that he is perfectly clear about what is the ordinary and 
proper use of the phrase 'aesthetic attitude'. Alternatively, the 
claim that I ~ have been in an aesthetic state whether I knew it or 
not, is contrary to the hypothesis, for it amounts to an admission 
that the attitude (or remark) is a sufficient condition for the state, 
and not vice-versa. 
But perhaps there is a weaker thesis which is defensible ? Try: 
There is a peculiar emotion, or inner state, which might 
as well be called the aesthetic emotion, which ~ 
people sometimes detect introspectively whenever they 
adopt paradigmatically aesthetic attitudes to paradigmatic 
aesthetic objects (let us say, when they attend 
sympathetically, in an appropriate setting and 
circumstances, to the music of Bach, the poems of Donne, 
or the sculpture of Marini). This emotion is such that, 
as a matter of fact, its presence is felt from time to 
time upon unexpected, unpropitious, unparadigmatic or 
experimental occasions; and whenever this occurs to such 
a person he is entitled to certainty that he has located 
an aesthetic object and adopted an aesthetic attitude to 
it - even if the normal outward or public signs that this 
is the case are lacking. 
This thesis is too weak to be worth the trouble of assault. The 
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capacity for aesthetic states or emotions is not held to be universally 
enjoyed, and even if it is regarded as a connnon asset it is not held to 
be the necessary foundation of aesthetic theory, since it is not denied 
that someone without benefit of such states might adopt aesthetic 
attitudes and make acceptable aesthetic remarks. If this ~ denied, 
then we should be back with an indefensibly stmng form of the original 
thesis. The last resort of the aesthetic emotion theorist, then, 
appears to be something like this: 
Sometimes, some people enjoy a special kind of feeling or 
emotion, which we might as well call the aesthetic emotion, 
which they detect introspectively as the accompaniment of 
what they recognize - by other and ordinary means - to be 
the adoption of an aesthetic attitude to an appropriate 
object. They may even be able to trust it to some extent 
as a guide or indicator or cue to what is afoot, although 
it does not give them guarantees and they must learn the 
proper use of such expressions as 'aesthetic attitude', 
'aesthetic remark' and 1aesthetic object' in the ordinary 
way, from outward signs, or public criteria. 
Well, perhaps there are such people. It is not easy to imagine 
what it would be like to be one of them. Would it be as if one felt, 
say, a surge of gaiety or a twinge of toothache every time one 
noticed that a hat was jaunty, a cat sleek or a parrot gaudy? 
Clearly, the doctrine of inner aesthetic states will not solve 
the problems it was invented to solve. We must look for the 
criteria of aesthetic objects, attitudes and situations in the public 
arena, not in the private world of inner voices whispering 
authoritatively into an introspective ear. 
It is not, as Mead claims, 'axiomatic' that the aesthetic 
attitude is one which involves the adoption of a detached, 
disinterested and impersonal standpoint; although these are certainly 
familiar - if unclear - ideas around which Western aesthetic thinking 
has revolved since the eighteenth century. Or (not to argue about a 
word) if it is an axiom it is not one such as those of geometry or 
logic which we can grasp firmly and apply confidently. It is more 
like a wise saw of an almost platitudinous character which roughly 
marks, one might say, the centre of the concept of an aesthetic 
attitude. It is neither precise enough nor powerful enough to help 
solve those problems - typically, demarcation problems - which most 
puzzle aestheticians. In illustration of the point, consider the 
following passage from the writings of a politically connnitted critic 
who is less doctrinaire about what makes for aesthetic excellence 
than many writers who confess to no ideological position at all. 
Concerning the work of a small group of young painters: 
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••• they reject all finesse or elegance of method. It is 
as if they were beginning again with only a basic 
vocabulary, or as if they were deliberately painting with 
their left hands because their right hands had only 
acquired the skill to perform specious tricks. Their 
paintings are difficult to enjoy, the colour is usually 
turgid, the paint coarse, the tonal contrasts slight, the 
subject vague. But at the same time their seriousness of 
purpose is obvious, and their austerity, in a sense, 
heroic ••• clearly they connnent on a world in which there 
is air to breath, in which forms occupy space and so can 
be solid obstacles, in which men can live three 
dimensionally ••• l 
Has Berger here adopted an aesthetic attitude to the work under 
review, or a moral attitude? Are his 'seriousness of purpose' and 
~heroic) austerity' moral remarks, or are they aesthetic remarks? It 
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is just such questions as this, the really interesting questions about 
actual artMappreciative and critical practice, which are not settled 
by appeal to the criteria of disinterestedness, detachment or 
impersonality. There are, after all, comparably imprecise notions of 
moral disinterestedness and detachment which we are at a loss to 
distinguish from the aesthetic without falling back helplessly upon 
the hollow assurance that the one is moral, the other aesthetic. Here 
the doctrine of the inner state, of the indubitable deliverances of 
introspection, was evidently supposed to be at its most attractive: 
It would only be necessary to look or to listen inwardly and one would 
1 
John Berger, an exhibition review in The New Statesman, 
28 February 1959. 
simply know whether the feature to which attention is paid is an 
aesthetic or a moral feature. 
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It is not the purpose of this inquiry to explore territory 
adjacent to the aesthetic - or trespass in ethics or sociology or 
politics - but it nevertheless strongly suggested that the boundaries 
between the subject matter of these disciplines are fenced by 
agreement between the leaseholders of neighbouring properties; they 
are not dispensations of nature. If this is indeed the case then it 
is possible to give an account of the way in which demarcation 
problems - such as that implicit in Berger 1 s remarks - arise, which 
will dispel some of the intellectual distress felt by theorists of 
art criticism. 
Some aesthetic remarks are made in terms of such a paradigmatic 
character ('graceful', 'delicate', 'dainty•, etc.), and they are made 
in such exemplary aesthetic situations, that we come to believe what 
is almost true of them - that they could not conceivably be other 
than aesthetic terms whose point and occasion of use is invariably 
the utterance of aesthetic remarks. And similarly with moral remarks: 
they occur in exemplary forms and situations. Professional art 
critics write in publications devoted to the criticism of the arts, 
about works of art exhibited in art galleries, such phrases as • ••• a 
subtle counterpoint of forms ••• •. And in a similar way moral critics 
(perhaps there are no strictly professional moral critics) write or 
say of those who defraud widows and orphans that their acts are 
• ••• depraved, corrupt, wicked ••• •. In both cases the proper 
characterization of the remark and of the attitude that prompted it 
is decided by reference to the whole complex of factors and 
circumstances which constitute the total context of utterance. Some 
remarks ('dainty', 'wicked', etc.) are so redolent of their standard 
origins and use that they will survive removal from any distinctive 
context and yet retain a strong generic flavour. Others again are 
less distinctive; and many forms of words are so neutral that if 
they are not presented in context we are unable to classify them, 
even tentatively, in one way rather than in another. 
The demarcation problems which are least tractable are those 
which arise in consequence of a remark which belongs most naturally 
in, say, a moral context, occurring in an aesthetic context - and no 
doubt vice-versa, although to insist upon this would perhaps be to 
trespass. Our difficulty arises as a dilemma, or a conflict of 
inclination: on the one hand we are disposed to treat a moral-
sounding remark as a moral remark because it sounds moral • that is 
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to say, it is a remark which is most comm.only made in moral contexts -
and on the other hand to treat it as aesthetic because it is made 
within a clear de facto aesthetic situation, and occurrence in such 
a situation is one of our strongest reasons for treating an 
utterance as aesthetic. 
And of course all this is true, if it is true at all, not only 
of the relation between the aesthetic and the moral, but also of the 
prudential, the economic, and so on. Whatever distinct domain or 
region of human action or interest gives rise to characteristic 
linguistic forms and formulas will open up the possibility of 
apparently displaced material finding itself swallowed into an alien 
system which is not invariably or easily able to digest it. Our 
difficulty with John Berger's criticism is, I suggest, of this kind. 
On the one hand we are inclined to consider that such phrases as 
102 
' ..• their seriousness of purpose is obvious, and their austerity, in 
a sense, heroic .•• ' are necessarily moral remarks because they very 
plainly are just such remarks as would be made most naturally by 
persons intent upon passing moral judgment. But against this we are 
obliged to take into account that the words are used by a professional 
art critic, writing in a regular column of art criticism about works 
of art exhibited in an art gallery, for the purpose of drawing 
attention to features which the critic (at least) believes to be of 
aesthetic relevance. 
It is perhaps worth special emphasis at this point, in order 
to avoid misunderstanding, that I am not here suggesting that 
sometimes, under unusual circumstances or in the light of unusual 
considerations, what are really moral considerations may be 
regarded as aesthetic considerations, but - quite differently -
that what one might very easily mistake for moral considerations 
(because of their prima facie form) may actually be aesthetic 
considerations. Further, I wish to suggest that to the 
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extent that aesthetic theorists have attempted to bring out strict 
logical principles in the light of which such dilemmas may always be 
resolved, such enterprises have been either legislative or ineffective. 
Decision problems involving the precise scope of the aesthetic in 
relation to the moral, economic, etc., are, in any historical context, 
amenable to sociological forms of enquiry. Thus we may say that for a 
Soviet critic, detecting and bringing out the ideological content of 
works of art is an exercise of aesthetic sensibility; for a 
Renaissance critic such as Vasari, noticing the degree of life-
likeness in a painting is a connoisseurs' characteristic concern 
('Mona Lisa', he said, •: •• has even been esteemed a wonderful work, 
since life itself could exhibit no other appearance 11); and for a 
society which is neither contemporary nor Western, such as that of 
ancient Polynesia or Peru, the range of the aesthetic is perhaps 
better elucidated by the historian of ideas than by the contemporary 
aesthetic theorist. 
It is when the decision as to whether some consideration is or 
is not aesthetic is not yet made, at what one might call the growing 
point of cultural history, that philosophical aesthetics seems to 
have the positive role of arbitration in the light of principles 
which it is widely thought to be within the philosopher's special 
1 
GiorgioVasari, tr. Mrs Jonathan Foster, Lives of the Most 
Eminent Painters, Sculptors and Architects (London 1876), II, 
p.384. 
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competence to discern in the flux of things and to make 
explicit to the unphilosophical critic. But such principles are 
liable to turn out, upon inspection, to be prescriptions or 
exhortations. Their apparatus of rational argument and of internal 
consistency give them the appearance of being - as indeed they surely 
often are - more or less sensible reconunendations, but never of being 
the outcome of a conclusive chain of reasoning from factual or !!. 
priori premises which nobody would wish to dispute to conclusions 
which no rational person could escape. Sometimes, too, the 
philosophical 'argument' pretends to no greater validity than is 
given it by an explicit appeal to facts of experience which are at 
best uncertain and at worst quite certainly false. Thus, for 
example, Harold Osborne: 
1 
Whether or not a work of art was made for any purpose 
other than to be a work of art, whether it in fact 
serves any other purpose and, if it does, whether it 
serves that purpose efficiently or inefficiently, is 
completely irrelevant to its excellence as a work of 
art. The purpose of the artist is, therefore, an 
irrelevant consideration in judging works of art, for a 
great number of excellent works of art have been 
produced incidentally by artists who had other objects 
in mind - such as earning a living, arousing a sense of 
indignation at social inequalities, making people laugh, 
copying as exactly as possible a selected piece of 
nature, and so on. In saying that these utility-
purposes are irrelevant to the excellence of works of 
art I am not enunciating a dogma of my own but making a 
generalisation from the facts of ·critical judgment 
everywhere.l 
Aesthetics and Criticism (1955) p.80, footnote. 
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It is, I think, unnecessary to deploy the legion of counter-
examples to defeat the claim that 'the facts of critical judgment 
everywhere' support Osborne's view. Nor, of course, is it a dogma 
of his own: the alternatives he offers are not logically exhaustive. 
His suggestion is, indeed, quite a familiar one; what is astonishing 
is that any serious attempt should be made to pass it off as a 
universally accepted one. Thus, to remind ourselves that Leonardo's 
work was judged aesthetically excellent ' ••• since life itself would 
exhibit no other appearance'; that Goya's or Daumier's work has been 
judged excellent for the sharpness of its satirical edge; that 
Chaplin was considered a substantial artist precisely because he made 
us laugh so much .- all this is of no avail against the ultimate 
exclusion of such considerations by fiat. Once the stipulative 
definition of the range of aesthetic considerations is forced out of 
hiding we can see that what is proposed is dogma, for all the 
disarming appeal to alleged facts of experience. 
A stronger example, in that the argument is more philosophical 
in character and the prescription more finely wrought into the 
argument and therefore less evidently arbitrary, is J.A. Passmore's: 
It is ••• impossible to define 'the aesthetic use of 
"good"' as 'the use of "good" in which it is applied to 
works of art', for we can rightly describe a work as 
'good' without ascribing aestl:a:ic characters to it. The 
solution, I think, is that although there are not 
'aesthetic properties' connnon to all good works of art, 
there is what we may call an aesthetic approach to works 
of art, just as there is a scientific way of considering 
a thing, without it being the case that things have 
scientific characters; or again, there are not technical 
properties but there is a technical approach. The technical 
approach raises the question: 'how was this work put 
together?'; the historical approach: 'when was it done, 
influenced by what?'; the biographical approach: 'what does 
it amount to, as an event in its creator's life?'; the 
aesthetic approach: 'how does this work hang together?'. 
But 'hanging together' - or, to use more genteel 
expressions, coherence, harmony, integrity, form - is not 
a special aesthetic property, recognizably the same in 
various works of art; it is more like a category than a 
property, suggesting the kinds of questions which are to be 
asked rather than the sort of property that is to be looked 
for.l 
To say that the aesthetic attitude or approach consists in an 
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observer's disposition to ask and to seek answers to certain loosely 
specifiable kinds of question is a perfectly acceptable descriptive 
move; but prescription, or persuasive definition, is woven into the 
analysis just where the need to face the problem 'which kinds of 
question?' begins to be felt. The aesthetic approach, Passmore says, 
is responsive to questions about ' .•• coherence, harmony, integrity, 
form'. And this is surely true - but is the aesthetic approach not 
concerned with any other kind of question? And might not these 
questions (of coherence, etc.) be asked from another approach? Is 
it impossible that questions about coherence should ever be technical 
or that questions about integrity should ever be moral questions? 
The point is not argued, and indeed it would be very difficult to 
argue. It is, in the end, a matter of doctrine that, for example: 
1 
'The Dreariness of Aesthetics', in Elton, ed., Aesthetics and 
Language, p.52. 
.•• the Aristotelian question (understood as Aristotle 
understood it) - has this work a beginning, a middle, and 
an end? - cannot be settled by any mechanical method; and 
this, the formal problem, is, I should say, an aesthetic 
question.l 
It is true that the critics of the present half century have 
been much concerned with formal questions - although it must be 
pointed out that they have not found themselves in conspicuous 
agreement about what are and what are not formal questions - but 
again, as with Osborne's claims about the function of works of art, 
it is not apodictic but a matter of exhortation that the scope of 
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the aesthetic should be determined in the reconnnended way. Moreover, 
the clear distinction, upon which Passmore 1 s criterion turns, between 
the technical, the aesthetic, the biographical, and so on, is not one 
which we are in fact able to discern at all confidently in the 
present state of conceptual confusion about these matters. Passmore 
takes the question 'Is this a sonnet?' to be a mere technical 
question; 2 while Beardsley for example - regards the analogous 'Is 
this a rondo?' as a formal question and a paradigm of formal 
questions. 3 Neither of these eminent writers can lightly be dismissed 
as indulging an idiosyncratic usage, and the conclusion is inescapable 
1 
Ibid., p.41. 
2 
Ibid., p.41. 
3 
Aesthetics, p.166: 'Most critics, I think, would agree about 
the words "rondo" and "gay"; the former refers to form, the 
latter does not'. 
that the concept of form in the arts is not one which can safely be 
used as a logical lever until it has itself been subjected to a good 
deal of analysis. 
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It seems - not to undertake such an analysis here - that there 
certainly are some questions about the objects of aesthetic attention 
which might, or indeed which must, be called formal questions: but 
whoever would show that these or any other distinctive set of 
questions is in some unmistakably natural way marked out as the set 
of aesthetic questions, will find that he must either frankly 
resort to persuasion, or else he must conceal tautology - generating 
definitions somewhere up the sleeve of the argument. Neither of 
these expedients seems quite strictly philosophical in the modern 
sense of the word, although the former is certainly the proper 
recourse of a philosopher who wishes not merely to see how matters 
stand but to tidy or improve their stance. 
* * * * 
Probably the best way to illustrate - not to define - the 
scope of the aesthetic is in terms of paradigm remarks and situations. 
Boundary disputes will then be seen to arise where a feature of the 
total situation is unparadigmatic, or even contra-paradigmatic, while 
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the remaining features are unproblematical. The appropriate ways of 
arguing such boundary problems will vary from instance to instance, 
and in some cases may be amenable to nothing short of legislation; 
although the names of the de facto arbiters may not emerge until 
matters have receded into historical perspective. Certainly it would 
be absurd to think of them in general as appointed, 1 although some 
may be self-appointed. It is, incidentally, curious that the phrase 
'arbiter of taste' should so seldom be met in aesthetic writings -
as if any element of the arbitrary in intellectual and cultural 
matters were an unfortunate impropriety quite beneath a stern 
theorist's notice. 
Let us consider, then, a paradigmatic aesthetic situation: 
Suppose that the remark 'The stone is handled with great 
sensitivity to its natural qualities' is made by a professional art 
critic about an acknowledged work of sculpture which is exhibited in 
an art gallery. Let us further suppose that appropriate 
investigation has disclosed no reason whatever to think that the 
critic has any covert or illicit purpose in making this remark: on 
the contrary, let us imagine that we have every reason to believe 
that he wishes only to draw our attention to an aesthetic feature of 
the object before him which gives him, and may give us, purely 
1 
But perhaps not, after all, so absurd. What is the function of 
a national Ministry of Culture? 
aesthetic pleasure or satisfaction. 
If this is not an aesthetic situation, then we would scarcely 
know what is. If the critic has not adopted an aesthetic attitude 
to the sculpture, exercised his powers of aesthetic discimination 
and made an aesthetic remark, then we do not know how to use some or 
all of these expressions, for they were surely devised to 
characterize th~ aspects of just such a situation as this. 
And now let us imagine the main elements of this situation to 
be altered in the following ways - in each case supposing the bulk 
of the considerations to retain their original character. 
1. Suppose that the critic does not remark that the material 
is handled with great sensitivity to its natural qualities (which 
perhaps nobody would hold to be other than an aesthetic remark) but: 
'This wor~ brings out the dignity and essential humanity of the 
bank-manager (or steel-worker, or whatever)'. Is this an aesthetic 
remark? Could only a critic who was sensitive to the aesthetic 
features of things have made it? The aesthetician cannot, as such, 
advance arguments which would conclusively settle such a question -
assuming it still to be an open question in our society. In some 
societies, not utterly unlike our own, such a remark will be taken 
to be at least as evidently aesthetic as the one at the head of 
this paragraph. As an informed and articulate person the aesthetic 
theorist is in a position to contribute to the discussion, and as a 
philosopher he might contribute valuably to it, by speaking more 
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clearly, consistently, and with less prejudice than most. It is 
nevertheless, at root, an ideological question which only a firmly 
legislative aesthetic theory could settle out of hand. 
2. Let us suppose that the remark is not made about a work of 
patently human origin, but about a natural formation exhibited as an 
object trouve. 
It would certainly be a curious, although perhaps not an utterly 
incoherent locution to say that material is handled sensitively by 
natural forces. It is, indeed, almost necessarily true, since the 
notion of sensitivity to the natural properties of a medium - stone, 
for example - is derived from the appearance of natural formations; 
the softer parts eroded, the harder parts prominent and worn smooth, and 
so on. To the extent that it is acceptable to anthropomorphize nature 
at all it is proper to do so in aesthetic contexts. Of course, it may 
be denied that such ways of speaking are ever acceptable; in which 
case ordinary language is stripped of one of its familiar resources. 
We shall be required not to say 'Time has been kind to her .•• 1 or 'If 
only it would decide whether or not it will • I rain .••• But whatever 
one's decision here, it is evident that the anthropomorphic question 
only arises in connection with genetic remarks - that is to say, 
remarks which concern in some way the origins or the originator of an 
object. There are many remarks which do not raise this issue and which 
plainly ascribe aesthetic features to natural objects and phenomena: 
'A delicate tracery of shadow cast by the trees', for example. 
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It would in general be a mistake to regard objets trouv~s 
straightforwardly as parodies, say, of deliberate works of art, 
because of the element of intention or deliberation implicit in such 
notions as 'parody', 'copy' or 'satire'. But it would not necessarily 
be a mistake to speak elliptically of such an object as a parody or a 
satire, since it may well have been the purpose of the finder or the 
exhibitor to give it just this role. Indeed, it is not impossible 
for a critic to give an object such a role independently of anyone's 
intentions, by his very utterance, provided only that the object is 
adapted to it, that the role fits, and is not laid upon an 
inappropriate bearer. The ellipsis consists in the omission of 
explicit reference to the fact that the object is seen as having a 
function in a context, and not as a pure, 'meaningless' spectacle. 
3. Let us suppose that the original remark is made in the 
original context, but by a passing carpenter and not by a professional 
art critic. 
It would, I think, be regarded as an interesting and perhaps 
unusual incident, but not as such necessarily destructive of the 
aesthetic character of the remark, since this is stamped so firmly on 
its face. Nevertheless the qualifications of the speaker may affect 
the decision if the issue is up for debate, and this will especially 
tend to be the case where the remark itself lacks Erima facie 
character. If the critic remarks 'How very massive it looks' he will 
probably be taken to have uttered an aesthetic remark, whereas a 
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passing carpenter might be supposed to be making audible non-
aesthetic calculations about the strength of the required plinth. 
4. The entire incident takes place not in an art gallery, but 
on a rubbish tip. 
There is nowadays a fairly general acceptance, amongst educated 
people, of the view that no place is much holier than another from 
the aesthetic point of view. Nevertheless, some remarks about some 
objects seen on rubbish tips will not naturally be regarded as 
aesthetic remarks while the same form of words used about a sculpture 
in a gallery may be so taken. 'Notice how quickly it is rusting 
1 
away', for example. 
5. Let us suppose that the critic is not disinterested - in the 
most connnonplace sense of the word. We may go so far as to imagine 
that he is the author of the work in question, and is anxious to sell 
it. 
Can we say that a venal motive automatically disqualifies putative 
aesthetic remarks made in its interest? Evidently not, for it is 
surely a consideration of importance whether or not the material is 
handled with great sensitivity, quite irrespective of the critic's 
motive in drawing attention to this feature of it. But suppose that 
the remark had been less specific, and more patently a verdict: 'That 
1 
Compare the criticism of auto-destructive art, regarded as a 
quasi-performance, discussed in Ch.II. 
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sculpture is good', for example. Should we consider that the critic's 
authorphip and financial interest denatured the remark? There is 
evidently no general answer to this question; it must be argued out 
case by case. 
6. Suppose that the remark was not in fact made in order to draw 
the attention of an audience to an aesthetic feature, or in consequence 
of any exercise of aesthetic sensibility, but for some other reason 
altogether. 
This is an implausible variant of the paradigm case as outlined 
here, but we can imagine more appropriate circumstances. Suppose that 
we are invited to inspect a vegetable marrow, by a man who mistakenly 
supposes that we know him to be a singleminded plant pathologist, in 
these terms: 'Notice the interesting pattern of purple 
discolouration .•• '· We shall no doubt discover, if we look into the 
matter, that he did not intend an aesthetic remark, but shall we be 
absolutely confident that he has not made one? It is, of course, one 
of the recommendations of this thesis that aesthetic remarks be 
regarded, amongst other things, as remarks the making of which 
exercises a characteristic kind of sensitivity to the world; but a 
qualification must be introduced at this point. 
It is implicit, if not fully explicit, in all that has already 
been said, that a remark is not 'aesthetic' in virtue of its form but 
in virtue of its special role or function in human intercourse. 
Remarks are normally given that function, deliberately, by their 
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authors; and it has been argued that a special sensitivity is a 
necessary qualification for whoever would launch remarks with just 
that role, regularly and successfully. It does not follow that a 
remark otherwise aimed might not misfire in relation to its intended 
function and yet prove serviceable in a role not anticipated by its 
author. Just as we may drive screws with a chisel (to the craftsman's 
disgust) so we might find a - pathologically - interesting pattern of 
discolouration aesthetically remarkable. 
It would be more precise, although more pedantic, to refuse to 
handle the question 'Is this an aesthetic remark?' altogether; and to 
discuss only one or other of the family of questions: 'Was this 
remark intended by its author to have an aesthetic role?'; 'Was it 
taken by its audience to have an aesthetic role?'; and 'does it really 
fit its designed or its accepted role?'. An affirmative answer to the 
first does not. entail affirmative answers to the remaining questions, 
although it will tend strongly in that direction, and especially will 
it do so in a culturally homogeneous society. 
The claim, then, that aesthetic remarks exercise sensibility in 
the making, must be regarded rather as a slogan than otherwise, and 
exceptions admitted. Only a speaker with aesthetic sensibility will 
be capable of making aesthetic remarks deliberately, although anyone 
might make them accidentally - as jokes are sometimes made accidentally 
although only a speaker with an eye for the comic will make good jokes, 
deliberately, often. 
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All the foregoing considerations in relation to the paradigm case 
and its peripheral uncertainties, although they are very general and 
by no means comprehensive, surely indicate clearly enough what kind of 
domain is the aesthetic; and they show the absurdity of supposing that 
a definitive survey might be made which would culminate in formulas 
apt to the solution of every question. 
The criticism of the arts - which I have taken to be at least a 
substantial part although not quite the entirety of the subject matter 
of aesthetics - is something sui generis. We discover what kind of 
thing it is, what are its characteristic problems, disagreements, and 
modes of argument, by investigating it so to speak in situ, in its 
social and cultural context. We cannot lay down in advance of 
investigation the precise conditions and considerations which will 
determine whether or not given instances of speech or behaviour are 
properly to be called 'aesthetic'. There is little scope even for 
convincing empirical generalisation, and none for a priorism. It may 
be impossible, upon occasion, to say whether a given remark is 
properly speaking aesthetic, economic, moral or whatever. This 
impossibility does not, of course, amount to a confession of 
philosophical failure, but, on the contrary, to a claim of modest 
success: we have discovered - roughly - how things ~· 
In Urmson's words, ' .•• moral, aesthetic and economic satisfactions 
seem neither to be logically disconnected nor to be true species of a 
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1 genus.' We can ask whether a satisfaction is aesthetic or moral or 
economic, as we can ask whether something is round or square or 
triangular; and we can be simultaneously satisfied by a single object 
aesthetically, morally and economically - but nothing can be 
simultaneously round, square and triangular. He urges that: 
If we find the criterion for distinguishing aesthetic 
from kindred reactions in the nature of the explanation 
of the reaction we can readily account for this logical 
situation. To say that a satisfaction is wholly 
aesthetic, for example, will be to say that the 
explanation or grounds of the satisfaction are wholly of 
one sort, which will necessitate that the satisfaction 
cannot rest also on moral grounds; on the other hand 
there is clearly nothing to prevent our satisfaction 
from being multiply-grounded and thus simultaneously 
aesthetic and moral, aesthetic and economic, and so on.2 
I should prefer to say, and perhaps Urmson would not disagree, 
that aesthetic and other attitudes and situations are more and less 
evidently of a paradigmatic character, and that when they are less so 
then the 'satisfactions' enjoyed and the remarks uttered may be of 
uncertain status. And, on the other hand, in paradigm aesthetic 
situations remarks which belong, prima facie,to other situations may 
be sheer solecisms, or they may be deliberate moves in an attempt to 
change the game - to divert the course of cultural and intellectual 
history. Harold Rosenberg, the American critic and apostle of 
1 
J.o. Urmson, 'What Makes a Situation Aesthetic?' PASS, XXXI 
(1957) p.79. 
2 
Ibid. 
abstract expressionism, embraces the overtly historicist view 
that: 
Art is constantly making itself; its definition is in 
the future. Criticism cannot therefore be a single 
developing theory; it must be partisan and polemical 
in order to join art in asserting what it is to become.l 
And whether deliberate or not, whether initially gravely 
solecistic or not, new moves do change the game. If functional 
considerations and aesthetic considerations had been set for ever 
apart in adamantine cultural forms we would not have had the 
functional aesthetic which was midwife to the spare elegance of our 
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best urban scenery. No doubt the first critic to remark, sensitively, 
1How ugly are those unnecessary towers at the ends of the bridge!' 
seemed to his contemporaries not to have hold of the aesthetic end of 
the stick. And certainly Boccioni went too far when he wrote 'In art, 
everything is conventional. The truths of yesterday are the downright 
lies of today•; 2 but his mistake was less fundamental, if more 
superficially extravagant, than that of the iron theorist who holds 
that if the aesthetic attitudes and situations of today are unlike 
those of yesterday, one or both of them must not be aesthetic. 
1 
The Tradition of the New (1962) p.54. 
2 
Umberto Boccioni, Technical Manifesto of Futurist Painting, 
(1910). 
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CHAPTER V 
VERDICTS 
There are certain presuppositions of traditional aesthetics 
which are so pervasive as to be effectively invisible. That the 
aesthetic theorist is primarily, or at any rate very largely concerned 
to explicate the notion of a unique and distinctive entity, property 
or relation called 'aesthetic value' is generally taken for granted; 
and that the investigation of the meaning and proper use of the word 
'good' is peculiarly and intimately related to this task is -
traditionally - beyond question. It does not seem to be much 
remarked in the literature, except with something like the 
condescension or irritation of professional for tradesman, that 
critics of the arts, connnentators upon natural beauty and those who 
exercise aesthetic sensibility in whatever context, make only 
moderately frequent use of the word 'good'; and that the class of 
remarks to which one might confidently tag ' ••• and that is a value 
judgment' is neither co-extensive with the class of remarks which 
make use of the word 'good', nor indeed is it conspicuously marked in 
any other way. 
In order to reduce the complex lights and shades of actual 
critical discourse to the stylised formal contrasts of evaluation -
description or judgment - interpretation, it is usual to concentrate 
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attention massively, if not always quite exclusively, upon a 
supposed distinction between the use of the word 'good' and that of 
allegedly neutral or purely descriptive terms. One of two assumptions 
or presuppositions is built into this procedure. It is taken for 
granted either: 
i) that the use of non-neutral terms other than 'good' 
is no concern of the aesthetician, to which Law one 
might respond, classically: 'Why not?' or 
ii) that the meaning and use of non-neutral term other 
than 'good' is always in principle reducible to or 
equivalent to or logically identical but better 
exemplified bY the use of 'good'. 
The expression 'non-neutral' as used here already concedes far too 
much to the champion of the second, more prepossessing assumption. He 
is in any event unlikely to try an analysis of such terms as 
'marvellous' or 1 consurmnate 1 with a view to demonstrating their 
equivalence or reducibility to 'good' absolutely; all that he will seek 
to accomplish is a demonstration of equivalence in a certain respect. 
He will nominate that respect somewhat as follows: 'We are interested', 
he will say, 'in the aesthetic excellence (or ' ••• in the degree of 
aesthetic excellence') which is attributed to an object by the use of a 
non-neutral or value term. It may be the case that some non-neutral 
terms have multiple functions or connotations, but to the extent that 
any one of them has this function it is assimilable to the (aesthetic) 
use of "good", which differs from those other terms or expressions in 
conunon use only in what one might call its purity, or the absence of 
adulteration with foreign purposes. 1 
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This story is plausible, but it should not be overlooked that 
the demonstration of reducibility or equivalence remains to be done. 
It is not self-evident that 'marvellous' in the mouth of a critic 
attributes (perhaps amongst other things) some measure of excellence 
of precisely the same kind as does 'good'. Indeed - anq this is why 
'non-neutral' is a dangerously loaded expression - what is at issue 
here is whether there is or is not a simple binary classification 
such that whatever is properly spoken of in (aesthetically) non-
neutral terms has, of necessity, a positive and homogeneous character 
describable simply as that of being (to some degree) aesthetically 
valuable. Or, to put the matter in terms of a mathematical analogy; 
what is in question is whether aesthetic excellence is a linear or a 
multi-dimensional concept. On a basis of this analogy the assumption 
that aesthetic value is in principle exhaustively discussable in 
terms of the meaning and use of the word 'good' is equivalent to the 
assumption that aesthetic value is one-dimensional; that all the 
aesthetic values, or degrees of aesthetic value, which are properly 
attributable to any object must lie on a linear scale and not in a 
plane, or in a volume, or indeed in a logical space of some number of 
dimensions only determinable by investigation. 
As well as the tacit assumption of linearity in the aesthetic 
dimension there is, connectedly, a general assumption that the 
proper use of 'good' is always directed to one end and always 
obviously and consistently so directed. Philosophers who reject the 
notion that goodness is an intrinsic property of things in favour of 
the view that 'good' is a word which connnends or reconnnends, are 
prone to suppose that consistency in use is determined by 
reference to the natural properties of the object of which 'good' is 
used, and not by the nature of the activity of connnending or 
reconnnending itself. Thus Hare, in a brief excursion into 
aesthetics, writes: 
1 
Now since it is the purpose of the word 'good' and other 
value-words to be used for teaching standards, their 
logic is in accord with this purpose ••• l'he reason why I 
cannot apply the word 'good' to one picture, if I refuse 
to apply it to another picture which I agree to be in 
all other respects exactly similar, is that by doing 
this I should be defeating the purpose for which the 
word is designed. I should be connnending one object, 
and so purporting to teach my hearers one standard, 
while in the same breath refusing to connnend a similar 
object, and so undoing the lesson just imparted. By 
seeking to impart two inconsistent standards, I should 
be imparting no standard at all. The effect of such an 
utterance is similar to that of a contradiction; for in 
a contradiction, I say two inconsistent things, and the 
effect is that the hearer will not know what I am trying 
to say.l 
R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (1952) p.134. Hare makes the 
same point over again, at greater length, in Freedom and Reason 
(1963) pp.139 et seq., discussing in particular the example of 
two lithographic prints. He is, consistently, connnitted to the 
doctrine that two 'qualitatively similar' works of art must be 
the same work of art. But Cf. H.S. Eveling's dismissal of a 
similar claim made by Ruby Meager (PAS, LIX (1958-59) pp.57-58) 
in Eveling, 'Composition and Criticism', PAS, LIX (1958-59) p.222: 
'Miss Ruby Meager has argued that if two persons wrote down a poem 
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Of course, a great deal hangs on Hare's phrase ' ••• in all other 
respects exactly similar'. If he means absolutely all other respects, 
including mode and time of origin, material and historical context and 
so on, then he earns his conclusion at the cost of losing that 
connnonsense distinction between qualitative and numerical identity 
which seems crucial to the point he is trying to establish. In fact 
he does not appear to have in mind a fully literal interpretation of 
'all other respects' but only that ordinary understanding of the 
phrase in which a perfect facsimile of a painting would be said to 
resemble the painting 'in all respects'. Without the aid of some 
individuating clue, we might reasonably suppose, no connoisseur could 
distinguish between a painting and a perfect facsimile. If this is 
indeed Hare's meaning, then it is far from obvious that a critic is 
not entitled to say, pointing to the picture on the museum wall: 
'This is good in that it is the first painting to break with the 
exhausted tradition of such-and-such a style or period', and, pointing 
Note contd. 
consisting of the same words we should have to say that they had 
written the same poem. I do not see that we ~ to say this at 
all. If such a situation did arise then I am more inclined to 
say that it would not be at all clear how we should want to 
describe the situation. The difficulty here is that there is not 
one criterion of identity and difference involved in the 
inviduation of poems but that one individuating feature is that 
they are written by particular persons. The difficulty about the 
situation Miss Meager envisages is that there is a clash of 
criteria, one feature inclining us to say that it is one poem, 
the other, in virtue of the fact that it only becomes possible to 
make sense of poetry on the presumption of a particular author, 
inclining us to suppose that we ought to speak of two poems'. 
to a very exact copy on a student's easel: 'This painting, which I 
confess I might easily mistake for the other under certain 
circumstances (if they were shuffled, for example) differs just in 
that, being a copy, it does not break with any tradition and is not 
good in that particular respect. 
Several responses are possible here. It might be maintained 
that critical remarks which evidently have tokens as their subject 
matter and not types are improper or invalid. Such a view could 
then be developed in two ways: either it might be argued that 
critical remarks which are not about the~ ('the picture' as 
contrasted with 'this - physical - painting') are necessarily not 
aesthetic remarks at all; or alternatively that what is not about 
the type, although it may be an aesthetic remark of some kind, is 
not directed to or at the work of art as such. 
The first of these suggestions is not worth powder and shot, 
but the subtler alternative requires answer, which may be made in 
this way. It is true that there are some things we can properly 
say about a type as contrasted with tokens of it, and some things we 
cannot properly say about the type but only about individual tokens. 
For example, we may say of the type Mona Lisa that it has an 
enigmatic smile - or, not to provoke irrelevant disagreement - that 
it is a portrait; but we may not say of the type that it recently 
travelled to America under heavy guard. On the other hand it is 
permissible to say of one particular, quite unique token of the 
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type - the one that Leonardo made - both that it is a portrait and 
that it visited America. We may say, too, of this token (as perhaps 
of a number of others) that its varnishes have changed and darkened 
with time; but we cannot say any such thing of the type. Of course, 
one of the problems of the notion of a Mona Lisa type is that we are 
a little uncertain what colour we ought to regard it as being - that 
of the original token of c.1500 or of the same token c.1960. If the 
former, then we must tolerate what is, to say the least, an odd 
suggestion: that we treat the object now in the Louvre as only a 
poorish token, presentation, or version of the picture Mona Lisa. 
The root of the matter seems to be that ordinary language - by 
which is meant the ordinary language of specialists, critics, 
historians, museum-keepers, artists, exporters and insurance 
companies as well as that of the connnon man - speaks equivocally 
from the point of view of the type/token distinction in the plastic 
arts. We have no warrant from ordinary language to treat the Mona 
Lisa considered 'as such' as being abundantly obviously a type and 
not a -that is, one particular - token. There is ample warrant for 
regarding other tokens of the same type as disqualified from 
consideration for the status of being the work of art 'as such', 
and in the case of those arts which exhibit no prime instances or 
privileged tokens it is quite natural to regard the type as being 
the work of art 'as such'. Nobody supposes that the Iliad, as such 
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is in his library, but the government of France certainly supposes 
the Mona Lisa, as such, to be in its custody. 
Aestheticians, then, may be tempted to generalize from some 
arts (or even perhaps from most arts) to all arts, and thereby to 
make mistakes; and they may be tempted to convert their mistakes 
into logically consistent although not very illuminating moves by 
means of open or concealed legislation. If it is ruled that no 
token is ever to be considered to be the work of art as such, not 
even those hallowed tokens in the Louvre, then it is so ruled. But 
even this insight does not bring us to the end of the matter: there 
remains the consideration that each and every token, and not merely, 
in appropriate cases, the privileged tokens, may be the subject of 
aesthetic appraisal, and that such appraisal may properly be said 
to be of ~work of art or aesthetic object as such. It is true 
that if a critic observes, tritely, that a student's copy of, let us 
say, Malevich's White on White (1919) is not an original painting -
in the honorific sense of 'original' - he is not speaking of White 
on White as such, which, of course, is an (honorifically) original 
painting, or at least is widely regarded by contemporary critics as 
an (honorifically) original painting. He is speaking of the 
student's copy as such, and the student's copy is not, as such, the 
work called White on White in either the type or the privileged 
token sense. Nevertheless it is an aesthetic object; and as an 
aesthetic object it is the proper subject of aesthetic attention and 
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remark: what is at issue is whether such a remark as 'It is not 
original' (i.e. it does not break valuable ground artistically) is 
127 
in any way at odds with the opposite opinion expressed about Malevich's 
painting, in view of the fact that the two paintings are, in a very 
viable if not quite absolute sense, indistinguishable. Recognition 
that the remarks are not about the same aesthetic object and therefore 
cannot be in contradiction easily resolves the paradox, which can only 
be re-introduced by insisting once again that, because of their 
visible similarity, remarks about Malevich's painting and about 
facsimiles of it must concern the same aesthetic object. This view 
derives plausibility, in the plastic arts, from a concentration of 
attention upon such cases as that of the lithograph, in which we have 
not one but multiple 'indistinguishable' privileged tokens: it is 
nevertheless a mistaken view when put into the form of a 
generalization about all those objects which are alike enough to 
fool - as we significantly say - even the most accomplished expert. 
The force of 'fool' in such a context derives from our possibly often 
misplaced but nevertheless quite natural assumption that the expert 
who chooses wrongly does not merely choose the wrong object but, 
possibly, the less valuable object. 
Resistance to the general conclusion that the artist's product 
and some other object may be 'indistinguishable' and yet the former 
be aesthetically good in that it is, for example, original, and the 
latter not good in that respect, may be offered in a somewhat 
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different way, placing no stress upon the type/token distinction. It 
is sometimes claimed that such virtues as originality are not in any 
object, but that they are if anything virtues of the originator; and 
that since they are not virtues of the object they are, a fortiori, 
not aesthetic virtues of it. This is a view which has much intuitive 
plausibility in spite of the fact that it is not here, and indeed is 
not often, formulated with striking clarity and precision. 1 In order 
to meet it we must first of all distinguish between the merely 
descriptive and the honorific uses of such terms as 'original', 'new', 
2 
'novel' and so on. Whoever makes anything whatsoever is, in the 
flattest possible sense of the term, the originator of that object -
although of course not necessarily the originator of the type, or 
'design' of it. We distinguish between objects in which or by means 
of which new designs are initiated and objects which merely conform to 
existing designs, by describing the former as 'original' and the latter 
as 'unoriginal' or 'not original'; and these expressions, in this use, 
quite certainly attribute relational properties to the objects in 
question. They do not attribute virtue to, nor do they withold it 
from, the authors of the objects; although of course approval of the 
1 
See, for example, Beardsley's Aesthetics, pp.458-461, for as 
perspicuous a presentation of the case as any. 
2 
See also the brief discussion of this point by myself and 
Maxwell Wright in 'Henze on Logic, Creativity and Art', AJP, 
41 (1963) esp. p.383. 
author is often only a short step away in ordinary discourse. Such 
approval, if given, may however be altogether misplaced, unless we 
assume that the production of novel objects, whether or not they are 
intrinsically admirable novelties, is itself an intrinsically 
admirable activity. This assumption will not bear much weight, 
although it is not unconnnon to see a great load of argument laid 
carelessly upon it. 
If novelty, or originality in the strictly descriptive sense, 
is not to be regarded as per se a species of excellence - as indeed 
it should not be so regarded - then we may recognise two varieties 
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of novel object: the merely novel, and the novel-and-admirable. This 
recognition is made unnecessarily difficult by our indifferent use of 
the single term 'original'; we speak of an original work as contrasted 
with copies of it, and of an original work as contrasted with 
unoriginal (derivative, inferior) work. It is important, too, that 
we should not make the mistake of supposing that 'novel-and-admirable' 
is an expression invoking two or more properties or relations of the 
object - that of being novel and that of being admirable in some way 
altogether distinct from the novelty. Xo exploit the terminology of 
intrinsicality, it is not the case that we regard all novelty as 
intrinsically admirable, but it nevertheless is the case that we 
regard some novelties as intrinsically admirable, and what have been 
spoken of as the descriptive and the honorific uses of 'original' 
mark this distinction. 
130 
It remains to be shown that just as the descriptive application 
of 'original' is properly directed towards objects, as distinct from 
their authors, so too is the honorific application; and this 
demonstration is much more difficult. The difficulty is intimately 
connected with the fact that the honorific use of 'original' is 
reserved almost exclusively (in the view of many, utterly exclusively) 
for the works of man, whereas the descriptive use is not. The works 
of man have each a distinct place in the cultural history of man, and 
that is to say that each has a distinct location in the history of 
values. Thus, to the extent that artifacts are seen as having been 
deliberated within a cultural context, they are seen also as 
something like moves in a game, although a game of very great 
complexity with very imperfectly formulated and 'open' rules. The 
accidental occurrences of nature, including the accidental acts of 
man, on the other hand, are not in any sense whatever moves in a game -
unless transcendentally a divine or satanic one. Thus, any natural or 
artificial, accidental or deliberated object whatsoever may be said to 
be 'new' in that its observers see it for the first time, and even 
'new' in the sense that it has verifiably just occurred for the first 
time, but not 'new' in the sense that its occurrence just then merits 
applause unless its occurrence just then is more than an accident. 
We do not in general stand by and cheer the unfolding of events as 
such; even those who daily rejoice that things are as they are do so 
because they suppose that things are designed to be as they are, 
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perhaps by a special sort of artist working on the cosmic scale. And 
their peculiar problem is, of course, how to withold praise from 
certain such novelties as unprecedented pestilence without impiety. 
The virtue or merit of originality, then, is somehow attributable 
to an object as that object lies embedded in its cultural context. 
Objects arise in a context of cultural history - not merely one of 
natural history - ultimately by virtue of the efforts of human 
individuals, and it is therefore tempting to attribute the 
excellence not, so to speak, to the feast, but to the founder. But 
this would be a mistake; it by no means follows from the fact that 
certain excellences are context-dependent that they are not properly 
speaking excellences of the object-in-context, but of the author of 
that object-in-context. 'Good knight's move!' does not entail 'He is 
a good chess player', although there are of course important logical 
connections between claims about moves and claims about players. 
Originality (the virtue) in art poses a number of more or less 
familiar problems. How, for example, should we deal with works from 
an alien culture the proper history of which is not well known to us? 
Under such circumstances we cannot distinguish with confidence what 
~ original (honorifically so) in its genetic setting from what was 
perhaps quite blatantly derivative. Some aestheticians, it is true, 
seem to see no problem here. Erich Kahler, for example, writes: 
For it is this effort to express something inexpressible, 
to grasp and to shape something for the first time, it is 
this 'for the first time' that gives a work of art its 
lasting freshness and vitality, its genuineness of 
language, its convincing vigor, so that ancient works, 
whose scopes and styles are by now utterly familiar to us 
and in one way or another left behind by the endeavours 
of our age, are still fully alive, and we are able to 
enjoy them as if they were created today. The trace of 
that ultimate effort that created them persists in them, 
the longing, the struggle, the suffering, the innnediacy 
of all primal creation. When we feel certain works to be 
of secondary quality it is because all this is lacking in 
them; they echo, iterate and imitate the achievements of 
the masters.l 
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Clearly, a knowledge of the proper history of the work in question 
is built into such a position as a presupposition; or else, if it is 
not, the conviction that originality can be discerned by simple 
inspection of the work is an untenably mystical one, since we could 
have nothing but the barest intuition that some given work is not 
slavishly derived from that of an earlier, undiscovered master. This 
is the sort of difficulty which critics must face, and which 
philosophers cannot abolish on their behalf by a simple act of 
legislation. We are able to avoid mistakenly attributing honorific 
originality to an object if we resolve, as critics, never to make such 
an attribution; but by this course we show ourselves not to have 
stumbled upon the boundaries of sound critical practice, but to have 
erected them ourselves. 
It would seem, then, to be possible to admit Hare's contention 
(at least for argumentative purposes) that ' ••• it is the purpose of 
1 
'What is Art?' in Weitz, ed., op.cit., pp.165-66. 
133 
the word "good" and other value-words to be used for teaching 
standards', but at the same time to deny that the application of the 
word 'good' to one picture and the refusal to apply it to another 
which is ' ••• in all other respects exactly similar' would be 
contradictory and would defeat ' ••• the purpose for which the word is 
designed'. 'I'he logic of identity, of 'exact similarity', and of 
difference, in connection with aesthetic objects in general and works 
of art in particular, is of such a complexity as to frustrate so 
simple a theoretical scheme. Not even the last kick of argument -
that, analytically, remarks which bear upon an object in relation to 
its context or setting do not bear upon the object simpliciter - will 
effectively disqualify the excellence of originality from candidature 
as a possible excellence of works of art. To do this it must first be 
shown that works of art are, must be, objects simpliciter; and this 
has not been shown nor does it seem likely that it could be shown by 
philosophical argument. We must in the end defer to actual critical 
practice, and it simply is the case that critics sometimes treat Mona 
~ (for example) as a work of art in which the technique of sfumato 
is newly developed that is to say, they regard that work of art 
which is called Mona Lisa as an object (whether token or type is here 
irrelevant) in a context. That critics sometimes do and sometimes do 
not regard works of art in this light, or speak of them in this way, 
is not a sign of inconsistency in critical practice, but of 
complexity. 
In order to fill out and give substance to these criticisms of 
traditional assumptions and procedure in aesthetics it would seem 
worth while to look more carefully at an entire range of epithets, 
phrases and expressions - of which 'good' is only one - without 
connnitment to the view that 'good' will do duty for the rest either 
as the most typical or as the most general of them. The use of such 
expressions has already been characterized roughly as the utterance 
of verdicts, and before attempting a firmer account of them it is 
important to remind oneself that aesthetic verdicts are members of 
the larger family of aesthetic remarks. If it is true, as has been 
claimed, that aesthetic remarks are not made of necessity by means 
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of any particular words or phrases, then this is true also of 
verdicts; and moreover if it is true that the correct application of 
aesthetic remarks is not governed by specifiable necessary and 
sufficient conditions as set out in terms of natural properties, then 
so also is this true of verdicts. 
Verdicts do not differ from the general run of aesthetic remarks 
in any very simple and clear-cut way. It is, as will shortly become 
apparent, partly a question of the extent to which the giving of 
reasons in support of a remark is possible, which determines whether 
or not that remark should be regarded as a verdict. A critic may be 
asked to justify 'What an unadventurous work!' whereas he is not 
ordinarily pressed to act or speak in support of 'What a lovely 
patina!' Unless we are novices, learning about the arts and the 
criticism of the arts, we shall in the latter case simply agree or 
disagree with him; we shall not ask him what reasons he has for 
maintaining that the patina is lovely. Or, if we do so, it will 
very likely be as a rhetorical device: a critic may sometimes be 
ridiculed by being challenged to defend his remarks in a way in 
which they cannot be defended - although his complicity in the 
misunderstanding is a precondition of success. 
That verdicts may involve evidence and the giving of reasons is 
connected with the fact that, unlike the generality of aesthetic 
remarks, they are directed not, so to speak, at objects much as pure 
descriptions are directed, but are offered as being in some sense 
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for them or against them. Much of the point of the following 
investigation is to give a clearer sense to the notion of the 
partisanship of verdicts in relation to objects through a scrutiny of 
examples. It is, of course, superficially contradictory to insist 
that verdicts are not necessarily uttered in any set forms of words -
that there are perhaps no words whose exclusive function it is to 
convey aesthetic verdicts - and then to set out a selection of words 
for an inspection which purports to be an inquiry into verdicts. 
The contradiction is more apparent than real. Firstly: although, for 
example, the word 'ugly' may not invariably and necessarily be used 
to convey an aesthetic verdict, it is nevertheless generally and 
typically so used. And secondly, it is only needful, in order to 
legitimize the procedure, to stipulate that the words and phrases set 
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out below are to be regarded as having been taken from aesthetic 
contexts of utterance in which they have their most characteristic 
role. Xhe only uncertainty about the propriety of including this or 
that example stems from the inherent uncertainty regarding the 
position of any example in typical use upon the spectrum of aesthetic 
remarks as a whole. Since most if not all aesthetic remarks can 
fairly easily be pressed into service for the utterance of verdicts 
it will never be very difficult to construct arguments that this or 
that example most typically is, or most typically is not, used as a 
verdict. Such arguments, however, while they might tend to show 
that there is some arbitrariness in the choice of examples, should 
equally tend to show which are the better - or at any rate the least 
contentious - ones, and not that the entire enterprise is unsound. 
Xhe strategy to be adopted involves the allocation of verdicts 
to one or other of six groups formed out of the deliberately 
imprecise notions of 'pro' and 'con', together with the classifying 
expressions 'Genetic', 'Open' and 'Consequential'. Xhese heads are 
explained in the following way. 
Pro and Con: A livlier grasp of the notion of partisanship is 
what is sought, and therefore cannot be given 
priority over an inquiry into the actual use of 
verdicts. To the objection that is impossible to 
allocate particulars to classes without a full 
understanding of the relevant differentiae it 
Genetic: 
.QE.fil!.: 
must be countered that most people can, for example, 
competently assign a great range of organisms to the 
class of animals or to that of vegetables, but this 
does not entail that they are able to give an 
account of the differences which would satisfy a 
biologist. Nor, to be sure, is it quite certain 
that most people would make no mistakes. Even as 
scientists, we begin with coarse differentiae and 
then upon closer examination of the character of the 
objects so netted we refine, or even altogether 
revise our original principles. And just as there 
are organisms to the classification of which the 
simple animal-vegetable distinction is not apt, so no 
doubt are there verdicts which are neither plainly 
pro nor~· A verdict like 'modest' seems 
sometimes to occupy such an ambiguous position. 
Verdicts are sometimes only to be explained or 
accounted for in terms of the object to which they 
refer regarded as being the result or consequence of 
formative factors or conditions. 
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Verdicts are often inexplicit as to whether the object 
is regarded as something which has a history, or as 
something which itself brings about effects or 
consequences. Sometimes they seem quite explicitly 
to refer to the object in neither of these roles or 
capacities, but simply as a phenomenon detached from 
the causal sequence. Thus, 'first-class' seems to 
invoke in some way an object's peers, but not its 
origins or its effects. Whether or not this 
impression can be sustained upon closer analysis, it 
seems safe to treat all such verdicts initially as 
open with respect to origins and to consequences. 
Conseguential: Verdicts often make the plainest possible reference 
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to an object in its instrumental or affective capacity. 
Thus, 'moving' would be a senseless verdict if nobody 
were ever emotionally moved by a work of art, and 
would be inappropriate of a given object if that 
object did not move the critic who was author of the 
verdict, or at least seem to him to be likely to move 
others. 
There follows a selection of verdicts distributed in what seems 
to be the mcst natural way under these heads. The first example 
given, in each case, will be regarded for convenience in discussion as 
typical or characteristic of the group. It is not suggested that an 
exhaustive analysis of the samples so favoured would bring to light 
every least facet and aspect - or even every significant facet and 
aspect - of aesthetic verdicts. 
GENETIC PRO: 
OPEN PRO: 
CONSEQUENTIAL PRO: 
· GENETIC CON: 
Masterly, daring, well-executed, consUIIllilate, 
original, etc. 
~' excellent, first-rate, superb, splendid, 
etc. 
Stimulating, marvellous, exciting, breath-
taking, moving, inspiring, impressive, etc. 
Incompetent, badly-executed, derivative, 
vulgar, presumptuous, pretentious, etc. 
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OPEN COO: Bad, poor, trivial, worthless, negligible, etc. 
CONSEQUENTIAL CON: Tedious, shocking, frightful, appalling, 
dreadful, tiresome, boring, etc. 
There are, in addition to these examples, many which it is 
impossible to place confidently within this schema, either because two 
or more heads make equally compelling claim, or because none at all is 
conspicuously suitable. For example, although 'feeble' is distinctly 
£2!1, is it, in typical use, genetic, open or consequential? 
'Unassertive', on the other hand, is neither distinctly genetic nor 
consequential, and might be tentatively classified as 'open', but is 
it unambiguously either pro or con? In addition to these difficulties, 
the two groups of consequential verdicts contain at least some members 
which must be regarded as acquisitions of doubtful propriety. We do 
not nowadays mean to imply by our use of such words as 'frightful' 
that something is literally provocative of fear, nor even by 
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'breathtaking' that, speaking strictly, respiration is inhibited. 
There is certainly at least a prima facie case for re-allocating 
'frightful' to Qpen con in spite of its literal sense; there may also 
be some slight inclination to transfer 'breathtaking' to Qpen con. 
But at least the leading instances, 'stimulating' and 'tedious', should 
prove unexceptionable. 
There is one irmnediately striking feature of verdicts considered 
in the light of this classification. It is that no two verdicts are 
incompatible - that is to say, inapplicable at once to the same work 
of art, or to the same feature of it - merely because one is pro and 
the other con. Incompatibility will only occur between verdicts taken 
from corresponding groups, whether genetic, open or consequential, in 
the pro and .£2!!._ ranges respectively. We are not at liberty to say, 
coherently, that something is masterly and incompetent, although it is 
quite permissible to say that something is masterly and bad (as, for 
example, Hellenistic carving was widely held to be until quite recently) 
or that it is masterly and tedious (and perhaps the same illustration 
will serve). Incompatibility is not simply the inevitable consequence 
of using expressions which are each, in their ordinary uses, regarded 
as the negation or contrary of the other, but of the use of such 
expressions taken from corresponding but contrary groups. Thus, 
although 'good' and 'bad' are paradigmatically opposed they may 
nevertheless be applied together to the same work of art if their 
real import is not after all open but, say, genetic and conseguential 
respectively. If I offer the exegesis: 1By "good" I mean "well-ma.de" 
and by ''bad" I mean ''boring"', then I have justified my admittedly 
eccentric and misleading verdict 'Good and bad'. If two apparently 
contradictory verdicts are regarded as falling within the same basic 
group, whether genetic, open or consequential, such a move is 
inadmissible, just as 'Masterly and incompetent' or 'Stimulating and 
tedious' are inadmissible. 
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It is a distinctive feature of open verdicts, whether pro or £2!!:., 
that they can fairly readily be distributed between either of the 
other two groups as the point of their use is made more explicit. 
They are, of all verdicts, the leastspecific, and to sharpen and 
give precision to them is as a general rule - although possibly not 
invariably - to re-allocate them either to the group of genetic or to 
that of conseguential verdicts. Only after so much precision has been 
achieved are residual open verdicts which negate each other seen to be 
necessarily incompatible. Another way of putting the point, perhaps 
more simply, would be to say that the open verdicts listed above are, 
prima facie, 'open' in two senses: they may require further explication 
before they can be confidently allocated to their proper group, or they 
may be quite correctly placed where they are - as neither genetic nor 
conseguential. 
That a particular verdict is incompatible with its natural 
contradictory in the corresponding group by no means implies that it is 
incompatible with all, nor even with quite similar verdicts from that 
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corresponding group. 'Tedious and stimulating' is inadmissible; 
'tedious and impressive' is not. 'Derivative and original' is 
inadmissible; 'derivative and well-executed' is not. These contrasts 
are much less sharp in the case of open verdicts. We may say that 
'good and bad' (considered as bona fide open verdicts) is impossible, 
but what is contrastingly possible? 'Splendid and trivial' perhaps? 
One might well choose to say something of this sort about a firework 
display, or the decoration of a cake. Even so, however, there is a 
distinct feeling of strain here unless one or other of the terms is 
gently eased at least to the fringe of another group. 'Trivial', in 
this case, seems the natural candidate for interpretation in terms of 
a lack of profundity or of significance in the work - that is to say, 
in either genetic or conseguential terms. It is by no means easy to 
think of a pair of verdicts, pro and .£.£!!., which are neither distinctly 
genetic nor consequential and which are not in some degree evidently 
incompatible. I shall not maintain the radical view that this is 
because open is a quite artifical and unnatural class whose members 
must, upon analysis, inevitably escape elsewhere; although this is at 
least an indicated possibility. On such a view the members of the 
group of open verdicts would be 'open' only in the single sense that 
they are ambiguous or deceptive as they stand, and merely await 
allocation to their proper places after fuller investigation. If this 
were indeed the case it would go a long way towards explaining why it 
is that most, if not all, open pro verdicts seem obviously incompatible 
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with most, if not all, open con verdicts. ~verdicts, on this view, 
are inevitably unspecific verdicts, and what is (unspecifically) pro 
can scarcely avoid seeming to confront what is (unspecifically) con 
more or less squarely. 
It must not be supposed that if open verdicts are, or tend to be, 
what might be called sunnnaries of more specific remarks, that it is 
this which, in itself, distinguishes them from genetic and 
consequential verdicts. Indeed, it is in the very complexity of all 
verdicts - in the fact that reasons can usually be given in support of 
them, that they can be explicated or 'unpacked' - that verdicts are 
seen to differ from the generality of aesthetic remarks. And it is 
perhaps appropriate to insert a reminder at this point, before moving 
on to a consideration of how verdicts are justified, that the 
justification of an aesthetic verdict must be subject to the same 
limitations as the justification of any aesthetic remark; that is to 
say, the justification cannot take the form of a demonstration that 
necessary and sufficient natural conditions for the application of the 
verdict are satisfied. There is nothing which, because it is of such 
and such a description, must be, cannot but be, tedious or masterly 
or bad. 
We justify aesthetic verdicts in terms of aesthetic remarks 
which, for the purposes in hand, are not themselves verdicts but which 
together constitute what might be called, in keeping with the 
legalistic metaphor, the evidence for the verdict. Thus, just as a 
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verdict of 'guilty' may be justified by evidence that an accused 
person was seen by reliable eye-witnesses to perform a certain action, 
so the aesthetic verdict 'masterly' may be justified by evidence that 
the work is unconnnonly well done. The significant feature of the 
parallel is the absence in both cases of any strictly logical 
implication. It does not follow syllogistically that a person who 
performs a certain action is guilty, for there is not any universal 
major premise to the effect that all who perform this action are 
guilty. The insane perhaps, are not, nor are those who were provoked 
in certain ways, nor those who are able to show that they performed 
the action prior to a certain date upon which legislation was enacted, 
nor are those who charm the jury sufficiently, and so on. In a 
similar way, there is no universal major premise to the effect that 
whatever is unconnnonly well done is masterly. Much copying, 
imitating or forgery, for example, may be unconnnonly well done, but 
only the work of a Dossena or a van Meegeren is very likely to be 
called masterly; and even so there is a tendency amongst many critics 
to retain the accolade for award only to the work of the masters they 
emulated. On the other hand, there is a type of inference which is 
not totally unlike a deductive argument from sufficient conditions to 
be derived from an appeal to quasi-universal canons. As Margaret 
Macdonald has put it: 
Throughout the history of an art there have accumulated a 
number of rules, prescriptions, prohibitions, called 
'canons of the art'. A wise critic relates his spontaneous 
judgment.to the wisdom distilled in these formulae though 
neither artist nor critic regards them as absolute norms. 
Indeed, their very existence may prove a challenge to 
defy or go beyond them. Critical canons are, perhaps, 
more like rules of etiquette than morals and very unlike 
scientific law or logical principles.l 
The legal analogy, whilst it is illuminating as to the notion of 
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the justification of verdicts in terms of evidence, is quite seriously 
misleading in other respects. Firstly, verdicts in law are - at 
least paradigmatically - supported quite scrupulously by 
considerations of fact, whereas the aesthetic remarks which support 
aesthetic verdicts are not necessarily factual, or at any rate not 
factual in the same sense. We are quite free to regard the elegance of 
an umbrella, or of a gesture, as a fact; but not to regard it as so 
mechanically demonstrable a fact as the length of the umbrella, or the 
sheer occurrence of some movement. Of course, the rudeness of a 
gesture might well be an issue at law in a prosecution for 'insulting 
behaviour', and to that extent it mtSt be conceded that the law allows 
aesthetic, moral, and other kinds of non-(strictly)-factual remark to 
be used in evidence. Secondly, verdicts in criminal law are 
incomparably less complicated than aesthetic verdicts for at least one 
good reason. They are uttered for one purpose and one purpose only; 
and that is to decide the question whether an accused person should be 
freed without stain or should have sentence passed upon him. It is 
1 
'Some Distinctive Features of Criticism of the Arts', ~' 
XXIII (1949) p.187. 
because of this that prisoners are restricted to the simple two-
value formula: 'guilty or not guilty?' and forbidden to plead 
'careless' or 'unrepentant'. Aesthetic verdicts, by contrast, are 
uttered in an enormous variety of forms and with at least three 
distinct objectives; and they are correspondingly more complex. 
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Aesthetic verdicts are uttered in order to commend objects, to 
recommend objects to people, and to give expression to personal 
attitudes both with and without the intent to urge changes of 
attitude upon others. The first and last of these purposes or 
functions have given rise to theories dignified by titles: the 
performative theory and the emotive theory of aesthetic judgment, 
respectively. The theory that the point of utterance of an aesthetic 
verdict is to recommend objects has no traditionally sanctioned name, 
but might as well be called the predictive theory of aesthetic 
judgment. The difference between a commendation and recommendation 
is brought out by reflecting upon the logical propriety of such 
statements as: 'I recommend this to you as an outstanding example of 
the tedious, derivative and trival in art. You must see it - it is, 
as a matter of fact, an object that I know you will enjoy and which 
you - unlike myself - will no doubt wish to commend'. The difference 
between recommendation and emotive expression or persuasion is the 
difference between simple prediction ('This is an object that you 
will enjoy', or ' ••• that it will be instructive for you to see'), 
and an utterance which is expressive of the speaker's preference-
attitudes and is or may be persuasive in intent. The distinction is 
not, of course, absolutely sharp, and it is most corrnnon to hear 
recorrnnendations made in persuasive terms. 
A good deal of disputation in recent aesthetic writings is 
attributable to what might be called the Fallacy of Single 
Explanations: aestheticians have tended to embrace one of these 
theories with perhaps excessive enthusiasm, and to regard the others 
not as supplementary but as competitive and in need of refutation. 
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In consequence, the familiar verdicts of practical critics have tended 
to undergo a processing from which they emerge in a thoroughly 
denatured form which fits a favoured theory. Or, alternatively, the 
great variety of natural verdicts has been quite ignored in favour 
of the malleable single expression 'good' which can be pressed into 
the service of any theory at all and, by a tightening of rules or 
definitions, be witheld from any theory held in specific disesteem. 
But we are under no constraint, logical or otherwise, to treat these 
theories as irreconcilable competitors. Why should not some verdicts 
actually be performative, some emotive, and some predictive? Why 
indeed, should not some of them be intelligibly discussable in more 
than one role? the only combination which is evidently logically 
objectionable is that of a verdict regarded as both simply (i.e. non-
persuasively) predictive and as persuasive. Apart from this, there is 
no compelling reason why a verdict should not be used, as verdicts are 
in fact used, both to corrnnend and to persuade; nor any reason why an 
act of connnendation should not be, on occasion, an effective act of 
reconnnendation. 
Any critic who offers a verdict might do so for any of these 
reasons, purposes or motives - and perhaps for others, although these 
are surely the most important. And the appropriate form of 
justification of the verdict he utters will depend upon the point of 
utterance; it will depend upon whether the verdict is a connnendation, 
a reconnnendation, an emotive expression, or some combination of 
these possibilities. 
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Performative verdicts, as in the classic case of such performative 
utterances as the naming of ships, promising, saying (under appropriate 
circumstances) 1 1 will', and so on, are speech-acts the function of 
which is not to report upon or describe the world, but to change it. 
They are not merely words, but deeds. They perhaps differ from these 
classic cases in that as a general rule they change the world but 
little, and that often only temporarily. This is no doubt because 
the circumstances and ceremonial attendant upon or prior to the 
passing of performative aesthetic verdicts is not very clearly 
specified or specifiable; and in particular the authority vested by 
the connnunity at large in the critic is uncertain and liable to 
withdrawal without notice. The great majority of critics (and by 
'critic' is meant whoever utters an aesthetic verdict) are self-
appointed' and the obligation which their audiences feel placed upon 
them to accept their verdicts is tenuous often to the point of non-
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existence. Nevertheless, any critic may adopt something of the 
posture, the gravitas, of an umpire or a magistrate, and pronounce as 
if his verdicts were authoritative and binding; and to the extent 
that his audience is prepared to and does treat what he says as 
authoritative and binding, he has succeeded not merely in speaking 
but in acting in the world. It should not be overlooked that 
although such successes may be comparatively rare, they are none the 
less real. A critic who by general consent comes to have sufficient 
authority vested in him is able to commend works of art as surely as 
the properly appointed judge at a cattle show who places a ribbon 
round the neck of a favoured animal. Especially is this evidently so 
in the case of novel work to which existing canons of criticism apply 
only very doubtfully, or not at all. In such cases there is often a 
general public readiness to allow that critic with most charisma -
generally nowadays a celebrated professional - to initiate a 
tradition of verdicts which will be widely followed. There is, it 
is true, no formal ceremony of appointment for the arbiters of 
contemporary taste, but there are many complicated informal moves 
which, by a loose collective consent, have the same effect. A 
sculptor of, say, giant hamburgers relies heavily upon the benediction 
'Splendid' of an authoritative professional critic to smooth his path 
towards the ultimate acceptance of his work by the general public. 
A performative verdict does not, strictly speaking, require 
reasons to be given in its support, but they are nevertheless 
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regularly offered. The range of possible cases is given by the fact 
that familiar works of art within a stable cultural tradition are 
usually embedded in a persistent matrix of canons, whereas genuine 
novelties may defy prevailing canons and implicitly call for new ones, 
or for new applications of old ones. A critic might seek to justify 
1 his verdict: 'Michelangelo's greatest work', passed upon The Rondanini 
Pieta, by saying: 11 don't know of any other single work of art by 
anyone that is more poignant, more moving ••• ', and rely exclusively 
upon a justification in the form of aesthetic remarks of this by now 
almost incontrovertible kind to make his case for him. Or he might -
and Moore does - lean upon personal authority instead of traditionally 
exemplary aesthetic remark, in asserting that prevailing canons are 
mistaken and, by implication, that new ones should be sought. For he 
continues: 
1 
Why should I and other sculptors I know, my contemporaries -
I think that Giacometti feels this, I know Marino Marini 
feels it - find this work one of the most moving and 
greatest works we know of when it's a work which has such 
disunity in it! L;y italicif ••• it's a work of art that for 
me means more because it doesn't fit in with all the 
theories of critics and aestheticians who say that one of 
the great things about a work of art must be its unity 
of style' .2 
Henry Moore: 'The Michelangelo Vision', The Sunday Times 
Magazine Supplement, 1964. 
2 
Ibid. 
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Of course, here Moore might be taken impishly to be saying that 
his own verdict is simply and deliberately crass, contradicting 'the 
theories of critics and aestheticians' for the sheer peverse pleasure 
of doing so. But I think that the invocation of Giacometti and 
Marini carries the implication that he supposes the verdict to be 
sound (i.e. justifiable in principle although the means are not yet 
available), and the 'theories' to be in need of revision. And 
certainly a verdict so weightily subscribed is a verdict which stands 
in little if an innnediate need of the support of evidence. Lesser 
pundits, mere miserable theoreticians, must scrabble around for the 
evidence - in other words, must contrive the explicit revision of 
canons - after the principal authorities of our times have rough-hewn 
the material for their petty manipulations. 
An aesthetic connnendation, then, is something for which, in very 
many contexts, a capable judge is able to give reasons which will be 
quite widely acceptable; but for which he need not (and often either 
will not or cannot) give reasons if either the work or the 
commendation is novel, and if the judge has performative authority. 
Even when he does not give reasons, however, or when he confesses 
himself unable to do so, he will generally be supposed to have reasons, 
which it will become the duty of the journeymen of taste to investigate 
and bring to light. The suspicion that great critics may be in a 
perfectly clear sense Lords of Misrule in their powers with respect to 
judgment of genuine novelties, can only be silenced by the reflection· 
that !h.!2., misrule is the basis of future, more systematic, 
legislation. There is, and must be, a point of entry for the 
purely arbitrary into the history of standards of taste, or else we 
should not find aesthetic verdicts such contentious utterances. 
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Evidence which is aptly chosen in support of a verdict designed 
to reconnnend an object differs from that which is given in support of 
a connnendation, in the principles of its selection. A connnendation 
relies upon aesthetic remarks which (it is believed) it would. be 
appropriate for anyone whatsoever to make about the object if he 
could but free himself of ignorance and prejudice. It leans - but 
in as much as it is performative it does not depend upon universal 
or quasi-universal canons. A reconnnendation - and it is for this 
reason that it leans not at all upon authority or upon canons for 
its force - is supported by aesthetic remarks which are not 
necessarily known, or believed, to be universally acceptable, but are 
thought to be within the capacity of a particular audience to utter 
willingly for itself. 'This is stimulating', we say, 'and by this we 
mean that you will derive pleasure or advantage from seeing it since 
it has the aesthetic features a,b,c ••• n which (so we believe) are of 
peculiar interest and importance to you'. 
Emotive verdicts which are persuasive rather than merely 
expressive are, like reconnnendations, chosen and justified with a 
particular audience in mind. They differ from purely predictive 
verdicts - that is, from recommendations - in that the aesthetic 
remarks which would be offered in support of a verdict, no less than 
the verdict itself, are designedly persuasive. That is to say, the 
speaker's aesthetic remarks are, and deliberately are, more than or 
other than merely correct in their application to the object: they 
prescribe an attitude to the object under review, and do not merely 
predict it. 
The case of the thoroughgoing and exclusive Emotive Theorist of 
aesthetic verdicts would seem to rest substantially upon the truth 
of the contention that both the exclamatory and the imperative 
components of aesthetic verdicts are in some invariably connected 
way parts of a universal emotive language. In effect, he is 
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committed to the view that such expressions as 'How sweet it is' are 
interpretable by English speakers as meaning (for example) 'Yum yum!' 
and 'Like this!' But it is surely perfectly evident that in 
somebody's utterance they might very plausibly mean 'Ugh!' and 
'Keep off!' The key to understanding a verdict is to be sought not 
so much in what the words mean (although the limits of the public 
language must not be overstepped) as in what the speaker means by 
them; and it is for this reason that they cannot always be interpreted 
in one emotive sense rather than in another, or even in some cases as 
emotive at all. Much of our language is 'loaded', without a doubt, 
but we are able nevertheless, without impropriety, to shift the 
balance of some of the loads, and even occasionally to shed them 
altogether. Can we say that someone is a scoundrel without urging 
our audience against him? Of course we can. Isn't Felix Krull an 
engaging scoundrel? 
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The very idea that verdicts may be pro or .£2!! depends ultimately 
upon the fact that there are human attitudes to things, and that 
these attitudes are not too individual and inconsistent, especially 
as they relate to fundamental issues of survival, power, sex and so 
on. But it by no means follows that a pro aesthetic verdict must be 
a command to adopt an attitude of favour or preference. It may do 
no more than predict that such an attitude will be adopted by a 
certain audience, or it may be an act of commendation - or of 
disconnnendation - made without any particular audience in mind at 
all. That prizewinners are generally admired does not entail that 
the award of a prize is a covert exhortation to admiration, although 
it seems contingently probable that if the human race lost the 
capacity to admire and to envy, it would cease to award prizes. 
In sum: Verdicts are commonly uttered by critics for at least 
three distinguishable purposes; and they differ from the generality 
of aesthetic remarks primarily in that whereas the astute critic's 
problem in justifying an aesthetic remark is, most typically, how 
to put his finger on the natural feature which prompts it, his 
problem in justifying a verdict is less primitive. He must unpack 
the verdict into components which bear roughly the relation of 
evidence to the verdict. And the amount and kind of evidence which 
it will be appropriate for him to offer will depend in turn upon the 
purpose for which the verdict is uttered: it will depend upon 
whether it is designedly performative, predictive or emotive. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PICTURES. MODELS, MEASURES AND MATCHES 
Whether or not the arguments, contentions and considerations 
advanced in the last three chapters are entirely sound, they are 
clearly for the most part capable of extension to arts other than 
sculpture. With this general framework adumbrated it becomes 
possible to locate problems specific to sculpture without losing a 
grip on the relation of the more specific to the more general 
aesthetic issues. 
It is probably correct to say that there is one problem which 
might be regarded as the aesthetic problem peculiar to sculpture; 
although it would no doubt be a mistake to insist that it is the 
only one. It might be put abstractly in terms of the distinction 
between the arts of two and those of three dimensions or, more 
concretely and traditionally, in terms of the domestic quarrel 
between the exemplary visual arts, painting and sculpture. Sir 
Joshua Reynolds told the students of the Royal Academy Schools, in 
his tenth Discourse delivered in 1780, that: 
If these observations have hitherto referred principally 
to Painting, let it be remembered that this Art is much 
more extensive and complicated than Sculpture, and 
affords therefore a more ample field for criticism; and 
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as the greater includes the less, the leading principles 
of Sculpture are comprised in those of Painting.l 
This opinion, forged during the Renaissance and become firmly 
received opinion by the eighteenth century, is nowadays in severe 
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disfavour. Efforts have been made by contemporary theorists, amongst 
whom Sir Herbert Read is conspicuous, to establish sculpture as an 
art with complete aesthetic autonomy whose 'leading principles' are 
quite distinct from those of painting. I shall argue, unfashionably, 
that an important mistake is involved in this view, no less than in 
Reynolds', and that neither faction has come properly to terms with 
the underlying epistemological issues. 
A circumspect approach to the confused problems of the criticism 
of sculpture must in the end be very indirect indeed, arriving at 
last by way of certain more philosophically fundamental questions in 
the theory of perception. Aesthetic theory and the theory of our 
perceptual knowledge of the world have tended to keep a guarded 
distance, except when both are expounded by such a philosopher as the 
giant of K.Onigsberg. And even Kant seems to have had difficulty in 
articulating the principles of the Critique of Pure Reason flawlessly 
with those of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement, as his uneasy 
apparatus of distinction between 'determinant' and 'reflective' 
judgment shows. 
1 
Discourses on Art (1961) p.155 
A good deal of modern aesthetics has been written by avowed 
specialists in the arts, or by philosophers in only a somewhat 
exiguous sense of the word; and there is little doubt that the most 
influential writers, in terms of their effect upon the actual 
practices of artists and critics, are often to be counted amongst 
the least rigorous thinkers. Wassily Kandinsky, for example, has 
wielded enormous power as a theorist and teacher of the fine arts, 
in spite of the fact that his mystical prose is almost totally 
impenetrable to the intellect. He writes, characteristically: 
Generally speaking, colour directly influences the soul. 
Colour is the keyboard, the eyes are the hannners, the 
soul is the piano with many strings. The artist is the 
hand that plays, touching one key or another purposively, 
to cause vibrations in the soul. 
It is evident therefore that colour harmony must rest 
ultimately on the purposive playing upon the human soul; 
this is one of the guiding principles of internal 
necessity.I Loriginal emphasi~1 
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It may be because one cannot discern quite clearly enough whether 
such dicta are absolutely senseless or poetic inflations of the merely 
trivial that profundity comes to be alleged of them. In part, no 
doubt, there is involved some act of homage to their distinguished 
artist author. However, a more perspicuous and plausible account of 
the connection between the sight of colours (for example) and 
judgments as to their harmony, is certainly called for; and here some 
1 
Concerning the Spiritual in Art, first published in German in 
1912, (1955) p.45. 
attempt to grapple seriously with the philosophy of perception must 
be made. 
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It would be both foolish and presumptuous toat.tempt a definitive 
solution of longstanding epistemological problems merely as an 
incident to the present aesthetic inquiry. On the other hand, the 
matter is too fundamental to be ignored with impunity. The remainder 
of this and the following chapter should therefore be read as the 
merest outline of a theory of perception which, if it has a little 
more than a grain of truth in it, offers the present advantage that 
it illuminates much that was obscure in the theory of the criticism 
of the two and the three-dimensional arts. Indeed, the debt of the 
visual arts to philosophy, if it is real, is reciprocal; for the 
theory I shall outline owes its key concept to the art of 
representational painting and drawing. 
Philosophical theories of perception have for some time been 
burdened with such notions as 'the contents of the visual field' and 
'the mosaic of sense-data', which have been urged, amongst others, 
as candidates for the status of the true objects of visual perception. 
These, or something like them, it has been maintained, are what we 
really see. But the transitive logic of verbs of perception is such 
that their proper objects seem to be required to have at least quasi-
substantial properties - in particular, to need a location. One of 
the most serious obstacles to agreement between philosophers who 
accept as corrnnon ground that the true objects of perception are not 
the objects of naive or of scientific realism, has been the problem 
of correctly locating these tenuous entities. 119.ny suggestions have 
been made, ranging from 'in the visual field' - wherever precisely 
that may be - through 'on the retina of the eye' to 'in the mind of 
the perceiver'. 
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In providing these disputants with a new and altogether more 
plausible candidate, viz. on the surface of an imaginary 
perpendicular-planar picture plane interposed at roughly picture-
viewing distance between the viewer and what is in view, I do not wish 
to seem to endorse their shared view. On the contrary, I hope to show 
that an understanding of the role of the picture plane in perceptual 
judgments dispels any inclination to contrast 'the true objects of 
perception' with those objects of common experience which the ordinary 
man supposes himself to see. 
It must be pointed out too, by way of preamble, that although 
vision - in the ordinary viewer's sense, not the seer's sense of 
preternatural insight - is fundamental to the appreciation and 
criticism of sculpture, it is by no means the case that other senses 
are totally irrelevant. Researches into the phenomenon known as 
'synaesthesia' strongly suggest, as do various speculative a priori 
and also linguistic considerations, that the interaction and mutual 
dependence of the several sensory modes is an important factor in 
perception. And even if the complete logical and empirical 
independence of the judgments of the various senses were suddenly and 
surprisingly to be demonstrated, it would not follow that criticism 
of the visual arts, and especially of sculpture, is within the 
exclusive province of the disembodied eye. It is no doubt true of 
much aesthetic writing, as David Pole says, that: 
••• it is, I think, in accordance with established usage to 
treat only the two distance senses, sight and hearing, as 
definitely aesthetic. Smell, it has been thought, is a 
borderline case.l 
Nevertheless to the extent that it is true it reveals a defect, 
not a merit in traditional thinking. And it is surely astonishing 
that he should add: 
No doubt there are pleasing tactual sensations; but I 
never heard of the beauty or sublimity or other aesthetic 
excellence of tangible surfaces. 
In the non-philosophical literature of sculpture there are many 
such references, typified by Lorenzo Ghiberti's remark about an 
antique carving that he had seen when visiting Rome: 'This statue had 
many refinements, which the eye could not perceive, bu_t the hand 
2 
could detect by touch'. And in general sculptors - perhaps 
especially some modern sculptors - are inclined to emphasize the fact 
that they regard the tactile sensations actually or imaginably 
1 
'What Makes a Situation Aesthetic?',~' XXXI (1957) 
pp.102-103. 
2 
From Ghiberti 1s Connnentaries, as quoted in Robert Goldwater 
and Marco Treves, edd., Artists on Art (1958) p.30. 
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derivable from their work as being of the greatest aesthetic 
importance. 
162 
In spite of this, I shall treat sight as the primary art-
critical instrument for sculpture, as it undoubtedly is for painting. 
It does not seem that the extension of the discussion to comprehend 
all the sensory modes would involve the negotiation of any chasm of 
principle but merely - for present purposes - an unnecessary and 
confusing increase in the complexity of what is already a difficult 
argument. 
* * * * * 
It will be convenient to begin with a criticism of one highly 
specific theory of perception. In this way it will be possible to 
introduce ideas and terminology which, without the substratum of 
existing philosophical literature, might seem mere slogans. If a 
choice of motto were to be forced at this point it would be this: we 
directly perceive the world. This is not to insist upon the 
metaphysical view that we always perceive material objects, but only 
to deny the contrast which is often proposed between the objects of 
connnon sense and the so-called 'real' or 'true' or 'proper' objects 
of perception. Thus, we see a house, or a rainbow, not 'sensa' or 
1 sensa-data 1 from which some kind of inference to the presence of a 
house or a rainbow is always a required and more or less hazardous 
move. 
Any theory of visual perception might as well be tested for its 
capacity to handle the problems associated with the perception of 
colours as in any other way. If a Direct Realist is to have a 
distinctive and coherent doctrine he must be prepared to maintain 
that our beliefs about the colours of things in the world are 
163 
acquired directly by sight; that is to say, the beliefs we acquire 
upon occasion that we are presently seeing an object of some specified 
colour are not based or founded upon - and therefore cannot be 
mistakenly based or founded upon - any intermediate entities such as 
'sensa' or 'sense-data', which are themselves the only objects 
'actually' or 'really' perceived. 
Of course this must not be taken to imply that we are incapable 
of making mistakes, whether about colours or anything else; and such 
mistakes may be placed within one or other of two broad classes. Very 
roughly, we may allocate to a class of hallucinations those cases in 
which a viewer believes that he is seeing a sample of a particular 
colour when he is demonstrably seeing no colour whatever; as for 
example in total darkness. A viewer who claims to see the colours of 
objects around him when he is securely blindfolded will generally be 
regarded as hallucinated, although there is of course always the 
logical possibility that his claims will invariably turn out to be 
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sound. In such a case we may be obliged, if trickery of one sort or 
another can be ruled out, to reconsider some of our basic and largely 
tacit presuppositions about both the physiology and the language of 
perception. The Russian woman, and her .American rival, who are 
alleged to read 'unseen' text and to discriminate colours through 
their hands or fingers, present a case in point. If their claims 
are indeed bona fide, and it seems possible that they may be, then 
it is a nice question whether we should or should not be prepared to 
say that they ~with their hands. 
As a rule in clear cases of hallucination the claims made are 
quite wild, and indeed we make confident use of the perverse locution 
'he's seeing things' to indicate that seeing things is precisely what 
he is ~ doing, but only imagining or falsely supposing that he is 
seeing things. Sometimes it is not quite clear whether we should 
allocate a certain case to the class of hallucinations or to that of 
illusions; and there is also the vaguer class of delusions hovering 
somewhere between them, about which it will be prudent, if a little 
cowardly, not to dogmatize here. The two classes of hallucination 
and illusion will suffice for present purposes. 
In a typical illusion, to make the contrast with hallucination, 
something is seen but a mistake is made about either its nature or 
its location, or both. For example, the lady on a conjuror's stage 
with her head in a black bag may be thought by the victim of 
illusion to be a lady with no head at all. The fact that there is 
nevertheless a viable sense in which this viewer might be said to 
see what is in front of him accurately or correctly (meaning, very 
roughly, as a camera would 'see' it), in spite of his inclination 
to misidentify or misdescribe what he sees, may well be the sort of 
consideration that has most strongly influenced proponents of 
'indirect' theories of perception. It is certainly a prima facie 
paradox, which I hope to resolve shortly, to say that a viewer sees 
correctly and is nevertheless the victim of illusion. 
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The technical term 'veridical perception' is an invention 
designed specifically to contrast with 'illusion'; cases of the one 
being necessarily not cases of the other. The notion of seeing 
correctly, as contrasted with that of mis-seeing, is somewhat 
different, and much confusion has been engendered by the 
identification of 'veridical perception' with 'seeing correctly', and 
of 'illusion' with 'mis-seeing'. 
The difference between a case of visual illusion and one of 
veridical perception, as drawn by a Direct Realist, is somewhat as 
follows. It is not that victims of an illusion see something that 
does not exist: the notion of seeing something that does not exist is 
simply absurd. The notion of believing that one sees something that 
does not exist, however, is perfectly intelligible. The difference 
should not be put in terms of what does and what does not exist, but 
rather thus: whereas the victim of an illusion and a 'veridical' 
perceiver both see something that exists, the former acquires (by 
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sight) mistaken beliefs either about the identity or about the 
proper description of that thing, while the latter acquires only true 
beliefs. 
It will be helpful at this point to examine a positive theory, 
and I have chosen, for its relative simplicity and clarity of 
1 
expression, the theory recently advanced by D.M. Armstrong, who 
identifies veridical perception with the acquisition of true beliefs 
about the world. He writes: 
I should now like to say that veridical perception is the 
acquiring of up-to-the-moment true belief about the world, 
using 'true belief' neither to exclude nor to entail 
knowledge.2 
A sympathetic way of treating this claim would be to regard it 
as a stipulative definition of the term 'veridical perception'. In 
this way it becomes securely unfalsifiable,although there may be good 
reason for taking it with a pinch of salt. 
One interesting feature of the thesis is that it seems to give 
us a means of distinguishing empirically between cases of illusion 
and cases of veridical perception. Beliefs are, at least in 
principle, investigable; 'perceptions', on the other hand, are 
notoriously inscrutable or - as some philosophers have put it -
1 
Perception and the Physical World (1961). But see note 
2 below. 
2 
This version, revised to meet objections to earlier 
formulations, is to be found in 'Max Deutscher and Perception', 
AJP, 41 (1963) p.246. 
'private'. Adverting to the particular case of colour. perception, 
Armstrong makes a suggestion about the appropriate way to investigate 
beliefs formed through visual perception. Concerning the colour of 
his garden gate, he writes: 
I may ••• not be able to specify the shade, because of an 
inadequate colour vocabulary. But I could still be said 
to know1 what the precise shade of colour was while I 
was looking at the gate, even though I did not know what 
its name was, because I would be able to pass certain 
tests. I could, for instance, note that the colour was 
identical with a certain shade in a colour chart. 
Failing the possibility of my noting this, or of noting 
something like this, I could not be said to perceive 
just what was the precise shade of colour of the gate.2 
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He does not, however, explore the question of exactly how the use 
of colour charts is to advance an enterprise which admittedly may 
founder upon the paucity of our vocabulary; and the easy intuition 
that it must do so stands in need of some close examination. 
Accordingly, I shall examine all the plausibly relevant or 
applicable colour""Illatching tasks and situations in such a way as to 
ensure - if no mistake is made - that no significant possibility is 
overlooked and that no pointless or irrelevant task or situation is 
solemnly retained in the canon where good ground for dismissing it 
can promptly be given. The elements of the task situation and the tasks 
themselves will be introduced under appropriate heads as follows. 
1 
For 'know' here one should evidently read 'form a true belief'. 
See the previous note. 
2 
Perception and the Physical World, p.109. 
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THE OBJECT TO BE MATCHED: 
This is an object, for the tasks to be considered a colour sample, 
about which a viewer's beliefs are to be tested for their truth or 
correctness. It must evidently be placed in or under suitable 
conditions for a viewer to see what colour it is. Direct Realism 
requires that there should actually be such conditions for any object 
of veridical perception: indeed, most ordinary conditions of daylight 
and moderate distance must be suitable conditions if the theory is not 
to be rendered unacceptably thin by the unrealistic specification of 
special or standard conditions. Annstrong does not suggest that a 
tape measure and a light meter would be required, as well as a colour 
chart, to cope with the problem of his gate. For the purpose of the 
tasks to be considered here it will be assumed that suitable 
conditions for seeing the colours of things obtain throughout, since 
it is trivially analytic that matching tasks cannot be successfully 
attempted under conditions which are not suitable for seeing the 
qualities in question correctly and forming true beliefs about them. 
The object to be matched in such tests as these is, most 
typically, an opaque surface such as that of a paint manufacturer's 
sample or chip. It must not be forgotten, however, that the world is 
full of such intransigently awkward coloured things as the blue sky, 
the green underwater sea and the white mist through which things are 
seen. There are also the confusing factors of surface texture and 
gloss which quite seriously affect our judgments of the colour of 
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opaque material objects. We shall have to neglect also such 
philosophically inconvenient objects as shot silk and mother-of-pearl; 
although it is worth remarking that a theory of perception without any 
niche in its framework for the skindiver's experiences is probably 
much too tidy. 
While it is possible to match some colour samples by laying 
others down beside them, there are situations in which this move is 
out of the question. We cannot lay a sample of blue beside the sky, 
in anything like the literal sense of 'beside'. A connected point 
which is of the utmost importance is that while it makes sense to 
speak of seeing a colour chip under suitable, and unsuitable 
conditions for the accurate determination of its colour by sight, it 
makes no sense to speak of seeing the blue of the sky or the purple 
of a shadow under suitable or unsuitable conditions. It makes no 
sense, that is to say, except for conditions which relate specifically 
to the viewer and his physiological or psychological competences; 
evidently he must not be jaundiced, wearing dark glasses, under the 
influence of post-hypnotic suggestion, and so on. The viewer's 
freedom from such impediments will be assumed: the point is that, 
unlike the colour chip, the blue sky and the purple shadow cannot be 
too far away, too tilted, or too dimly illuminated to be properly seen. 
THE SAMPLE: 
All conditions relating to the object that is to be matched 
relate equally to the sample with which it is matched, where the 
two can be set literally adjacent (see under 'the object and the 
sample' below). Matching is essentially a synnnetrical relation, in 
which the role of object and sample might be reversed. 
THE VIEWER: 
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It has already been remarked that a viewer without physical or 
psychological impediment is assumed. It is most important, however, 
that the notion of a normal viewer should be introduced without 
circularity: that is to say, not in terms of his competence at the 
specific tasks here to be considered. These are designed to show 
how much credence, if any, can be given to the idea that under most 
ordinary conditions a normal viewer may show that he forms true 
beliefs about precisely what colours he sees; and consequently the 
sense of 'normal' must be derived from the viewer's competence at 
tasks ordinarily used by optometrists to determine the normality of 
vision in general and of colour vision in particular. 
It must be made clear from the start that the strict 
concentration of attention upon the single property of the colour of 
things is altogether theoretical and quite impractical. Isolated 
featureless patches of colour, as seen for example through a long 
narrow tube, are often entirely enigmatic. Viewers are ordinarily 
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faced with complex situations in which they have learnt to make use 
of many visual cues, perhaps especially of distance cues but also of 
shape and object-recognition cues, in forming their estimates of the 
colour of things. The problem of determining, by sight, whether two 
coloured objects seen at different distances are in fact the same 
colour is totally insoluble if the viewer is deprived of all those 
ancillary cues from which he recognizes that the objects are at 
different distances. In the matching tasks to be considered the 
viewer will be assumed to have the benefit of a natural context and 
the right to natural assumptions, as for example that samples and 
objects which appear to be of the same shape and size, and at the same 
distance, are indeed so. Our purpose is not to trick our imaginary 
viewer but, on the contrary, to give him every possible aid. 
THE OBJECT AND THE SAMPLE: 
The object and the sample will be assumed throughout to be 
materially similar wherever this provision has sensible content. That 
is to say, where the object is a coloured chip of matt paint, then the 
appropriate samples will be similar chips of matt paint which differ 
from the object, if at all, only in their colour. At the other 
extreme of possibility we have such objects as sunsets and rainbows: 
the only kind of match appropriate to such things, as will shortly 
emerge, is what might be called a model match (of which a picture 
match is a special case), as contrasted with a direct match. There 
is no sample sunset that we can take up to and lay down literally 
beside an object sunset, since a sunset does not admit of the 
application of the concept of literal proximity, or of movement 
independently of a fixed observer and source of light. 
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A case in some ways intermediate between the blue sky and the 
blue paint chip is that of the blue distant hill. If we consider 
what is, in fact, a green hill, then a direct match of its green is 
possible - at the most literal understanding by means of a few square 
feet of similar vegetation. But only a picture-match is possible of 
'its' blue. Its is placed in quotes of misgiving here as a sign of 
distress, for that blue is connnon to the green hill, the grey hill, 
the brown hill, and indeed the blue hill (if there is such a thing), 
all seen at a suitable distance. When the familiar systematic 
connection between the local colour of something and the colour it 
'looks' or 'appears' or 'seems' breaks down, it is a serious problem 
to what object we should attribute the apparent or 'picture' colour. 
A similar puzzle arises in the case of coloured shadows. Perhaps we 
should speak of 'the blue distance', by analogy with 'the blue sky'; 
but then, whereas we can say that the hills are lent (or given) 
their blue by the distance, we cannot say that the birds are lent 
their blue by the sky. They too are only lent blue, if at all, by 
distance. 
For convenience, and in order to dismiss the innnediately 
irrelevant complexities of visual memory, all the task situations 
will be taken to be such that the object and the sample are visible 
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to the viewer at once, and adjacent to each other. 'Adjacent' is, of 
course, ambiguous: it may mean that the sample and the object are side 
by side and at the same distance from the viewer; or that, although 
they are not literally side by side, they would be so represented upon 
the picture plane in a standard perspective projection. We should not 
describe the latter as cases of the sample and object being apparently 
adjacent since it is often very clearly apparent, from cues other than 
colour, that one of them is nearer to the viewer than the other; and 
the formula 'occupying adjacent regions of the visual field' 
introduces a gratuitous and perhaps misleading concept with which we 
can easily dispense. 
To speak very strictly indeed it would be necessary to refer 
explicitly throughout to monocular vision, accepting the consequent 
slight artificiality of the discussion; or else to deal consistently in 
terms of stereoscopy. The latter course is more fully realistic, but 
it would call for a nagging pedantic precision in the formulation of 
amendments and reservations to the central argument out of proportion 
to the philosophical advantage. For the matching of colour, 
particularly, we may think of the surfaces to be matched as placed 
either literally adjacent or picture-adjacent from the point of view 
of a binocular viewer. This involves, if the objects are not 
literally adjacent, that they must overlap somewhat (as considered in 
a plan view of the perspective projection); a condition which might 
be unattainable in practice if the colour surfaces in question belong 
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to solid bodies inconveniently shaped and disposed. With coloured 
chips the practical difficulty is negligible and this is altogether a 
problem which, not having been overlooked, may safely be ignored. 
Object and sample then - to summarize these points - may be 
literally adjacent. That is, side by side and equidistant from the 
viewer. They will occupy as nearly the same spatio-temporal region as 
is compatible with object and sample having distinct identities; both 
of their near surfaces lying in the same plane perpendicular to the 
viewer's line of sight. 
Contrastingly, the object and sample may be picture adjacent: 
that is, placed in such a way that a central perspective projection 
upon any picture plane intermediate between the viewer and the objects 
would show them as literally adjacent on the picture plane although 
they are not literally adjacent in fact. In practice this simply 
means, of course, that one of the two - usually the sample - is nearer 
to the viewer than the other. The outstanding logical possibility 
that sample and object may be neither literally adjacent nor picture-
adjacent, only introduces the presently irrelevant complexity of 
visual memory, arising out of the intervention of other objects, or 
of a time delay, between the visible object and sample. 
If all the foregoing suggestions and stipulations are 
consolidated it will be seen - as indeed was intuitively obvious from 
the start - that the two states of affairs which may confront a viewer 
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who is put in a position to demonstrate that he acquires true beliefs 
about colours, by sight, are these: 
1. The object and the sample, both being seen under 
suitable conditions for true beliefs about their 
colour to be formed, are placed literally adjacent. 
And 
2. The object and the sample, both being seen under 
suitable conditions for true beliefs about their 
colour to be formed, are placed picture adjacent. 
THE MATCHING TASKS: 
The tasks which it would evidently be plausible to propose under 
one or other of these two sets of circumstances are as follows: 
Tl: WITH THE OBJECT AND A RANGE OF SAMPLES PLACED LITERALLY 
ADJACENT, SELECT A SAMPLE WHICH IS THE SAME COLOUR AS THE 
OBJECT. 
It is, of course, assumed that the range of available samples 
includes one which is the same colour as the object. We might 
alternatively, but less conveniently, speak of the selection of the 
best available sample. 
T2: WITH THE OBJECT AND A RANGE OF SAMPLES PLACED PICTURE 
ADJACENT, SELECT A SAMPLE WHICH IS THE SAME COLOUR AS THE 
OBJECT. 
A point of importance in connection with T2 is that the final 
selection of sample must be made by the viewer without his having an 
opportunity to check his selection by direct - that is, literally 
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adjacent - matching. If successive attempts are allowed, each one 
being checked against the object and then, if necessary, improved upon, 
task T2 merely degenerates into a laborious version of Tl with the 
gratuitous introduction of a little visual memory. 
A good example of a T2 task in a conunonplace situation is 
already familiar, and distressing, to many motorists who have tried to 
select, inside an adequately lit shop, a retouching paint for their 
car which is - let us say - clearly visible through the window at some 
little distance. Whoever has not had this usually humiliating 
experience will not find it difficult to devise a comparable task, and 
will perhaps be surprised to discover how unreliable his judgment is. 
T2 may be reduced to Tl as a special limiting case by diminishing 
the distance between object and sample towards zero. For a 
distinctive task, however, it does not seem unreasonable to place a 
viewer some twenty feet or so from Armstrong's gate, with his book of 
colour samples held at arm's length. 
T3: WITH THE OBJECT AND A RANGE OF SAMPLES PLACED PICTURE 
ADJACENT, SELECT A SAMPLE WHICH, WHETHER OR NOT IT IS 
THE SAME COLOUR AS THE OBJECT, IS A PICTURE MATCH FCR 
THE OBJECT. 
The example of naturalistic painting or photography will serve 
to illustrate the nature of the task; but something must be said at 
this point to clarify the relation between facsimiles, models and 
pictures. 
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A facsimile of an object - whether two or three dimensional - will 
be taken for present purposes to be a sample which, when appropriately 
placed, is totally indistinguishable from the object by sight in all 
its visible aspects. Visual discrimination between object and sample 
will be possible by virtue of spatio-temporal clues to individual 
identity and, of course, by means of such non-visible indications as 
differences in weight or concealed structure or constitution. A sample 
which perfectly matches the colour of a literally adjacent object - and 
considerable consonance of texture, surface finish and so on must be 
assumed for a good match - is a facsimile of the ~bject in respect of 
colour. The aim of tasks Tl and T2 is to select, in the very different 
situations prescribed, colour facsimiles of the object. 
A model of an object is a sample which, when placed picture 
adjacent (but not literally adjacent) is, in the chosen respects, 
indistinguishable from the object by sight from a viewer's 
predetermined and fixed viewpoint. A very pure example of a model, to 
bring out what is meant.here, would be that of a sample luminous rod in 
a dark room which is indistinguishable in length from an object rod 
placed picture adjacent to it but at a different distance from the 
fixed viewpoint. The viewer in such an artificial context (it is 
derived from well-known laboratory experiments on human perception) 
lacks a cue to the relative sizes from their relative distances. He 
cannot say whether the rods ~ the same length, but his claim that 
they ~ the same length from his predetermined viewpoint is what 
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makes the sample a model of the object. This legislation about 
terms is, of course, merely for clarity and convenience. It is not 
argued that this is either the most ordinary or the most correct use 
of the word 'model' but only, at most, that it is the word best 
suited to the present technical and explanatory task. 
Good examples of visual models in the present sense, a little 
less artifical than the luminous rods, would be the diorama type of 
display and colour stereo-photography, as compared with the actual 
scenes and objects that are modelled. The celebrated distorted Ames1 
room, familiar to all students of experimental psychology, might be 
described as a visual model of a possible normal room - indeed, of any 
number of normal rooms of different sizes. It may readily be 
contrasted with a facsimile of any normal room, which would 
necessarily be of precisely the same shape and size as the room 
copied; and the difference clearly hinges upon the fixed viewpoint 
from which the model is acceptable, as compared with the freedom to 
investigate facsimiles from all viewpoints. Evidently a facsimile is 
a limiting case of a model, just as task Tl is a limiting case of task 
T2. 
1 
For an account of relevant experiments (but not for the 
underlying epistemology) see Adelbert Ames, Jr., Nature and 
Origins of Perceptions: Preliminary Laboratory Manual (in 
typescript, from Hanover, New Hampshire: The Hanover Institute, 
1949). 
A picture is a special case (not a limiting case in the sense 
above) of the more general model. It is a case which is particularly 
apt to the problem of colour matching. A picture is, in effect, a 
model subjected to the limitations perpendicular-planar two 
dimensionality. Illusionistic pictures represent the object that is 
pictured upon a picture plane which is perpendicular to the line of 
sight and of such a size and at such a distance from the viewer that 
its variation from the spherical (i.e., having all points on its 
surface equidistant from the viewer) is entirely negligible. 
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Naturalistic paintings of objects, and colour photographs as well, 
are severely restricted in their capacity to deceive the viewer and to 
achieve a telling trompe l'oeil. Their most obvious disadvantage is 
that the whole of a picture surface is, as a rule, lit to a uniform 
and moderate degree of brightness, while the intensity of reflected 
illumination from the differently coloured and shaded objects that are 
pictured may vary over an enormous range from deep shadow to full 
sunlight. Compensation by adjustment of the hue and saturation of the 
picture colour, bearing in mind the limitations of practical pigments, 
is seldom if ever altogether perfect. Nevertheless, the importance of 
naturalistic art in the development of human sensitivity to the 
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appearance of the world should not be underestimated. 1 
More potentially successful as vehicles of spectacular trompe 
l'oeil are projected colour slides or films which permit variation in 
brightness over the picture plane. Moreover, the transition from 
picture to model via the projection of coloured light on to surfaces 
progressively relieved from the perpendicular-planar, is evidently 
continuous. Indeed, a distinction between picture and model can only 
be firmly preserved by insistence upon the two dimensional 
perpendicular plane surface as the defining characteristic of the 
picture. At the other limit, the distinction between model and 
facsimile can be firmly preserved only by insistence upon the fixed 
viewpoint for the model, with the implication that what is a 
satisfactory model from one viewpoint is not necessarily so from 
another. 
Some of the effects and implications of the considerations that 
have just been introduced will not be developed fully in the present 
chapter. For innnediate purposes, and to revert to colour matching, 
we must consider how the three basic tasks that have been outlined 
bear upon the question of the colour of Armstrong's gate and his claim 
to acquire, by sight, up-to-the-minute true beliefs about precisely 
1 
Here, and in much of what follows, my debt to E.H.Gombrich's 
seminal work Art and Illusion (1960) will be evident. This is 
not to say that I would expect Professor Gombrich's assent to 
the theories advanced here. 
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what colour it is. First, however, it should be emphasized that 
there cannot be any task (T4) bearing the relation to T3 that T2 bears 
to Tl. Whereas Tl selects a facsimile under perfect, and T2 under 
somewhat disadvantageous - but not, it is agreed, impossible -
conditions, there is no correspondingly disadvantageous position from 
which to attempt a T3 match. If anything is visible at all, then a 
T3 (model or picture) match can in principle be made of it; and it 
would be absurd to attempt to show fault in a T3 match by placing the 
viewer or the sample to greater advantage. The essence of a model or 
picture match is that the viewer is always in a position to make it 
from wherever he actually stands, under whatever conditions; and 
moreover he may only make it from where he stands and under these 
conditions. If he moves, or if the model or picture moves, there is 
no longer a match. 
Although the matching of objects and visual models (including 
pictures) is, as I shall argue, a key notion in a satisfactory theory 
of perception, it will not help Armstrong with his gate. For we may 
say quite certainly, and without even investigating what positive 
features a good, true, or correct model or picture must have, that -
by stipulative definition - it cannot be a facsimile. In other words, 
the successful selection of a sample which is a picture match of the 
object could not conceivably demonstrate that the viewer had formed a 
true belief about the actual colour of that object. We cannot even 
exploit the possibility of a systematic relation between actual colour 
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- or what painters call 'local colour' - and picture colour, for it 
does not seem that in general there is any such systematic relation, 
although there may be in certain special cases. Although we might be 
able sometimes to infer the actual colour of a near wall from the 
colour of a picture-match of it, we can infer nothing as to the local 
colour of the distant hills from the picture-matching blue. 
Visual models or picture-matches do not provide us with samples 
of the colours that the objects pictured are. So much is 
platitudinous. A more surprising reflection is that they do not even 
show us what colour things look or appear in anything like the 
authoritative sense in which the phrase 'It looks such-and-such a 
colour' is usually intended. The remark 'It looks chocolate brown', 
made about a scarlet object seen under mercury vapour street lighting, 
might be given greater precision by the choice of a sample which is an 
acceptable picture-match for the object, offered together with the 
claim 'It looks exactly this colour' (it is assumed that the sample, 
unlike the object, is seen under normal lighting conditions). In the 
usual understanding of such an assertion there is, it is true, the 
implicit qualification ' ..• from just here'; but there is not, I 
suggest, the important additional reservation ' ••. with the sample 
just where it is'. It is too easily overlooked that if the sample is 
moved backward or forward, or tilted, or if the light falling on it 
is changed, then the match will no longer be good. Because of this it 
makes no sense to say that any particular sample is a sample of the 
colour that the object looks; and it makes no sense to assert this 
even from a specified viewpoint. Objects simply do not have, and 
cannot have, a set of determinate 'looks' or 'appearances', one for 
each possible viewing position. We may say that a certain object 
and a certain model or picture of it are indistinguishable in 
appearance in one or more respects, but we may not say that, for 
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each viewpoint, there is ~ sample which resembles the object in the 
appropriate way. There is an infinitely large number of quite 
different samples, all of which look alike from that viewpoint, and 
all of which look like the object. One of the most pernicious 
confusions in the whole traditional discussion of perception is 
attributable to the myth that objects not only have a fixed 
complement of local or real properties (which is true), but tlE.t they 
also have a fixed - albeit enormously large - complement of 'looks' 
or 'appearances'; one for each viewing position. Such a misleading 
doctrine seems to lurk behind most talk of 'the visual field' and 
of those 'sensa' or 'sense data' which are said to form a 'mosaic'. 
Ruskin's 'innocent eye' (see Ch.IV) seems to see this 'look' that 
the world is supposed to present; but the sample of it that he puts 
on a picture plane at three feet is quite different from the 
appropriate sample of it on a picture plane at thirty feet, or at a 
different angle, or in another light. 
Turning our attention from T3 (picture or model matching tasks) 
to Tl (direct, literally adjacent facsimile matching), it is evident 
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upon reflection that this task also has no direct application to the 
problem of demonstrating that one acquires, by sight, true beliefs 
about the colours of things. To choose a matching sample from a 
range of colours that are literally adjacent to an object colour 
might be said to be making a measurement of the object colour, by 
analogy with the measurement of length or of angle; it cannot 
possibly be said to demonstrate that the successful wielder of the 
measuring technique had, prior to making the measurement, either a 
true or a false belief about the colour that he saw. A claim to 
acquire, on sight, a true (but unpublished) belief about the width of 
a gate may or may not be valid; the point is that one would not 
persuade an audience that one had acquired, by sight, a true belief 
by the comedy technique of laying a ruler against the gate and 
observing 'There! it is precisely three feet four inches wide'. The 
required demonstration in this case, as with colour or any other 
perceptible property, consists in the performance of a T2 task: that 
is to say, the viewer must first say (or offer a marked ruler as 
sample) 'The gate is .•• wide (or~ colour, or that shape); and only 
after he has done so is a measurement of the property in question 
appropriate, to confirm or disconfirm the viewer's claim. 
Now it happens to be the case that people are not, in general, 
particularly good at T2 colour matching tasks. In reasonably 
favourable circumstances, estimates of length are probably easier to 
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make since such problems are, literally, one-dimensional, whereas 
colour estimation depends upon complex assessments in terms of the 
connected variables of hue, saturation and brightness, and the 
differential sensitivity of the eye to light of different frequencies. 
Nevertheless, most of us do learn to achieve a moderate success in a 
modest range of situations, although - as has been remarked - hardly 
anyone has the skill to select a perfect retouching paint by sight 
without reducing the task-situation to a virtual measurement of the 
required colour. 
We may make ourselves as successful as we choose at T2 tasks, of 
course, by stipulating for our purposes a broad enough target. If any 
sample from mid-orange to near-green will count as matching any yellow 
whatever (to consider only the colour-dimension of hue), then we shall 
find it quite easy to show that we form true beliefs in anything but 
queer lights, or deep shadow, or at considerable distances. The tacit 
recognition that this sort of accommodation is unsatisfactory is, 
presumably, at least a component of Armstrong's motivation to suggest 
that the vagueness of language might be stiffened by the precision of 
colour charts. 'But I could still be said to know what the precise 
shade of colour was L;_Y emphasi§_f while I was looking at the gate', 
he says, 'even though I did not know what its name was, because I 
would be able to pass certain tests. 1 And: 'Failing the possibility 
of my noting this /that the colour was identical with a certain shade 
in a colour char_!./ ... I could not be said to perceive just what was 
the precise shade of colour of the gate. ,l L~riginal emphasi~/ 
To summarize: Only the successful execution of a T2 type task 
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can, in principle, demonstrate that a viewer has acquired, by sight, 
a true belief about the colour (shape, etc.) of an object that he 
sees. T3 tasks are not concerned with the 'local' properties of 
objects but only with the properties of pictures or models of the 
objects; and Tl tasks measure properties, they do not show what 
belief about those properties was entertained on sight prior to the 
act of measurement. But the remaining tasks, of a T2 type, do not 
answer Armstrong's needs, since: 
1 
1. Actual performance at these tasks yields results that 
are far from precise, and indeed it is doubtful 
whether any advantage at all is secured by the use of 
material samples to make good the deficiencies of 
language. Such positive techniques, in fact, merely 
reveal more precisely how imprecise our judgments 
normally are. 
And: 
2. There are very many connnonplace perception situations 
in which the conduct of a T2 task is impossible since 
the selected sample cannot be tested for accuracy. 
It is impossible to lay a chosen sample literally 
beside the sky or beside the blue (distance blue) 
hill in order to check its correctness - and yet we 
surely wish to say that we may see the precise blue 
of the sky, or of the distance. Equally, we are 
entitled to say of somebody who offers us a dark 
lac. cit. 
greenish picture of a light blue sullililer sky that he has 
made a perceptual error, or formed a mistaken belief by 
sight. 
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There ar~, then, two lines of objection to the identification of 
'veridical' perception with the acquisition, by sight, of up-to-the-
moment true beliefs about the world. The first is implicit in 1. 
above, and might be put in this way: either it must be granted that 
'veridical' perception is extremely rare, especially perhaps in the 
case of colour perception - this if ' ••• the precise shade of colour' 
is to mean what it says; or else it must be maintained that 'true 
belief' means 'roughly true belief'. But how roughly true must a 
belief be, in order to be true! How unsatisfactory a sample must 
Armstrong offer, from the collection of samples in his hand as he 
looks at his gate, before we would have agreed common ground with him 
on which to argue that he had acquired, by sight, a false belief 
about the colour? 
It would seem that only a quite arbitrary answer can be given to 
this question, unless we reinterpret the notions of the truth or 
falsity of assertions about colours in terms of average human 
perceptual performances. Even so, we should be obliged to establish 
the range of normal deviation from the median estimate by experiment 
for each and every single perception situation - clearly an 
enterprise of staggering impracticality. 
Secondly (and quite differently, for while the above 
considerations might be thought to go ad hominem against Armstrong's 
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formulation it would be possible to state the theory with less 
emphasis on the precision of perception beliefs), there is the problem 
of the perception of those things to which a T2 type task would be 
inappropriate owing to the impossibility of measuring the selected 
match. It seems far too great a sacrifice of common sense to say 
that the notion of acquiring true or false beliefs about the colour 
of the sky, of rainbows, shadows, distant hills, flames, and so on, 
is unintelligible. On the contrary, it is quite patently the case to 
common sense that a viewer who forms the belief, on sight, that a 
certain rainbow has no yellow in it, does not see the world rightly -
he acquires a false belief, by sight. 
It is for these reasons that a somewhat different formulation 
of a theory of perception, under the Direct Realist flag of convenience, 
will be proposed. 
189 
CHAPTER VII 
OBJECT ACCOUNTS, MODEL ACCOUNTS AND PICTURE ACCOUNTS 
Whenever someone can be held to have seen the world or some part 
or aspect of it rightly or correctly (deliberately to reject the 
technical jargon 'veridically' in favour of terms from ordinary 
language) it seems reasonable also to hold that he has acquired a new 
capacity to act discriminately or aptly in the world. Such action may, 
in principle, take the form of an utterance of a propositional 
character about what is seen, and may therefore be regarded, upon at 
least some if not all occasions, as exhibiting the acquisition of a 
belief. Some preference might be felt for an account of the 
situation in terms of capacity to act rather than in terms of belief 
formation because we are able, as all sentient creatures are, to act 
discriminately in relation to our environment even if we are deprived 
of language and are consequently unable to exhibit our capacities in 
terms of propositionally expressed beliefs. We might well prefer not 
to be obliged by our conceptual framework to defend such consequences 
as that a bird acquires the belief that the door of its cage is open 
when it flies through it; or that we ourselves acquire the belief 
that our front door is open when we enter successfully deep in 
thought about other matters. 
Nothing very important hangs, for present purposes, upon how we 
elect to manage the notion of belief in terms of actual and possible 
behaviour, including linguistic behaviour, although it is perhaps 
worth pointing out that what we would say and what we would do in a 
given situation might differ considerably in implication, and could 
pose serious problems for whoever would try an empirical test of 
whether a viewer does or does not see correctly. To take an extreme 
case, suppose that a test subject is fitted with spectacles which -
unknown to him - are image-inverting, and is then placed in front of 
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an otherwise featureless wall on which an upright figure (say, a letter) 
is drawn. Let him next be given a range of sample letters similar in 
all respects except that of orientation, and be asked to show that he 
sees the orientation of the original letter correctly (i) by saying how 
it stands, and (ii) by selecting from the range of samples a figure 
which is similarly oriented to the original. It is to be expected that 
he would say that the original letter is inverted, but that he would 
choose an upright sample as exhibiting the same orientation as the 
original. '.Che investigator's puzzle will be to decide whether he 
should accept the subject's words or his action as properly expressing 
or exhibiting the belief that he has acquired. It is a problem which 
might well confuse the experimental psychologist, and perhaps also the 
behaviouristically inclined philosopher; and which must not be allowed 
to confuse the present argument. 
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I shall take it that the perception action-capacities, or beliefs, 
in which we are interested for aesthetic purposes are linguistically 
expressed or expressible in terms which are of a roughly propositional 
character although, as has already been argued at length, aesthetic 
remarks are not as such propositions or statements of fact. 
Nevertheless, such remarks as 'It is a delicate shade of blue' or 'The 
tonal contrasts are dramatic' may be supposed to be the natural 
expressions of beliefs formed by sight which their author would 
probably withdraw if the object in question were shown not to be blue 
at all, or to be perfectly uniform in tone. In the latter instance 
the aesthetic remark might still be viable, perhaps as an ironic 
figure, but in this case the speaker would have formed the (correct) 
belief that the object was uniform in tone and merely chosen a devious 
way of saying so. 
The problem to which attention mu;;t be given is this. It seems, 
and indeed the fact was remarked upon in the previous chapter, that 
there is a possibility opened up by our ordinary use of language which 
is superficially paradoxical and of which some clear account must be 
possible within the framework of any theory of perception with a 
serious claim upon our credulity. I refer to the possibility that a 
viewer may, on occasion, form mistaken beliefs as to natters of fact 
on sight, and may yet nevertheless be said to see correctly, to make 
no strictly visual mistake, or not to be the victim of sensory illusion -
even if he is the victim of an illusion in some broader or different 
sense. The famous example of the Headless Woman will help to clarify 
the point: 
And when the plain man sees on the stage the Headless 
Woman, what he sees (and this is what he sees,whether 
he knows it or not) is not something 'unreal' or 
'immaterial', but a woman against a dark background 
with her head in a black bag. If the trick is well 
done, he doesn't (because it's deliberately made very 
difficulty for him) properly size up what he sees, or 
see what it is; but to say this is far from concluding 
that he sees something else.l 
To limit the area of argument I shall suppose it to be agreed 
that Austin is perfectly right about this. What the innocent 
spectator sees, if he looks just above the neck of the figure on the 
stage, is a black bag containing her head; although matters have 
been so contrived that he forms the belief - if he is sufficiently 
gullible - that he is seeing part of a continuous background some 
little distance behind the figure. 
This is a classic illusion, like Pepper's Ghost and the 
Disappearing Lady. The problem is, should we describe its dupe as a 
victim of sensory illusion? Have his eyes deceived him, or has the 
illusionist deceived him? To take an even more extreme case of false 
belief formation: suppose that you and I own indistinguishable copies 
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of a book, but that you do not know this; and upon seeing a copy on my 
desk you say 'I see that you have borrowed my book'. It is doubtful 
whether we should call this a case of illusionat. all, except rather 
1 
Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, p.14. 
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colloquially: 'You are under the illusion (or delusion) that this is 
your book'. But there is no doubt that you have formed, on sight, a 
false belief; and there is equally no doubt that the temptation to 
think of you as a victim of sensory illusion is negligible. You have 
made a mistake, it is true, but there is absolutely nothing wrong 
with your eyesight. 
The difficult point, around which a great deal of disagreemert: 
over the problems of perception revolves, is expressible in terms of 
the Headless Woman by pointing out that the object on the stage might 
be, to a normal viewer normally placed, totally visually 
indistinguishable from an actually headless woman similarly placed. 
Let us suppose that this is in fact the case: indeed, let us suppose 
further, what is certainly possible, that there is a veritable parade 
of objects on the stage all of which achieve the illusion in different 
ways. Perhaps one will have a black velvet cloth stretched in front 
of her head; another will be placed behind a tilted mirror which 
reflects black cloth in the wings; another will be a headless dunnny; 
and so on to the limit of a conjuror's ingenuity. All these objects 
may be, if they are well contrived, totally indistinguishable from one 
another by a normal viewer normally placed. They will each be a 
perfect model match, in the sense brought out in the previous 
chapter, for all of the others. 
They will each be a perfect model match for all of the others, 
that is to say, to a viewer who sees correctly. The notion of 'seeing 
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correctly' is now contrasted, as it should be, with defective or 
aberrant vision. An astigmatic viewer is under the impression that 
lines with a certain orientation are less emphatic than lines with 
another orientation, when this is not the case. A colour-blind viewer 
is under the impression that certain colours are alike when they are 
not; and so on through all the possible varieties of visual aberration. 
Such viewers undergo sensory illusion in the only really clear meaning 
of that term: a sense organ - for example the organ of sight -
malfunctions, and this malfunction may, if the viewer is unaware of 
it or unable to learn to compensate for it, be responsible for 
erroneous beliefs about the world. 
We need to be able to deal with two basic possibilities: that of 
mis-seeing, which is the lot of victims of genuinely sensory illusion; 
and that of mis-taking what is seen, which is the lot of those who 
form imprudent or incorrect beliefs about the objective, inherent or 
intrinsic properties of what they see. It is not necessarily the case, 
although it is no doubt very often the case, that a viewer who mis-sees 
also makes mistakes. Someone for whom objects at a distance of several 
feet appear blurred or indistinct does not ordinarily form the belief 
that the world is perpetually dissolving as it passes outside an 
egocentrically defined range of clear vision. He may be able to 
recognize many moderately distant objects quite well, and form very 
sound beliefs about their properties, although he certainly mis-sees 
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them and would do well to have his sight attended to by an appropriate 
specialist. 
These two possibilities are disastrously conflated in the concepts 
of 'veridical perception' and of that brand of 'illusion' with which 
veridical perception is in explicit contrast. Illusion, thus 
contrasted (and assuming Armstrong's account of veridical perception 
in terms of the acquisition of true beliefs), does not provide a 
conceptual scheme in which there is room for a distinction between mis-
seeing and making mistakes about the world; and this distinction is so 
fundamental to common sense and to ordinary linguistic usage that, I 
suggest, we cannot do without it even for quite mandarin philosophical 
purposes, much less for our ordinary talk about the things we see. 
A respectable motive - although not a sufficiently good reason -
for seeking to abolish the distinction between mis-seeing and mistaking 
is the desire to avoid being compelled by some such chain of reasoning 
as follows to postulate esoteric objects of 'direct' perception: 
A viewer sees correctly, yet he reports that he sees X when 
Y is in his line of sight (or, as we ordinarily say, when Y 
is what he is looking at). 
To say that he sees correctly amounts to the claim that any 
normal viewer in his position has a legitimate option to · 
say, amongst the many appropriate remarks that may be open 
to him, that he sees X. 
Now if Y is what he is looking at, and if Y is not X (e.g. 
if Y equals 'tilted circle' and X equals 'ellipse') then 
two objects must somehow be involved. 
If Y is an object of scientific, or even of common sense 
realism, and Y is not what A sees (or 'directly perceives'), 
although it is the only such object in the viewer's line of 
sight and the only thing that he would ordinarily be said 
to be looking at; then what he sees (or 'directly perceives') 
must be some kind of esoteric object. For example, amongst 
the standard contenders for the role, it is often claimed 
that what the viewer 'directly perceives' is a sense datum. If 
he 'directly perceives' an elliptical sense datum, for example, 
then he may be said to see correctly when he claims to see 
something that is elliptical, even though the object in his 
line of sight may not be elliptical but circular. 
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I shall contend that this argument is invalid, especially in its 
third paragraph, and that there is in fact no need whatever to 
postulate objects of direct perception intermediate between the viewer 
and whatever it is that he is looking at. All that is needful is to 
give a use to the phrase 'correctly describe as' - or rather, to 
recognize that there already is a use - such that it is quite 
unparadoxical to say that what is correctly described as X need not 
necessarily be X. 
The classic example to bring out the issues sharply here is that 
of the distant star. Ayer argues 1 that if a man says both that 'he 
sees a distant star which has an extension greater than that of the 
earth' and that he sees 'a silvery speck no bigger than a sixpence', 
then 'since it is impossible that the star should both be bigger than 
the earth and at the same time no bigger than a sixpence', therefore 
it follows either that 'at least one of his statements is empirically 
false' or that 'he has slipped from one to the other usage of the word 
"see"'. At the time of writing Ayer accepted the second of these 
1 
A.J. Ayer, Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (1940) pp.22-28. 
alternatives, embracing the view that there is both a sense of 'see' 
in which the existence of the object putatively seen is implied, and 
a sense of 'see' in which it is not; and this is a move in the 
direction of the introduction of sense data as the objects of direct 
perception. 
The 'two senses of "see"' argument has had a long run and been 
variously countered. A.R. White, 1 for example, points out that the 
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phrases 'a star which has an extension greater than that of the earth' 
and 'speck no bigger than a sixpence' do not come into logical 
collision; and that if Ayer supposed his example to provide logically 
incompatible answers to a question of the form 'What do you seeZ' he 
is mistaken. Moreover, merely different - but not incompatible -
answers to the question do not pose problems calling for such radical 
solutions as Ayer ultimately proposes. White makes much of the 
distinction between what he calls descriptions and identifications, 
" 
holding that ' ••• the answer in terms of "a speck" describes what I see, 
while the answer in terms of "a star" 2 identifies what I see' • 
It does not seem to me that argument along these lines resolves 
the difficulty entirely, although it certainly goes some way in the 
direction of a solution. To revert to the case of the Headless Woman, 
it is not at all clear that the description-identification distinction 
1 
'The Alleged Ambiguity of "See'11 , Analysis, 24 (1963) pp.1-5. 
2 
Ibid., p.2. 
enables one to take a coercive grip on the facts. The alternatives 
analogous to 'small silvery speck' and 'star bigger than the earth' 
are evidently: 'headless woman' and 'woman with her head in a black 
bag'; and these are on the face of it either both putative 
'descriptions' or both 'identifications'. They are not accounts 
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which are saved from possible collision by their evident membership of 
the classes or categories which lie on either side of White's divider. 
Somewhat different conceptual machinery is called for if this and 
similar cases are to be met, and I propose at this point to introduce 
two notions which are derived from the previous discussion of matching 
procedures, and especially from what was referred to in the previous 
Chapter as a 'T3 1 or model match. It will be recalled that a picture 
match is a special case of the more general model match. It is 
moreover one which has considerable importance in the discussion of 
perception within the context of a society which is thoroughly 
familiar with and makes a great deal of use of naturalistic pictorial 
images. I do not know of any empirical evidence that members of 
societies which entirely lack pictorial experience are prone ~ to say 
of tilted discs that they look elliptical, but it would seem a priori 
likely that this would be the case. Their language of matching, one 
should suppose, would be a language of models rather than of pictures. 
The difficulty of arranging empirical test of such intuitions is 
twofold: firstly, there are few societies lacking all pictorial 
experience with which we have a sufficiently sophisticated linguistic 
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contact to explore this question accurately; and secondly the boundary 
between pictures and models is very imprecise. Everybody has 
experience of two-dimensional perpendicular planar objects, even if 
these are only cliffs or walls, and while talk in terms of such 
objects may be technically talk in terms of models it will nevertheless 
be indistinguishable in practice from talk about pictures. 
The notions to be introduced and distinguished, then, are those of 
the model (or picture) account of an object that is seen, and the 
object account of what is seen. A model match, to recapitulate, is 
provided by a sample which, when suitably placed, is indistinguishable 
or very nearly so from the object it is selected to match - of course, 
from the viewer's fixed viewpoint. A model account of an object that 
is seen is an account which describes or characterizes ('refers to' 
would be a suitably general expression) a visual model of that object. 
Similarly, a picture account of something that is seen is an account 
which refers to a perpendicular planar picture of that thing. 
Since it is presupposed that all adequate models of anything are 
visually indistinguishable from it and from each other (from a viewer's 
fixed viewpoint), it is clear that a satisfactory account of any 
adequate model is an acceptable model account of the object that is 
seen. Thus, the spectator who says that he sees a headless woman on 
the stage has given, whether he knows it or not, a perfectly adequate 
model account of what he sees. If whatever is in fact on the stage 
is indistinguishable to a normal viewer from any one of half a dozen 
or more objects with which a conjuror might work the trick, then an 
account of any of these objects will be an adequate model account of 
what is actually on the stage. Moreover, there is nothing to be said 
in favour of one of these rather than another, considered strictly as 
model accounts. 
There is, of course, one model account which is peculiarly 
distinctive. This is the account of a model which happens to be that 
limiting case of a model - a facsimile. Thus, if a viewer says 'I 
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see a woman with her head in a black bag', and if this is indeed what 
is on the stage, then we might regard his account as either a limiting 
case (facsimile) model account or, contrastingly, as an object account. 
An object account of something seen is an account which is 
properly applicable to that thing, but not necessarily applicable to a 
model or picture, or even to a facsimile of it. Turning once more to 
the star: on the view here recommended 'I see a very small silvery 
speck' gives a picture account of the star that is seen, and 'I see a 
star much bigger than the earth' gives an object account of it. In 
saying that 'I see a very small silvery speck' gives a picture account 
of what is seen we mean that a picture of the visible part of the sky, 
placed at roughly normal picture viewing distance, which contained a 
small silvery speck, would be an adequate or acceptable picture match 
for the star. In a case of perfect illusionism it would be strictly 
indistinguishable from the star, as the lights on the dome of a 
planetarium are indistinguishable from stars to the spectator who has 
forgotten or was never told where he is. 
There is, it is true, an element of ambiguity about the object 
account ' ••• a star much bigger than. the earth'. This could, indeed, 
be a model - perhaps a facsimile - account. What we shall in general 
rely upon here is the utterer's own expressed intention; for he will 
very often know quite well what kind of account it is that he is 
proposing. And had he used a uniquely referring expression such as a 
proper name ('I see Sirius') there would be no possibility of 
uncertainty. It is interesting, and should not be overlooked, that 
the state of affairs under discussion is reversible. 'I see stars 
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that are much bigger than the earth' might well be an acceptable model 
account of what is seen by the viewer of a very small painting. The 
corresponding object account would be ' ••• little dabs of silvery paint'. 
Similarly in the apparently philosophically indispensable case of 
the tilted disc: 'I see an elliptical shape (patch, area, region, etc.)' 
gives a picture account of a tilted circular disc. That is to say, a 
central perspective projection onto a picture plane perpendicular to a 
viewer's line of sight would be an (actual) ellipse. It happens to be 
an empirical fact, not a logical necessity, that we employ the 
pictorial projective devices that we do. A race of beings with the 
extraordinary convention of making pictures always upon corrugated or 
curved planes set at some angle other than the perpendicular might well 
come to invent names for some of the more connnonly occurring actual 
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projected shapes in their system. These names would then take the 
place of those we ourselves use when giving picture accounts. Of 
course, it is very difficult to imagine a society in whicr·all the 
very good reasons of simplicity, practicality, repeatability and so on 
which have led to the adoption of our system were ignored. It 
certainly seems to us that the perpendicular planar convention, 
although not logically necessary, is not arbitrary, and that any of 
the logically possible alternatives would be. 
It is the case with the picture account, perhaps much more than 
with the more general and less precisely defined model account, that 
historical and cultural factors are of great importance in determining 
what will and what will not qualify as an adequate or acceptable 
I 
picture. This is the point that Gombrich has made so well1 and with 
such a wealth of erudition, and it would be supererogatory to emulate 
his example. A summary of the drift of his argument will not, however, 
be out of place. 
There is, first of all, a distinction to be drawn between 
naturalism and illusionism, about which Gombrich seems to be less than 
2 perfectly clear. The two cannot be run together for all of Gombrich's 
purposes, although it is certainly true that naturalistic pictorial 
1 
op. cit. 
2 
Cf. Richard Wollheim, 'Art and Illusion', BJA 3 (1963) esp. pp. 
25-26. 
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conventions have come to be treated as offering material for adequate 
picture accounts of objects in cases where, for strict 
·~ 
indistinguishability (thinking now in terms of matching tasks) only 
fully illusionistic devices would be perfectly appropriate. 
Naturalism is certainly, as Gombrich argues, partly conventional; but 
it does not seem anything like so certain that what is a successful 
visual illusion, when practised upon a modern Western man, would not 
have been equally successful against an ancient Oriental. The blue 
we accept as a naturalistic picture match for the blue of the sky 
might not be acceptable to someone in a different cultural tradition, 
but the blue outside the window that deceives us into thinking that we 
actually see the sky, when we do not, would very likely deceive our 
differently encultured viewer too. 
Bearing in mind this distinction, and making due allowance for 
the tendency most writers have to blurr it, the point to be made here 
has been well swmnarized by Steinberg: 
••• 'technical capacity in imitation' implies what no one 
seriously believes: that nature confronts man with a fixed, 
invariant look. For what else does it mean to speak of 
'mere skill in copying the model' (the words are Malraux's), 
but that the model's appearance is an objective fact 
susceptible of mechanical reproductionZ We know better 
than that. Appearances reach us through the eye, and the 
eye - whether we speak with the psychologist or the 
embryologist - is part of the brain and therefore 
hopelessly involved in mysterious cerebral operations. Thus 
nature presents every generation (and every person who will 
use his eyes for more than nodding recognitions) with a 
unique and unrepeated facet of appearance ••• The encroaching 
archaism of old photographs is only the latest instance of 
an endless succession in which every new mode of nature-
representation eventually resigns its claim to co-identity 
with natural appearance. And if appearances are thus 
unstable in the human eye, their representation in art is 
not a matter of mechanical reproduction but of progressive 
revelation.l 
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One or two illustrations will perhaps be helpful. Up to the last 
third of the nineteenth century shadows had generally been rendered by 
naturalistic painters in terms of a fairly narrow range of cooler or 
warmer browns with black as a limit, and perhaps with occasional hints 
of local colour on the objects in shadow. It was not until after the 
theoretically inspired researches of the Impressionists that the 
shadows in naturalistic art were given distinct hues. Shadows that 
are lilac, or green, simply did not appear in painting until roughly a 
century ago, and it seems reasonably safe to assume that such colours 
would not previously have been thought to match the appearance of the 
real world anything like so well as the traditional brown. Today, 
viewers whose perceptual opinions have been formed in part upon a diet 
of Impressionist painting are prone to distinguish colours in the world 
which would have been thought quite fanciful by people who differ, so 
far as we can guess, in no significant physiological respect, but who 
had learnt to see, and to give accounts of what they saw, in a 
different cultural milieu. 
1 
Leo Steinberg, 1The Eye is Part of the Mind', Partisan Review, 
XX (1953), reprinted in Langer, ed., Reflections on Art (1958) 
p.247. 
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In a similar way, mediaeval draughtsmen and mediaeval audiences 
must have accepted their very imperfect perspectival devices as quite 
adequate to the naturalistic picturing of the world. Although 
mediaeval drawings of tables seem to us to be in the act of 
precipitating their contents forward into the spectator's lap, they 
cannot have seemed so to the contemporaneous eye. It is a preposterous 
notion that whole epochs of naturalistic art must have seemed wrong to 
races and generations of artists who are to be supposed to have 
enjoyed a clear idea of what would be right (by simply paying 
attention to how the world looks) but to have lacked the skill to 
reproduce this appearance upon parchment or plaster. A mediaeval 
draughtsman who drew receding parallels as parallel upon the picture 
plane instead of convergent towards the centre of vision could hardly 
have been expected to say, if challenged: 'The parallel edges of the 
table look as if they converge, of course, but I am incapable of 
drawing them so.' It is surely obvious that if the artist were capable 
of saying this, then there was no reason why he should not have drawn 
in the manner of a later century. In fact, if the view I am 
sununarizing here is correct, it was because nobody had yet drawn the 
lines so (perhaps by chance at first), and the illusionistic success 
of the convergence been noticed, that nobody was yet in a position to 
~: 'parellels look convergent'. 
It would no doubt be a mistake to exaggerate the importance of 
these considerations to a viable theory of perception. They are 
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introduced here only in order to fill out the schematic doctrine of 
model and picture accounts of visible objects with some factual and 
historical material which is, to say the least of it, not irrelevant. 
The question we ought to ask about picture accounts of the world, and 
about model accounts as well, is not always whether they are true in 
strictly and exactly measurable ways, but rather whether they are 
adequate and acceptable to the speaker's audience; and to this question 
qualified answer reflecting historical and, cultural circumstances must 
be given. To simplify matters here is to distort them; nevertheless 
some distortion must be tolerated if the schematic account is to be 
presented in a reasonably clear and succinct way. Accordingly, I shall 
say no more about the differences and the relationship between a merely 
adequate, historically conditioned naturalistic picture account and a 
scrupulously exact, possibly timeless, illusionistic picture or model 
account. I shall deal, for simplicity and convenience, entirely in 
terms of the notion of that which is, in a general courtesy sense, 
'indistinguishable' from the object pictured, from the viewer's 
viewpoint. 
Returning now to the ideas of correct seeing, of mis-seeing and of 
making mistakes, the proposal is this: that a viewer who can either 
select or give a reasonable account of a model or picture of what he 
sees which would in fact match what he sees, thereby shows that he 
sees correctly. He may also be willing to offer an object account of 
what he sees, and if he does make such an attempt he may either get it 
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right or make a mistakeJwhether he sees correctly (as tested by the 
adequacy of the picture account that he would offer) or not. To give 
an example: a viewer who says 'I see a small silvery speck' may be 
taken to have seen a distant star correctly. He may go on to give an 
object account which is correct, or one which is mistaken: he may say 
'I see a very distant star' or - and let us assume that this is a 
mistake - 1 1 see a moderately distant street lamp'. Or again, a 
viewer who mis-sees, saying perhaps 'I see two street lamps', may 
nevertheless go on to add ' ••• but I have double vision; what I see is, 
of course, just one street lamp'. 
The important difference between the theory now emerging and 
Armstrong's theory as it was roughly expounded in the previous 
chapter, is that it leaves open the possibility of actually making 
empirical test, upon any occasion whatsoever, of whether or not a 
viewer sees correctly, by having him carry out (for example, verbally) 
a T3 picture or model matching task. This is a task at which he has a 
real opportunity to achieve any desired degree of precision; whereas 
it will be remembered that in the case of the T2 tasks previously 
discussed it would be rather a matter of luck how close a normal viewer 
came to matching sample and object. Moreover, it is an open possibility, 
upon the proposed basis, to determine whether or not the viewer of an 
1 inunaterial 1 object - a flame, a rainbow, a sky, a shadow, and so on -
sees correctly; which is not possible if some 'medium sized specimen of 
dry goods', to use Austin's phrase, or 'material object', to be more 
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respectful, must be available against which to check the chosen sample 
by direct match. 
A viewer may also, of course, in appropriate circumstances, carry 
out T2 tasks - or, in the proposed jargon, object account giving 
tasks. But failure to give a correct object account (or to offer a 
close T2 sample) does not, on the present view, necessarily imply mis-
seeing, or sensory illusion; although it certainly does imply that 
some kind of mistake has been made. 
I should like to say that we may acquire true beliefs about the 
world directly, by perception, but that the correct or normal 
functioning of this or that particular sense organ is not even a 
necessary condition for doing so. As has been remarked, a short-
sighted person does not form the belief that the world beyond .his 
range of clear vision is dissolving; and he may well become able, with 
practice, to recognize correctly the nature and true qualities of many 
objects of which he would be unable to give an acceptable picture 
account. What is a necessary condition for the acquisition of true 
beliefs about at least some of the real properties of things is that 
there should be sense organs which function systematically. If they 
also function normally, then so much the better. And of course, a 
systematic functioning which is abnormal will not result in the 
acquisition by sight (or by whatever individual sensory mode) of the 
full range of true beliefs as these are acquired by normal perceivers. 
For example, the colour blind viewer who has learnt to cope with 
traffic signals from their position cannot cope, as a normally 
sighted viewer can, with occasional reversals of the position of the 
lights. 
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It is not intended to elaborate this theory here, or indeed to 
develop it in any way Yhich does not help to throw light upon the 
aesthetic issues that are to be discussed in Chapter VIII. Although a 
very great number of important questions. must be left open, one 
difficulty at least must be faced. Indeed, it is the very difficulty, 
if I am right, that has generated the greater part of the prevailing 
confusion about the perception of objects occupying two and those 
occupying three dimensions of space. To face it squarely will be the 
only sensible way to proceed. 
It is here claimed that we ordinarily give, often indifferently, 
model (or picture) accounts of what we see and, or, object accounts. 
The difference, to recapitulate, is that an object account, if true, is 
true of the object that is seen but not necessarily applicable to 
models or pictures - or even to facsimiles - of it; whereas on the other 
hand what is true of a correct model or picture is not necessarily true 
of the object. The one is simply an account of the object, while the 
other is an account of the object in terms of a picture or model which 
would match it. What is said in giving an object account of something 
may also serve, sometimes, as a picture account, and vice-versa •. For 
example, an object account of a tilted ellipse would be: 'elliptical' -
but so too, as it happens, would a picture account be from very many 
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points of view, although there is one special axis of view from which 
a picture account of an elliptical shape would be 'circular', just as 
the reciprocal picture account of a circular shape is, from all axes 
of view but one, 'elliptical'. 
Unfortunately (and this, I believe, is the reason for much of the 
confusion and cross-purpose in perceptual theory) these two types of 
account are so interwoven and mixed in our ordinary talk about what we 
see that we are not always clear on all occasions as to which type has 
actually been proposed. Indeed, that there is a difference which is 
expressible in the way suggested is not a fact to which our attention 
is often explicitly directed in the course of a normal education. We 
are sometimes quite unheeding of which account we have given, and our 
audience often has good reason to mistake our account since there are 
no strict formal criteria for determining the question. One fairly 
clumsy device is in connnon use, it is true: we often say 'It looks ••• ', 
or 'It appears ••• ' to herald a model or picture account, and 1 It is ••• ' 
to introduce an object account. But the usages are very far indeed 
from being strict. We say of the distant star that it is a tiny 
speck, and we say of the hills that they ~ distant. The latter 
case is rather interesting in as much as there seems here to be use 
made of that limiting case of the model, the facsimile. It is as if 
the speaker were to say: 'I'm not claiming quite that the hills~ 
distant, but only that hills placed at a (considerable) distance 
would look just the same as these do 1 • The difference between these 
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claims is very slight indeed, but in other cases it might be 
considerable. For example, if the claim 'He looks happy' were to be 
made we could construe it, on 'facsimile' lines, as meaning that a 
normally happy person would be - in the relevant respects of expression, 
gesture and so on - quite indistinguishable visually from the object of 
the remark. But this ~ differ materially from the claim 'He is 
happy', since there is nothing even faintly paradoxical about the 
remark 'He looks happy, but is certainly pretending'. ''.Che hills look 
distant, but aren't really' is also possible, but the opportunity to 
s ay so truly is relatively rare. Only occasionally, perhaps when 
looking through the wrong end of field glasses, mi~ht we have occasion 
to say with propriety that the hills look distant, whilst at the same 
time cherishing the true belief that in fact they are quite near. 
Even without introducing the complication of limiting cases it is 
clear that there are many capable language-users who would, on specific 
occasions if not invariably, be at a loss to say whether they were 
proposing an object account or a picture account. Nevertheless, if we 
are to find fault with the account that they give it is characteristic 
of our methodology that we take it one way or the other. If it is said 
that the hills look distant we object that they ~ not, and if it is 
said that the moon looks enormous we object that it looks only the size 
of a small coin at arm's length. '.Che point is that although the 
utterance of a perception statement does not presuppose a clear and 
explicit grasp of the model account and object account distinction, the 
effective criticism of such a statement does presuppose it, for what 
will go against one will not necessarily go against the other. 
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The question of precisely which type of account has been given 
upon any occasion; facsimile, model picture or object; is one which, 
like general questions about the meaning of utterances, is not 
amenable to simple solution by rote or rule. We cannot take a 
speaker's claim or admission of intention to have decisive authority -
although we often and properly regard it as important - because it is 
sometimes a viable objection that he cannot mean what he says he 
means by the words he uses when these are sufficiently inappropriate. 
Thus, a speaker cannot intend the words 'It is (or appears to be) a 
tiny speck' to be taken as an object account, or even as a facsimile 
account of what he and his audience know to be a large distant star, 
any more than he can ordinarily intend the word 1Yes' to be taken as 
a form of denial. 
It is obviously impossible to explore all the problems that arise 
here: for present purposes it is sufficient to establish that we do 
offer accounts of the two fundamentally different kinds distinguished 
here; that they are ordinarily tangled together in the skein of 
unreflective talk about what we perceive; and that disentangling them 
may not always - although it will quite often - be easy. 
Only one point remains to be stressed before attempting to apply 
these considerations to the problems of painting and sculpture. It is 
that facsimile, model, or picture accounts,and object accounts,are all 
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accounts of what is seen. The former, however, are accounts given in 
terms of visual facsimiles, models or pictures of the thing that is 
seen. To hold that what is seen when a model account of what is seen 
is given, is a model, or an imaginary model, of what is seen, is to 
speak not so much darkly as incoherently. We do not see a headless 
woman, or an imaginary headless woman, when we say that what we see 
on the stage is (that is, is not distinguishable by sight from) a 
headless woman. We see (probably) a woman with her head in a black 
bag, and we describe her in terms of a visually indistinguishable 
object. Of course, if we think that our model account is actually an 
object account, then we have (probably) made a mistake. It would be 
surprising indeed if we did not make such mistakes from time to time 
especially when conjurors pit their guile against us. In many, indeed 
in most ordinary cases, we have learnt from childhood to give both 
object accounts and picture accounts of things on sight, with 
confidence and a fair measure of success. The correctness or 
rightness of our vision, however, can only be tested by model or 
picture matching tasks. An inability to carry out such tasks with a 
considerable degree of accuracy (bearing in mind the point about the 
inherent imperfections of naturalistic picturing devices where these 
are employed) will certainly indicate sensory illusion. Erroneous 
object accounts, on the other hand, may indicate a defective 
education (as when, for example, never having seen a mirror, we 
mistakenly suppose certain objects to be behind or through it); or 
else a conspiracy of either events or persons to defeat the 
expectations even of normally educated viewers who see correctly (as 
when, for example, an illusionist or a natural but rare illusory 
phenomenon catches us out). 
It will be the task of the following and final chapter to give 
these considerations a concrete application to the problems of 
aesthetic criticism. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE AESTHETIC PERCEPTION OF SCUL~TURE 
The distinction between object accounts and - collectively -
picture, model and facsimile accounts, corresponds to a difference 
between things and representations of things: although it cannot be 
too much stressed that the latter are all accounts of the object that 
is seen, no less than the former. They are accounts of it which are 
delivered in terms of pictures, models or facsimiles which would 
match it from the spectator's viewpoint; and matching pictures, 
models, and facsimiles might as well be referred to collectively as 
'representations'. 
The distinction petween things and representations of things is 
one which has always been important - although it has seldom been 
kept perfectly clear - in the theory of art. Clive Bell's famous 
remark that 'The representative element in a work of art may or may 
not be harmful; always it is irrelevant' is immediately qualified in 
his next, much less familiar paragraph: 
To appreciate a work of art we need bring with us nothing 
but a sense of form and colour and a knowledge of three-
dimensional space. That bit of knowledge, I admit, is 
essential to the appreciation of many great works, since 
many of the most moving forms are created in three 
dimensions. To see a cube or a rhomboid as a flat 
pattern is to lower its significance .•• Pictures which 
would be insignificant if we saw them as flat patterns 
are profoundly moving because, in fact, we see them as 
related planes. If the representation of three-
dimensional space is to be called 'representation', 
then I agree that there is one kind of representation 
which is not irrelevant.! L'MJ emphasi~/ 
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There are not, of course, two or more 'kinds of representation', 
one of which is and the rest are not relevant to the appreciation 
and criticism of painting. Ignoring the rather different question 
of symbolic or codified representation, there is only one broad 
'kind of representation' by which three dimensional objects are 
naturalistically or illusionistically rendered on a two dimensional 
2 
surface, whether the objects be human heads or mere dull cubes. 
Bell's point presumably has to do with the kind of interest he 
thinks an audience likely to take in, say, the human image as 
contrasted with a mathematical model. He supposes (what is in any 
case not necessarily true) that we shall not feel any inclination 
to respond to what might loosely be called 'the associations' of a 
cube, as we shall to those of a head. It is also one of his 
principal theses that such 'associations' must be aesthetically 
irrelevant, but it is not this aspect of his now somewhat 
unfashionable position with which we are innnediately concerned. The 
point to be brought out with all possible force and clarity concerns 
1 
Art, Sect.I, Ch.I. 
2 
The reservations discussed in the previous chapter, which 
take Gombrich's thesis into account, must not be overlooked. 
the real distinction, only blurred and confused by Bell, between 
flat representations (particularly paintings) of solid objects and 
the objects thus represented. 
This difference is surely simply enough characterized. It is 
a difference of one spatial dimension. Yet the temptation to 
abolish it for art critical purposes must be very strong, for not 
only .was Bell hopelessly muddled about the matter but so too were 
the inveterate opponents of the brand of formalism for which he 
stood. De Witt Parker, for example, wrote: 
The space of sculpture, like that of painting, is, of 
course, a represented or imaginary space, to be 
carefully distinguish~d from the real space of the room 
in which it is placed and the floor upon which it stands. 1 
Sculpture, a particular case of the general three dimensional 
object, is here explicitly assimilated to painting by being 
etherealized; its inconvenient bulk abolished by a wave of the 
theoretical wand. This tendency to render sculptures insubstantial 
for critical purposes is not nowadays so strong. Paul Weiss 
observes: 
1 
A. Hildebrand said that _!cu..!.Pture is a set of paintings 
around which we walk ••• /but/ As a result of his study 
of distinguished works in the history of sculpture, 
Herbert Read observes ••• that 'A very real confusion has 
always existed between the arts of sculpture and 
The Principles of Aesthetics, 1920 (reprinted 1946) pp.232-33 
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painting'. The 'confusion' has now been dispelled. No 
one would, today, I think, deny that sculpture and 
painting are distinct arts.l 
And yet, fresh from the resolution of the confusion, Weiss 
asserts only a few pages later, almost in Parker's very words of 
forty years earlier: 
Like architecture and sculpture, painting presents us 
with a newly created space. That space is distinct 
from the common-sense space in which we daily live.2 
Evidently, for all the apt invocation of Hildebrand and Read 
(about both of whom a good deal must be said in a moment) sculpture 
and painting have not at long last been properly distinguished but 
only once more conflated. 
There are, it seems, two quite sharply divided parties to a 
dispute which, I argue, revolves inconclusively about a shared 
mistake having its roots in the language of visual perception. On 
the one hand it is claimed, as typically by Sir Joshua Reynolds in 
the passage quoted at the beginning of Chapter VI, that sculptures 
constitute, for appreciative and critical purposes, a mere sub-class 
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of those aesthetic objects which comprise the class of paintings. On 
the other hand it is asserted - as most vigorously by Sir Herbert 
Read - that the classes are, for appreciative and critical purposes, 
utterly distinct. Read writes: 
1 
Nine Basic Arts (1961) p.85. 
2 
Ibid., p.101. 
The arts do not now compete to express a common ideal .•• 
Instead, the arts seek to distinguish themselves from 
one another, to preserve boundaries, to rely on distinct 
sensations, to appeal to specialized sensibilities. It 
is claimed that each art has its own proper virtues, 
determined by the nature of its tools and materials, and 
that the faculties engaged by these tools and materials 
are so distinct that the products cannot usefully be 
compared. l 
How sculpture is to appeal to the specialized three dimensional 
'tactile', 'plastic', or 'hap tic' sensibilities of which Read speaks 
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unless it is actually handled - not in mere imagination but in fact -
is not at all clear in view of his Berkeley-Ruskin theory of visual 
perception: 
If we merely 'look at' sculpture Lno reason is given.l- or 
is implicit in the argument, for the inverted comma~/ 
even with our sophisticated vision, which is capable of 
reading into the visual image the conceptual knowledge 
we possess from previous experience of three-dimensional 
objects, still we get merely a two-dimensional impression 
of a three-dimensional object.2 
And, to emphasize that there is no really effective commerce 
between vision and what he calls 'plastic sensibility' he insists 
that: 
1 
2 
.•• sculpture owes its individuality as an art to unique 
plastic qualities, to the possession and exploitation of 
a special kind of sensibility. Its uniqueness consists 
in its realization of an integral mass in actual space. 
The sensibility required for this effort of realization 
The Art of Sculpture (1961) p.3. 
lb id . ' p • so • 
A typical expression of the contemporary horror of any mention 
of the flat image in a sculpture critical context emerges in the 
course of a criticism by J.R.M. McCheyne of a woodcarving by Barbara 
Hepworth, which he castigates as 'brutal and insensitive'; adding, 
however: 
These criticisms of this work seem to be false and 
U£reasonable if only the photograph is looked at _ 
.lMcCheyne is actually reviewing an illustrated boo~/ 
and I would emphasize that I have considered the 
carving itself, which is, of course, the only way to 
look at sculpture and to remind ourselves in so doing 
that as an art sculpture has nothing in connnon with 
two-dimensional representations of any kind. Sculpture 
is the creation of solid forms which give aesthetic 
pleasure. There is an infinite variety of such forms 
and they arise and are proliferated by laws which are 
formal and neither representational nor yet picturesque.l 
Now there is no doubt that an adult viewer of very ordinary 
accomplishment and of no special sensibility whatever is capable of 
giving, on sight of a good photograph, sundry object accounts of the 
object that is pictured which are accurate in a great many respects. 
The most ordinary observer - not even to call upon an expert - is 
able to tell much about the shape (the three dimensional shape) of 
a woodcarving from even a single photograph of it. Now I do not 
mean to suggest that looking at photographs of sculpture is an 
entirely satisfactory alternative to looking at the solid originals, 
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by only that it seems incredible that a sculpture which appears to be, 
1 
Review, JAAC, 2 (1962) p.366. 
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in a three dimensional way, 'brutal and insensitive' to a present 
viewer should not seem so to a viewer of an adequate photograph. The 
most that McCheyne can mean, surely, is that considered as a two 
dimensional object in its own right the photographic image on the 
printed page is in some ways satisfactory; whereas in the presence of 
the solid work we should look in vain for these virtues and find 
instead only faults of a strictly three dimensional kind. 
Now it is true that the sculpture is unlikely to be, say, a 
delicate shade of silvery grey, as the photograph might be; but there 
certainly ~ features of the flat image which may be equally features 
of the solid object - for example a nice relationship of breadth to 
height. Those things which can be said only of the photographic 
image and not of the object, or vice-versa, concern matters in 
respect of which the two are strictly incomparable: it is not possible 
that the object might seem 'brutal and insensitive' in fact, and not 
seem so in image, unless the photograph is held to be misleading or 
deceptive as to the solid shape of the sculpture. Now this is not 
McCheyne's point. He does not argue that the photograph is such a 
bad one that it deceives the viewer about the qualities of the 
sculpture (although this is certainly often the case with photographs) 
but, quite differently, that the properties of the sculpture as they 
are seen in the photograph are totally irrelevant to a critical 
appraisal of the work, simply because the photograph is flat. This, 
I maintain, is not merely false, it is absurd. 
In order to understand how this sort of confusion has arisen it 
is important to consider the position from which these modern 
theorists believed it necessary to emancipate themselves. Some of 
the vehemence of their denial and contradiction of earlier theories 
is certainly attributable at least in part to the fact that they 
share with their enemies certain unquestioned assumptions about the 
theory of visual perception; and this has made it impossible for 
them to mark out as distinct a position for themselves as they would 
wish without falling into internal inconsistency or an intolerable 
betrayal of connnon sense. 
The intellectual origins of the dispute are to be found in the 
well known Renaissance debate about the relative excellence of the 
several arts; and in particular in some of the answers given to 
Benedetto Varchi when he questioned the leading sculptors of his 
time on the matter. Cellini's view, for example, was: 
I maintain that amongst all the arts based on design, 
sculpture is seven times the greatest, because a statue 
must have eight show sides and all should be equally 
good. Therefore it often happens that a sculptor 
lacking in love for his art is so satisfied with one 
beautiful side or perhaps two; and in order not to have 
the trouble of filing something from that one beautiful 
side, which he vS:.,lues above those six sides which_are 
not beautiful, Lhe leaves it with the result tha~/ his 
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statue will be devoid of harmony. For everyone L;ho 
admires i!_f, ten will criticize it, if after the first 
view they walk around it.l 
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Or, perhaps even more clearly and emphatically, in the letter of 
1547 as quoted in Goldwater and Treves' Artists on Art: 
These views are not only eight, but more than forty, 
because even if the figure be rotated no more than an 
inch, there will be some muscle showing too much, or not 
enough, so that each single piece of sculpture presents 
the greatest variety of aspects imaginable. And thus 
the artist finds himself compelled to do away with that 
gracefulness that he had achieved in the first view in 
order to harmonize it with all the others. This 
difficulty is so great that no figure has ever been 
known to look right from every direction. 
This pictorial approach to sculpture (neglecting what seems now 
the rather sterile question which art is the greater) received its 
most complete expression and theoretical defence in the writing of 
Adolf van Hildebrand at the end of the nineteenth century.2 The 
immediately relevant aspects of Hildebrand's doctrines will emerge 
clearly enough from the following extracts: 
1 
.•. both sculptor and painter have to deal with the 
relation existing between visual impressions and 
kinaesthetic ideas. The painter gives on a plane a 
visual impression of a three-dimensional form, while 
the sculptor forms something three-dimensional for the 
purpose of affording a plane visual impression.3 
From Due Lezzioni di M. Benedetto Varchi, Florence (1549) as 
quoted in translation in Elizabeth G. Holt, A Documentary 
History of Art, Vol.II (1958) p.35. 
2 
The Problem of Form in Painting and Sculpture (American ed., 
1907) was first published in German in 1893. 
3 
(1907) p.34. 
1 
And: 
If, now, we apply the conception of relief more 
particularly to the representation of a figure in the 
round, this conception requires that the figure 
represented shall, from various aspects, satisfy the 
demands of relief - indeed, express itself as relief. 
This again means that the various aspects of the figure 
shall each present an intelligible picture as a plane 
layer. Our concern is, that the figure in each of its 
aspects shall excite the idea of a layer of space, and 
at the same time describe a total space clearly 
possessing unity of plane. In this manner the whole 
material content is metamorphosed into a visible form, 
and thus, in contrast with its real and solid form - a 
cast, as it were, of nature - becomes a pure perceptual 
form ... Unified, from its principal points of view, in 
one conunon plane, the figure gives the same feeling of 
repose and visibility that we obtain in the case of a 
clear impression received at a distance .•• so that, even 
from near by, the appearance is that of a plane picture. 
If the figure offers more than one plane picture, there 
will, of course, be more than one position from which to 
view it. The number of satisfactory aspects a work may 
have depends on the artist's conception; it may be two, 
front and rear, as in statues of a relief-like character; 
it may be three, or four, etc. It is the energy with 
which the work emphasizes these certain points of view, 
not their number, which interests us here. But among 
all the possible aspects there will always be one that 
dominates. This one is representative of the total 
plastic nature of the object, and, like a picture or 
relief, expresses it all in a single two-dimensional 
impression ... The problem in a plastic ensemble consists 
in arranging a solid figure so that it can afford us 
such a picture.l 
And finally: 
pp .92-94. 
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But how can one speak of a variety of possible situations 
for a figure which is condemned to stand forth in empty 
space - in the middle of a square - just where no figure 
should be made to stand because of the fact that all 
aspects of it are given equal value? There is neither 
front nor rear, and the situation counteracts the 
pictorial effect of the figure. As the spectator 
circles about the statue he has at least four views to 
take in, and this can be to the advantage of only a very 
few works and of pleasure, in general, only with figures 
in the nude. When we ask the source of this 
superstitious regard for the center of the square, we 
can find only one answer. It is due to the uncultured 
mind which fancies an open square to be a sort of 
organic unity with which is associated a feeling of 
organic synnnetry.l 
It is not surprising that a cry for sculpture that is fully in 
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the round should sooner or later be heard, and theoretically defended; 
although the slogan 'in the round' has attracted a certain amount of 
pointed derision: 
1 
When negro sculpture first came to Paris, some five and 
thirty years ago, the dealer who launched it hoped to 
win us over by saying that no Greek masterpiece could 
hold up its head against it, and that it was in the 
round. This cry, that negro sculpture was in the round, 
you heard for a season at all the Paris dealers, and 
collectors, and in all the Paris social gatherings, and 
the next season everywhere in New York, and finally 
after a decent interval you read in luscious language 
in London dailies, weeklies, and monthlies, and heard 
at all London Luncheon parties and tea-tables: 'The 
great thing about negro sculpture is that it is in the 
round.' It occurred to nobody to ask the pioneer 
dealers and their disciples, the London critics and 
dilettanti: 'What of it? What if they are in the round?' 
And: 'What has their roundness to do with their being 
great works of art? Are not gasometers in the round, 
p.117. 
and the enormous pipes that disfigure lovely subalpine 
valleys7' 'Ah, but they are cylindrical', and no 
epithet could be more decisive, more magisterially 
final. l 
What is really at issue between the pictorial and the spatial 
schools (so to tag them) is not, in the end, an important matter of 
principle to do with the 'essential' nature of sculpture at all: it 
is no more than a matter of emphasis laid upon one set of aesthetic 
features rather than another. The more ancient party prefers - one 
should not say 'preferred', for the battle still rumbles 
inconclusively on - to seek in its sculpture mainly for pictorial 
effects; in Cellini's case as many as possible, in Hildebrand's 
relatively few but 'energetic'. The other party interests itself 
very little in pictorial effects but concentrates upon such spatial 
features as the complex turn of surfaces and the relationships of 
mass in three dimensions. This difference in attitude makes for a 
recognizably different kind of object, as one may easily confirm by 
comparing any work of, say, Carpeaux, with any work of Moore; and of 
course I do not refer to the connected but different difference 
between the more and the less naturalistic styles. But it is not 
true that every Carpeaux is without aesthetic features which are 
spatial, nor is it true that every Moore is without purely pictorial 
excellences. Indeed Moore's rightly celebrated photographs of his 
1 
Bernard Berenson, Aesthetics and History (1950) p.45. 
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own work often seem to be taken with careful consideration for the 
aspect; while upon the strict theory to which he subscribes it 
should not matter in the slightest where the camera is placed so 
long as the direction and quality of light are not such as will 
result in a print which misleads a viewer about the solid form of 
the sculpture. 
The partisans of the spatial school have, in general, taken it 
upon themselves not only to urge a certain kind of aesthetic 
preference, but to do so in part by seeking to show that other 
considerations, in particular pictorial considerations, are 
critically inadmissable. In this their efforts have been greatly 
hampered by the inconveniently common but unacknowledged theoretical 
ground that they share with their opponents. Ruskin mentioned only 
in a footnote that 'We~ nothing but flat colours ... '; and 
Hildebrand also relegates to the foot of the page the remark: 'The 
reader need hardly be reminded that our actual impression is two-
dimensional, a flat picture on the retina•. 1 Henry Moore makes a 
passing remark or two to the same effect, and while Read puts it 
boldly and explicitly into the main body of the text of his major 
treatise on sculpture he does not seem to consider it a theory, in 
need of defence, but a simple incontestable fact that (as already 
1 
The Problem of Form, p.21. 
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quoted): 'If we merely "look at" sculpture ... we get merely a two-
dimensional impression of a three-dimensional object'. 
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Some at least of the spatialists' difficulties would be 
alleviated if they were to concede that what we see is what we see: 
that if we see a solid three dimensional object then it is a solid 
three dimensional object that we see, or of which we have a 'visual 
impression', and nothing two dimensional whatsoever - unless it be 
some flat part of that object. The peculiar difficulty that special 
faculties or insights must be postulated to permit a viewer to have 
knowledge of the spatial qualities of what he sees is removed by 
this eminently connnonsensical move; but the utter defeat of the 
pictorialists would even so still be out of reach. 
It would still be out of reach because of the point that has 
been brought out in previous chapters: that we give, and both 
naturally and rightly give, picture, model and facsimile accounts as 
well as object accounts of the three-dimensional things that we see. 
* * * * * 
All the main pieces of the puzzle are now laid out, and it is 
only needful to pick them up in such a way as to construct a coherent 
account of the appraisal of sculpture which, in contrast with those 
of the principal embattled parties, does justice not merely to a 
preferred set but to all of the more conspicuous facts. 
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We look at a sculpture - and no 'synthetic realization' is 
necessary; only adequate eyesight cultivated by a normal education -
and we say: 'What a flabby, bloated shape' or 'See how subtly the 
surfaces turn away from the nodal point'; and these are object 
accounts of what we see. They are manifestly aesthetic remarks as 
well, but aesthetic remarks which derive their sense and 
appropriateness from a true understanding of the actual three 
dimensional properties of the object. Or we say, looking at the 
sculpture: 'What a strong profile that has, like a drawn bow', or 
'It looks uncomfortably top heavy from here'; and these are aesthetic 
remarks which are given point and sense by their acceptability as 
picture accounts. Sometimes, too, we give model or facsimile accounts 
of sculptures. We say of what is plainly a stonecarving: 'That's a 
man •.. a lion ..• ' and so on. To say that it is a man is to say, upon 
the proposed analysis, that a man would be indistinguishable from it 
(or at any rate, very like it; the spectrum from illusionistic 
through naturalistic to symbolic representation is not easy to break 
decisively at any point). 'It is a man', said of a shaped stone, is 
in analogy with 'It is a small bright speck' said of a great star; 
although of course the 'small bright speck' is a picture and not a 
model or facsimile account. The analogy holds only as to the propriety, 
in both cases, of attaching the description to the object by the copula 
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'is'. 'It is cold stone' and 'It is a smiling man' may both be 
true of the same object: they are not competing accounts of what 
is seen, unless their authors choose to have them compete by 
arguing, both, that they are object accounts. 'It is an attendant' 
and 'No, it's a dunnny' may well be competing opinions overheard in 
Ma.dame Tussaud's; although they can be re-aligned out of competition: 
'I know it's a dunnny - I mean that it is an attendant and not, as 
you might mistakenly have supposed, a policeman'. 
For the sake of symmetry, and because it solves an old problem 
neatly, it is worth pointing out how this conceptual apparatus 
enables one to deal with Bell's muddle about pictorial representation. 
Just as the more vehement spatialists of sculpture have tried to 
legislate against the admission of picture accounts in the criticism 
of sculpture, so there is a type of account of a naturalistic or 
illusionistic picture against which certain pictorial theorists have 
sought to legislate. A painting, they claim, is a two-dimensional 
object - a flat pattern. No remark which explicitly or implicitly 
treats it as having the properties of those three-dimensional 
objects which are represented in it can possibly bear critically 
upon the painting as a painting. 
This view overlooks the natural right we have, which cannot be 
legislated away, to give perceptual accounts other than object 
accounts of paintings. An object account of a painting, of course, 
will inevitably be a 'flat pattern' account of two dimensional shapes 
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and colours - an account of how the painting is which is independent 
of any particular viewpoint. Now it is quite true that we do not 
often offer picture accounts of paintings. Indeed, it is not easy to 
think of a plausible occasion or reason to do so. 'That picture 
looks very narrow when seen from far to one side' would be an example, 
but hardly an example likely to occur in the course of ordinary art 
criticism, in view of our well established convention of enjoying 
paintings en face from a moderate range of distances. 
No, the account of pictures which is given, on sight, as often, 
as naturally, and as properly as an object account of them,is not a 
picture account but a (three dimensional) model account. We say 
about a picture (or we don't say, because it is obvious): 'That is a 
house .•. a tree ••. a man'. In other words we offer a model which, we 
claim, would be sufficiently difficult to distinguish from the object 
actually in front of us to make it a testable matter whether what we 
say is true. That the model proposed is three dimensional and the 
object only two dimensional is a circumstance quite symmetrical with 
that which obtains when picture accounts of solid objects are given. 
There is one respect, however, in which the symmetry is awry; although 
it is a highly theoretical respect with only slight practical 
consequences from the point of view of art criticism. It is this: the 
geometry of central perspectival projection on to a perpendicular-
planar surface happens to be such that an infinite range of suitable 
models would match the pictorial object, 1 whereas in any one 
cultural epoch or milieu2 only one (admittedly somewhat variable or 
flexible) flat image will be regarded as an acceptable picture 
match for given solid objects. 
A tilted disc, for example, is picture-matched by an ellipse, 
and acceptably picture matched only by an ellipse: but a picture 
ellipse may be matched by an enormous range of objects, including 
not only tilted discs and non-tilted ellipses but the most 
233 
fantastical nameless shapes in surfaces of variable inclination to the 
perpendicular. Although of logical interest, this point has 
comparatively little practical significance in connection with 
representational painting, for although it is certainly possible to 
propose weird models which would match, say, a picture-cube (thus to 
beg the question of what account should be given of it), it is most 
natural to offer the model of a cube: and perhaps it is even more 
natural in the case of the pictured house, tree, or man. Anxiety 
about the apt model only arises where the picture seems, for one 
reason or another, to be naturalistically representational in 
character, and yet the objects represented are unfamiliar or else the 
conventions of representation vary conspicuously from an acceptably 
1 
The 'Ames room', for example, can be constructed in countless 
ways. 
2 
See the discussion of this point in the previous chapter. 
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naturalistic standard. In such cases we sometimes do not feel a 
sufficiently firm grasp of the situation to propose models with an 
easy confidence. This is a fact which has been exploited by such a 
(self-styled) 'metaphysical' painter as de Chirico, in order to 
evoke an eerie and unsettled mood in the spectator, who feels that 
he ought to be able to 'read' the natural model appropriate to the 
picture without difficulty because of one set of clues, but finds 
that he cannot because as many pointers contradict as are consistent. 
Such painting may be, in part, symbolic and not naturalistic at all; 
but it certainly owes much of its marvellous queerness to the way it 
both tempts and defies the giving of ordinary model accounts. 
Returning to the case of sculpture, it will help to clarify and 
to some extent to surrnnarize the points that have been made in a number 
of different ways and places throughout this thesis, if they are put 
together in terms of a concrete example of aesthetic appraisal. The 
Moschophoros (frontispiece) was referred to as a paradigm case of 
sculpture, and a paradigm case of aesthetically sensitive appraisal 
1 
might be the passage concerning it written by the late Humfrey Payne. 
I shall quote the entire passage, in order that the authentic feel of 
it may be communicated (if this is not the criticism of sculpture, 
1 
In the Introduction to Archaic Marble Sculpture from the 
Acropolis (1950) pp.1-3. 
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then what is?); and then examine it in terms of the notions that have 
been developed here for the analysis of just such talk: 
1 
2 
The Moschophoros is not a single statue but a group: a 
group which is not simply a combination of two figures, 
but a composition the elements of which are inseparably 
fused. It is, perhaps, the first example 1of its kind 
in Greek sculpture. The motive - man with calf or ram 
on shoulder - is older, even in Greece, than this statue, 
and it has a long history; but it is hard to find a 
version in which the relation between the figures is 
more finely expressed. The peculiar character of the 
statue is, in part at least, due to one unusual feature 
of the composition - the locking of arms and legs, like 
harness, across the man's chest. An obvious device, 
certainly, but one which is not to be found in any of 
the other versions of the subject; its effect on the 
composition may be appreciated if the Moschophoros be 
compared with a figure such as that in the Barracco 
collection,1 or with the early Cretan statuette in 
Berlin. 2 
The relation between man and calf is emphasized in other 
ways. The calf is not, as often, held horizontally: it 
has settled down comfortably on the man's shoulders, 
with the weight on its hindquarters, the contour of the 
back (interrupted only by the projecting thigh bone) 
slanting easily away to the right. To bind the figures 
together the sculptor has made the tail fall neither 
vertical, nor parallel to the division of the haunches, 
but along the centre of the man's left arm ... so that it 
is fully visible, and therefore fully effective, in 
front view. Again, as though to accentuate their 
connection, the calf's head is not vertical, but tilted 
slightly towards the man's. In all thepe respects, as 
in many others, the Cretan statuette just quoted 
provides a striking contrast. There the man and the ram 
which he is carrying certainly imply each other, but 
Winter, K.unstgeschichte in Bildern, pl.233,3. 
Neugebar, Kat. pl.19, no.158; Lamb, Greek and Roman Bronzes, 
pl.25b. 
only in a general sense. The relation is limited to the 
requirements of the subject: it has not really permeated 
the design. 
The calf and the cloak tend to obscure the form of the 
man's figure: think these away, and it becomes apparent 
that the Moschophoros stands early in the series of sixth-
century men. The shoulders are innnendsely broad, the 
chest narrows rapidly to an extremely narrow waist, and 
from the level of the navel the contour falls in a bold 
unbroken arc until it reaches the knee, giving great 
breadth to the hips and thighs. The main lines of the 
figure (though not, of course, the modelling) are even 
reminiscent of the Sunium kouroi. In profile, despite 
the breaks, it is clear that the thighs were massive, 
like those of a figure on some very early black-figure 
vase. 
The forms (for example in the face, chest, shoulders and 
arms) are admirably conceived in simple convex surfaces, 
rather like a landscape of compact and open downs. The 
minor division of the body, such as those of the stomach 
or knee, are treated with reserve, and here and there one 
recognizes a device familiar to an earlier period, a low 
ridge used to define an area (the arch of the stomach, the 
navel, the borders of the cloak). The same reserve is to 
be seen in the modelling of the face: the harshness of the 
earliest phase of ~ttic sculpture has been overcome; 
traces of it only in the grooves which bound the nostrils, 
and in the region of the mouth. Above all the head is no 
longer dominated by the long vertical contours and flat 
converging planes of the Sunium style, and of the Berlin 
goddess. The rectangular - or rather cubical - structure 
of these earlier heads is still apparent, but it is 
modified: for the sculptor of the Moschophoros has a 
feeling for convexity which is something new in the history 
of Attic sculpture; he is, in fact, the first Attic 
sculptor to whom working in three dimensions means working 
in the round. The warmth and intensity of the man's 
expression make a vivid contrast with the passivity of the 
calf - a contrast once heightened by the inlaying of the 
pupils of the man's eyes with coloured glass. How 
brilliant the effect must have been one may imagine from a 
later statue ... where the glass is still partially preserved. 
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There are two respects in which this passage is a little less 
than ideally exemplary for present purposes: although perhaps only an 
artificially contrived sample would be satisfactory - suspiciously so -
in each last detail. First of all there is the concern shown, quite 
properly by a Director of the British School of Archaeology in 
Athens, for the correct placing of the group in a historical sequence 
which will establish reliable dates. This interest is not in itself 
aesthetic, although it overlaps with a concern for the proper 
understanding of the culture-contextual background against which the 
sculpture must be seen for certain of its aesthetic qualities to be 
fully appreciated. And secondly, it does not contain any very 
explicit aesthetic verdict. The aesthetic remarks which are most 
verdict-like, although they are by no means paradigmatic, are:-
.•. but it is hard to find a version in which the 
relation between the figures is more finely expressed. 
And: 
... admirably conceived in simple convex surfaces ..• 
One would have preferred more exemplary verdicts such as 'In this 
magnificent work .•. ', or 'Amongst the finest examples of .•• '. Indeed, 
one would have preferred an example each of a genetic, an open and a 
consequential verdict, one pro and one con for each case: 1 but to ask 
so much of a single uncontrived specimen of aesthetic appraisal would 
1 
See Chapter V. 
be unrealistic. Payne's verdict is, of course, in a general way, 
quite clearly implicit in his treatment of this sculpture, both in 
his text and in the relative size and number of his chosen 
illustrations. His appraisal is restrained and scholarly, and he no 
doubt considered it unnecessary to make emotive, performative or 
predictive moves about a work that is already so secure in general 
public esteem. 
There are plenty of aesthetic remarks, however, in spite of a 
restraint of expression that verg-es on the ascetic. (The emphasis 
laid upon what seem to be amongst the more telling words or phrases 
is my own): 
..• a composition the elements of which are inseparably 
fused . 
... slanting easily away to the right. 
The same reserve is to be seen in the modelling of the 
face: the harshness of the earliest phase of Attic 
sculptur_e has. been overcome; ... 
. . . a bold unbroken arc .•.. 
The warmth and intensity of the man's expression make a 
vivid contrast with the passivity of the calf ... 
How brilliant the effect must have been ... 
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And many others in varying shades of prominence, including whole 
sentences which, although they contain no conspicuously aesthetic 
words or phrases, would nevertheless not be uttered except by a person 
of taste engaged in drawing attention to features of aesthetic 
importance. It may seem that many of Payne's remarks are simply 
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descriptive, yet it is pertinent to ask why he chooses to describe 
that which he describes, and not other aspects of the work. The 
answer, if I am right, is that an exercise of aesthetic sensibility 
is involved in choosing the material for mention, however apparently 
neutral the terms in which it is mentioned. And of course the 
reservation must be inserted here that his aims· are divided: that in 
part his choice of matter is made as an historian, and not altogether 
as aesthetic commentator. Again, it will only be possible to offer 
very pure illustrations of all aspects of the thesis at once, if we 
invent them. 
Amongst the aesthetic remarks that are made, honorific 
originality1 is attributed to the work, as seen in relation to its 
historical and cultural context: 
It is, perhaps, the first example of its kind in Greek 
sculpture ... due to one unusual feature of the composition -
the locking of arms and legs, like harness, across the 
man's chest. 
And 
... for the sculptor of the Moschophoros has a feeling for 
convexity which is something new in the history of Attic 
sculpture; he is, in fact, the first Attic sculptor to 
whom working in three dimensions means working in the 
round. 
There are many occasions upon which a point is made or a 
description given in terms of a facsimile account of the sculpture. 
1 
See Chapters III to V, esp. V. 
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In fact, whenever Payne speaks of 'the calf ... ', 'the man .•. ' we must 
regard these as facsimile accounts of the marble carving if we are not 
to have our noses rubbed in the contradictions readily generated by a 
stubborn insistence that 'It is marble' and 'It is a man' are both 
object accounts of the thing described. These could, of course, be 
regarded not as facsimile accounts but as model accounts; and indeed 
would have to be so treated if the object had not been a sculpture in 
the round but, say, a shallow relief. The facsimile may be regarded, 
in such a situation, as no more than a particular case of the model, 
and it may be an unsettlable and unimportant question which account 
has been given on many occasions. That it is neither an object nor a 
picture account is all that may be unequivocally clear. 
There are, in this passage, several picture accounts of the 
sculpture, which at the same time are, or internally embody, aesthetic 
remarks: 
.•. the contour of the back (interrupted only by the 
projecting thigh bone) slanting easily away to the right. 
And: 
The shoulders are immensely broad, the chest narrows 
rapidly to an extremely narrow waist, and from the level 
of the navel the contour falls in a bold unbroken arc 
until it reaches the knee, giving great breadth to the 
hips and thighs. 
But object accounts, spatialists will be relieved to notice, are 
not lacking: 
The forms (for example in the face, chest, shoulders and 
arms) are admirably conceived in simple convex surfaces, 
rather like a landscape of compact and open downs. 
And: 
The rectangular - or rather cubical - structure of these 
earlier heads is still apparent, but it is modified: for 
the sculptor of the Moschophoros has a feeling for 
convexity which is something new in the history of 
Attic sculpture •.• 
It is characteristic of sustained passages of appraisal and 
criticism such as this, written without any doctrinaire aesthetic 
theory in mind, that the words and phrases work together in a most 
complex way; so that it seems almost intolerably clumsy to try to 
assign a single distinct and specific aesthetic role to each one in 
turn, as one might parse a sentence. A phrase might be a picture 
account, part of an aesthetic remark, a component of an attribution 
of either an intrinsic or a contextual property, and perhaps (a 
matter not touched upon here, but of fearsome complexity) a metaphor 
or some other figure as well. The easy mastery of such discourse is 
a little like the capacity to walk downstairs - one knows very well 
how only so long as one does not think about it too directly. And 
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just as capable steppers may be ignorant of neurology, physiology and 
the theory of dynamics, so sensitive and cultivated persons who are 
effective critics of the arts may be quite unable to comment upon 
their own practice in such terms as this thesis has sought to 
elucidate. 
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On the other hand, an adequate grasp of the character and 
relatedness of the several components of an activity so complex as 
aesthetic appraisal can hardly fail to save a bad critic from some 
of his more egregious errors. Whoever insists, for example, that 
the fact that a piece of sculpture looks alarmingly unstable from 
here must be totally irrelevant to the critical assessment of the 
sculpture (because a picture account and not an object account is 
given) is simply wrong: unless, that is, his claim is not really to 
be taken seriously in its overtly theoretical pretensions, but only 
as covertly rhetorical. If he is ready to admit: 'Yes, it does look 
topheavy from just here, but I don't think that's anything like so 
important a consideration as the fact that it .•. ', and so on, then 
he may well be a perceptive enough observer and a capable critic, 
although by now a self-confessed partisan in a battle of preferences. 
At this point one may wish to say, echoing Kant, that there is 
no disputing about matters of taste - provided it is well enough 
understood that although it may be a matter of taste which 
aesthetic considerations are, in a given situation, influential upon 
a given critic, it is not at all a matter of taste but a matter of 
eminently disputable fact which are the aesthetic considerations in 
that situation. I have argued, amongst other things, that if a 
sculpture has, from some point of view, a taut or a delicate profile 
(for example), then this is an aesthetic consideration no less than 
that it has (for example) a vigorous spatial movement. I have not 
argued - for it is not arguable - that a critic ~ be impressed by 
such a consideration; any more than that he ~ enjoy garlic in his 
food once he is persuaded that garlic is an edible vegetable widely 
employed as a seasoning. 
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